Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 1
Due: Tues, 15th January.
1. Consider the following game. There are two players, 1 and 2. They will play either matching
pennies version A (as dened in class, where 1 moves rst), matching pennies version A, modied
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 2
Due: Tues, 22nd January.
0. In class we argued that the linear Cournot game with 2 rms is dominance solvable.
Given that the 1-rationalizable set is [0, (0)], the 2-rationalizable set is [ 2 (0), (0)], the 3ration
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 3
Due: Tues, 29th January.
1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along a boardwalk of length 1 mile. The price of icecream is xed by a regulator, so consumers go to the nearest rm because they dislike walking
(assu
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 4
Due: Tues, 5th February.
1. Recall this game from HW 2:
a
2,1
6,10
5,0
8,1
1,3
A
B
C
C
E
b
4,2
2,20
0,0
2,4
2,6
c
1,0
0,10
3,3
0,0
0,4
d
10,3
7,15
5,0
5,1
8,5
e
2,4
0,18
0,1
4,2
1,3
Completely characterize the set
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 7
Due: Tues, 26th February.
1. Practicing Equilibrium Concepts: Consider the following game played by two parties,
A and B. First, nature chooses either C or D. C is chosen with probability 0.7, and D is
chosen with
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 6
Due: Tues, 19th February.
1. Fighting an Unknown Opponent: Consider the following strategic situation. Two opposed armies are poised to seize an island. Each army general can choose either attack or
s
notattack. I
Eco201B, Winter 2013
Board/MtV
Homework 5
Due: Tues, 12th February.
1. Consider an asymmetric all-pay auction between two bidders whose values are common
knowledge. The object is worth v to Bidder 1 and v to Bidder 2 where v > v. Both bidders
simultaneous