Probabilistic voting
Bruno Amable
University of Paris I
2011
Bruno Amable (Paris I)
Probabilistic voting
2011
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Median Voter models:
- Traditional work-horse model in many applications
- Focus on distribution of preferences. Distribution of preferenc

PE: Electoral Competition
Krzysztof Makarski
1
Electoral Competition
Assumptions
Starting point Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957).
Suppose that elections involve two identical politicians (or parties).
Politicians are opportunistic in the sense they st

Probabilistic Voting Model
Advanced Political Economics
Fall 2010
Vincenzo Galasso
PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODEL
Majoritarian voting model for two opportunistic
candidates (or parties)
Novelty: Voters have preferences over the policy
implemented by the win

Chapter 9
Backward Induction
We now start analyzing the dynamic games with complete information. These notes
focus on the perfect-information games, where each information set is singleton, and
apply the notion of backward induction to these games. We wil

Chapter 10
Application: Negotiation
Negotiation is an essential aspect of social and economic interaction. The states negotiate their borders with their neighbors; the legislators negotiate the laws that they make;
defendants negotiate a settlement with t

Chapter 13
Application: Implicit Cartels
This chapter discusses many important subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies in optimal cartel, using the linear Cournot oligopoly as the stage game. For game theory they
provide many applications of single-deviati

Chapter 14
Static Games with Incomplete
Information
So far we have focused on games in which any piece of information that is known by
any player is known by all the players (and indeed common knowledge). Such games
are called the games of complete inform

Chapter 15
Static Applications with Incomplete
Information
This chapter is devoted to economic applications with incomplete information. They
are meant to illustrate the common techniques in computing Bayesian Nash equilibria
in static games of incomplete

Chapter 16
Dynamic Games with Incomplete
Information
This chapter is devoted to the basic concepts in dynamic games with incomplete in
formation. As in the case of complete information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium allows
players to take suboptimal actions i