Problem 5 In this scenario, she can practice two-part pricing. For each group, the number of token will be equal to quantity demanded at price $2, which is the marginal cost of a drink. Number of toke
Problems on Second degree Price Discrimination 1. Problem #5 on page 129 at end of chapter 6 (4th edition) 2. Problem #6 on page 129 at end of chapter 6 (4th edition) 3. A monopolist is doing second d
Eco 171 - Industrial Organization Second Midterm Exam
Name: Section:
Instructions
There are 6 short questions and 2 problems. Short questions are worth a total of 40 points and the problems a total o
Eco 171 - Industrial Organization Second Midterm Exam Instructions
Name: Section:
There are 6 short questions and 2 problems, each worth 1/3 of the total points. Answer in the space provided (no nee
Eco 171 - Industrial Organization First Midterm Exam Instructions
Name: Section:
There are 6 short questions and 2 problems. Short questions are worth a total of 40 points and the problems a total o
Problems on Third degree price discrimination
1. An event in a stadium was sold out. While 60% of the participants paid full price, the other 40% paid only half price. Some people that were willing to
Concentration and Profitability
Assume that we have N firms with different marginal costs We can use the N-firm analysis with a simple change Recall that demand for firm 1 is P = (A - BQ-1) - Bq1
Schedule and requirements
Requirements: The course will have 2 midterms and a final exam. The final grade is computed as follows: weight Midterms (best of 2) Final exam 40% 60%
Exams: Midterm 1: Feb 2
Econ 171 - Industrial Organization Second Midterm Exam - 2009 Instructions
Name: Section:
There are 6 short questions and 2 problems. Short questions are worth a total of 40 points and the problems a
Economics 101: Solution to Final Sample Questions
by Jiyeon
Written Questions
1.
QEW
QM S
MC
= 1600 50PEW
= 1500 100PM S
= AC = 3:5
a. Kasey cannot distinguish two markets.
3100
1600
Q = QEW + QM S =
Problems on Cournot and Bertrand competition 1. Suppose that an industry with 20 rms has a Herndahl index of 500. What can you conclude about the four-rm concentration ratio? Answer. If the Herndahl i
Industrial Economics=Econ 171 Lecture 1 George Stocking brilliant writer about Industrial Organization, "structure, conduct and performance" concentration George Stigler also a major writer, Univers
1. A restaurant chain has to choose how many stores to open in a city. Assume it oers free delivery. Then it will open a socially excessive number of stores. True or false. Explain. 2. A monopolist ca
Problems on Second degree Price Discrimination 1. Problem #5 on page 129 at end of chapter 6 (4th edition) 2. Problem #6 on page 129 at end of chapter 6 (4th edition) 3. A monopolist is doing second d
Problems on Second degree Price Discrimination
1. For each group, the number of tokens will be equal to quantity demanded at price $2, which is the marginal cost of a drink. Number
of tokens for stude
Problems on Third degree price discrimination
1. An event in a stadium was sold out. While 60% of the participants paid full price, the other 40% paid only half price. Some people that were willing to
Problem 3 (a) The demand functions for the two consumer groups are
X 1 = 200 P if P 200 , and X 1 = 0 if P 200.
X 2 = 50 1 P if P 100 , and X 2 = 0 if P 100 2
First consider the case when P 20
Solution to Practice Midterm 2
SHI, Wei
Question 1: Cooltime and Airlite
Cooltime and Airlite produce the same product and share the market demand
= 800 50 . The inverse demand is = 16 /50. Both of t
Problems on Product Dierentiation
1. Two rms are Bertrand competitors in a dierentiated products market where goods
are (imperfect) substitutes. Suppose demand functions are linear in both prices. An
Monopoly: Linear pricing
Econ 171
1
Introductory remarks: use of market power
OPEC share of the oilmarket: 52 percent in 1973, about 40
percent currently
Owns 70% of reserves
Since 1973 managed to kee
Price Discrimination and
Monopoly: Linear Pricing
Econ 171
1
The benefits of segmentation
Take example from last class:
P =100-Q and c =20
Result p =60, q =40, profits = 1600
Excluded consumers th
Concentration and Profitability
Assume that we have N firms with different marginal costs
We can use the N-firm analysis with a simple change
Recall that demand for firm 1 is P = (A - BQ-1) - Bq1
Oligopoly Models
Static vs. dynamic models
Characteristics of the markets
Homogeneous products
Differentiated products
Strategic considerations:
Decision variable role of prices vs. capacity cho
Price-Fixing and
Repeated Games
ECO 171
1
Collusion and cartels
What is a cartel?
attempt to enforce market discipline and reduce competition
between a group of suppliers
cartel members agree to co