Solution for Problem Set 1 (Questions 1-6)
Econ 106D Winter 2015
The additional explanations in italics would not be required on an exam. In particular, the description
of the run of DA in questions 3 and 4 is optional because these questions on the probl
Notes for Lecture 3
Theory of Matching (Part 1)
Marek Pycia
April 6, 2015
The problem sets and exams build on the material from the
notes. You can rely on the notes during exams.
This note introduces the economic model of two-sided matching, the concept o
Econ 106D. Problem Set on Two-Sided
Matching
Marek Pycia
April 8, 2015
This problem set is intended to give you a comprehensive review of exam-grade material
on two-sided matching. The problem set is optional and ungraded. It will be discussed
in sections
Notes for Lecture 4
Theory of Matching (Part 2)
Marek Pycia
April 8, 2015
This note starts by looking at side-optimal stable matchings
and provides a way to check whether there is a unique stable
matching. It then discusses participants incentives in repo
!
Economics 106D and 106DL: Designed Markets, Spring 2015
https:/moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/15s-ECON106D-1
Marek Pycia
[email protected]
!
DESIGNED MARKETS
!
We will discuss the design and use of markets and other institutions to solve problems
The Evolution of the Labor Market
for Medical Interns and Residents:
A Case Study in Game Theory
Alvin E. Roth
Universi t y of Pittsburgh
The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking it
New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization
1/28/14, 10:40
What follows is an electronic reprint of the article
Roth, A.E. "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," Science, 250, 1990, 1524-1528.
New Physicians: A Natu
Econ 106D (2pm). Final Exam Solutions
March 14, 2011
Please answer questions and provide arguments when asked
Please make sure to connect the argument to the problem at hand stating the denition does not count as an
argument. For instance, if you are aske
Solution Problem Set on Auctions
Econ 106D
Spring 2013
May 29, 2013
1. As shown in the lecture notes, an optimal bidding strategy is to bid ones
true value.
2. According to the notes, the expected second highest when there are N
agents whose values are dr
Solutions: Problem Set on Reserve Prices
Econ 106D
Spring 2013
June 8, 2013
1. As shown in the lecture notes, an optimal bidding strategy for each bidder
is to bid ones true value. Notice that from the bidders perspective, the
reserve price is like an add
Econ 106D. Additional Practice Questions for the Final Exam
Marek Pycia
May 29, 2013
These are additional practice questions : the solutions will be posted early next week. Please
think about the answers to questions and about the arguments. An argument s
Econ 106D (4pm). Final Exam
Marek Pycia
March 14, 2011
Please answer questions and provide arguments when asked for. Please make sure to connect
the argument to the problem at hand stating the definition does not count as an argument.
For instance, if you
Econ 106D (2pm). Final Exam
Marek Pycia
March 14, 2011
Please answer questions and provide arguments when asked for. Please make sure to connect
the argument to the problem at hand stating the definition does not count as an argument.
For instance, if you
Solutions: Additional Questions on Reserve
Prices
Econ 106D
Spring 2013
June 11, 2013
1. As shown in the lecture notes, an optimal bidding strategy for each bidder
is to bid ones true value.
2. For a given R, the expected revenue (R) of the seller equals:
Econ 106D. Problem Set on Reserve Prices in Auctions
Marek Pycia
June 2013
The problem set is intended to give you a comprehensive review of exam-grade
material on reserve prices in auctions. The problem set is optional and ungraded. It
will be discussed
Econ 106D. Problem Set on Auctions
Marek Pycia
May 2013
The problem set is intended to give you a comprehensive review of exam-grade
material on auctions. The problem set is optional and ungraded. It will be discussed
in sections, and the solutions will b
Econ 106D. Additional Questions on Reserve Prices in Auctions
Marek Pycia
June 2013
A monopolistic seller has a single indivisible good for sale. There are two potential
bidders; each bidder i = 1, 2 has value vi for the auctioned good. Each vi is an inde
Econ 106D: Notes for Lecture 14
Marek Pycia
February 26, 2014
Abstract
This note (i) shows how to construct equilibria of the rst-price auction with many bidders,
(ii) shows that both rst-price and second-price auctions are ecient in the setting we study,
Econ 106D Midterm Exam (2pm)
May 6, 2015
100 points: 10 questions, 10 points each. Please answer questions and provide arguments when
asked for. Please make sure to connect the argument to the problem at hand stating the denition
does not count as an argu
Econ 106D Midterm Exam (3:30pm)
Marek Pycia
February 12, 2014
100 points: 10 questions, 10 points each. Please answer questions and provide arguments
when asked for. Please make sure to connect the argument to the problem at hand stating
the denition does
Solution for Practice Final
Econ 106D Spring 2015
Part 1
1. Round 1:
A1
B4
C 2(rejected)
D2
Round 2:
A1
B4
C3
D2
Doctor-proposing DA matching: cfw_(A, 1), (B, 4), (C, 3), (D, 2)
2. Suppose there is such a matching and let x, y, and z be the hospitals othe
Econ 106D. Final Exam (2015)
Marek Pycia
June 7, 2015
4 parts, 100 points total. Please answer questions and provide arguments when asked for. Please make sure to
connect the argument to the problem at hand stating the denition does not count as an argume
Econ 106D Midterm Exam (3:30pm)
May 6, 2015
100 points: 10 questions, 10 points each. Please answer questions and provide arguments when
asked for. Please make sure to connect the argument to the problem at hand stating the denition
does not count as an a
Solution for Problem Set 3
Econ 106D Spring 2015
The additional explanations in italics would not be required on an exam.
1.
Denote the bidding strategy of i by bi .
b1 = b2 = b3 = 3 is strategy prole in a Nash equilibrium because each
bidder bids their t
Econ 106D. Problem Set on First-Price Auctions with Restricted Bid
Spaces.
Marek Pycia
May 18, 2015
The problem set is optional and ungraded. The problems will be discussed in sections, and the solutions will be posted. You may rely on all
results derived
Econ 106D. Problem Set on Second-Price Auctions with Restricted Bid
Spaces.
Marek Pycia
May 18, 2015
The problem set is optional and ungraded. The problems will be discussed in sections, and the solutions will be posted. You may rely on all
results derive
Solution for Problem Set 5
Econ 106D Spring 2015
The additional explanations in italics would not be required on an exam.
Since we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, denote the high value types bid by bH and
the low value types bid by bL .
1.
Econ 106D. First Problem Set on Auctions
Marek Pycia
May 13, 2015
The problem set is optional and ungraded. It will be discussed in sections,
and the solutions will be posted. You may rely on all results derived in class
notes without re-proving any of th
Solution for Problem Set 4
Econ 106D Spring 2015
The additional explanations in italics would not be required on an exam.
Since we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, denote the high value types bid by bh and
the low value types bid by bl .
1.
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SOLUTION PROBLEM SET 2: No-Transfer Allocation and Exchange.
(Part 1) School Choice
ECON 106D
The additional explanations in italics would not be required on an exam.
!
1. The allocation is efficient since nobody can be strictly better off without makin