Econ 106G Spring 2015
Solution to Homework 2: Applications of Nash Equilibrium
1. Protecting LAZ: LAZ airport has a domestic and a international terminal but only one security team
(player 1) that can
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Homework 1: Dominated Stratgies, Best Responses
The due date for this homework is Monday April 13th in class.
1. Game Theory Concepts, True-False: For each of the following state
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Homework 2: Applications of Nash Equilibrium
The due date for this assignment is Monday April 27th in class.
1. Protecting LAZ: LAZ airport has a domestic and a international ter
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Solution to Homework 1: Dominated Stratgies, Best Responses
1. True-False:
(a) False. Cooperate is not a best response to any beliefs in the prisonersdilemma.
(b) True.
(c) False
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Practice Problems 2 - Solution: Normal Form Games Application
1. Policy Setting with the Mean Rule: An odd number n of players have to set a
common policy, i.e. a number x 2 [0;
For the exclusive use of C. Hurley, 2014.
CASE: SM-176
DATE: 07/28/09
GOOGLES ANDROID: WILL IT SHAKE UP THE WIRELESS
INDUSTRY IN 2009 AND BEYOND?
We want people out there to use the Internet on their
Arbitrage
Professor Pierre-Olivier Weill
1
Last time
Measuring interest rate sensitivity:
Duration
Application of duration:
Immunization
Convexity
Pension fund example
2
Outline
Arbitrage defin
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Solution to Assignment 3: Extensive Form Games
The due date for this assignment is Monday May 18th.
1. Game Theory Concepts, True or False: Answer if the following statements are
Dr. Randall R. Rojas
Economics 106V
Department of Economics
Investments
UCLA
Fall, 2014
Midterm Exam
November 13, 2014
First Name
Last Name
UCLA ID #
TA/Section
Please do not start the exam until inst
Lecture 14 - Cooperation through Innitely Repeated Interaction
Watson: 22
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Innitely Repeated PrisonersDilemma
Consider the Repeated PrisonersDilemma
2
C
1 C 1,
D 2,
1
1
D
1, 2
0,
Lecture 10 - Commitment
Watson 15-16
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Commitment
War Game - Chicken
Consider the interaction between two armies. Each army can either F ight or Retreat. Each
army prefers to ght i
Lecture 11 - Bargaining
Watson 19
Econ 106G Spring 2015
In many economic scenarios, parties argue over how to divide some surplus, e.g. rm and
workers, partners in a partnership, interest groups in a
Lecture 9 - Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction
Watson - 14-15
Econ 106G Spring, 2015
Extensive Form Games and Game Trees
In many situations, players move sequentially, for example,
real games
Lecture 8 - Applications of Mixed Strategies
Watson - 11
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Expert Diagnosis
Consider a situation where a customer has a problem and relies on the advice of an expert
who selling he
Econ 106VL
Statistical and Probability Review
Professor Pierre-Olivier Weill
Linlin Ye
1
Outline
Practical information about the class
Random variables, probability distributions
Introduce todays l
Statistics Review
Prof. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Prof. Pierre-Olivier Weill
September 26, 2010
1
Introduction
Please study this handout carefully. It will be instrumental for your understanding of p
Problem Set 7
Investments
Prof. Pierre-Olivier Weill
Find investment strategies using Microsoft puts, calls and/or underlying stock, which best
express the investors objectives described below. Constr
Market Eciency
and Anomalies
Professor Pierre-Olivier Weill
1
Last 1me
Black and Scholes
Prices of calls and puts as a func1on of:
Price of the stock
Vo
Options and Derivatives
Professor Pierre-Olivier Weill
1
Last time
Binomial option pricing
Applies to the pricing of all derivatives!
2
Today:
Black-Scholes-Merton Formula
Assumptions
The formula
Options and Derivatives
Professor Pierre-Olivier Weill
1
Last time
Arbitrage pricing
Replicating portfolio
Dynamic trading strategy
Real world arbitrage strategy
Merger arbitrage
2
Example 3: Arbi
Lecture 13 - Cooperation through Repeated Interaction
Watson: 22
Econ 106G Spring 2015
The dilemma of the prisonershas it roots in the divergence of individual interests, to play
Def ect, and the soci
Lecture 12 - Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium
Watson: 15-16
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Entry into an Monopolistic Market
When we considered the entry game earlier we modeled the competition after entry by a
si
For the exclusive use of C. Hurley
SARIT MARKOVICH AND EVAN MEAGHER 09
KEL792
Hip to be Square:
Disruption in the U.S. Mobile Payment Market
Founded in San Francisco in 2009, Square finished 2012 as t
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Answers to Practice Problems 1: Basic Concepts, Dominated
Strategies
1
Basic Concepts
Sex-ratio Prisoners Dilemma and Run or Pass are games of complete
,
information. In Crying i
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Practice Problems 2: Normal Form Games Applications
You do not need to submit answers to these problems. I still encourage you to
think them through thoroughly, and write down yo
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Practice Problems 1: Basic Concepts, Dominated Stratgies
You do not need to submit answers to these problems. I still encourage you to
think them through thoroughly, write down y
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Solutions to Practice Problems 3: Applications of Normal Form Games
1. Game Theory Concepts, True or False: Answer if the following statements are
true or false. If they are fals
Econ 106G Spring 2015
Practice Problems 3: Applications of Normal Form Games
You do not need to submit answers to these problems. I still encourage you to think
them through thoroughly and write down