CHAPTER 21
21.3.1 {i} Svmmetrr:
i _ I . . . . 1 _
icntcl, then Eiai L=IaEU . which implies Sign [1:1cii] _
which in turn implies that Flare:
Let 1t:{l.2.,I} r {1.2.,I} be any permutatiun
. I
Sign[L=la
CHAPTER .18
18.5.1 Let [a*,v',pi he an equilibrium. Suppese that there is a cealitien S
that can impreve upeh 1t. Then, fer each i e S, there exist at}. e FEE and y E Y
such that 11.1». at and . 1:.
CHAPTER 14
14.8.1 The answer is yes, and the argument is supplied in footnote 8.
immediately after Lemma 14.3.1 in the textbook.
14.3.2 Now, the program cannot be split into a minimization program and
CHAPTER 13
I 9' 6.
0111 c at e
P315;on / C kt
/ :' .
, , 4:19)
Com e'ive A "x A
with / I [ease] / I [ease]
/ I / f
/_ I / I
L/ l I l
I l
9 G 9 9 ' G 9
Figure 133.1(1) depicts the situation in figur
X5 -1- E that represents 1-1. 1
Lil-".2 ireplies that the fanatieh u.1{-} has a maximiaer, aerated by 11".: e xii
1.
xi fer ever}r :ti e Xi. Thus :1. 1s
.h
Hence 11ifo 1' 11111.1, that is, 1-1. 1-.
1
CHAPTER 11
11.3.1 Note first that the technologies are CR5 so that producers will
either choose no production or will choose producing at full capacity. - Assume
that the prices of apples and honey in
CHAPTER 8
8.3.1 Firm i chooses hi to maximize din. + BULh.) - wiihilz. The
. .J J J
F._0.C. is: a: + 3(jnihjl - Zwihi = 0. The best response function for firm i is
~ 1 . . . .
therefore. hi [a + B (jg
CHAPTER 7
7 C 1 P12 6 r 1
Grand Empire
Central State
# ' "x
k _ _ E313L2_ _ )
Grand Email: Grand Empuc
Cam-:1 r Central Sm:
100 0 0 100
100 0 0 100
Figure 7 C 1
7.D.l Player i has M xM 21M x- - -
7.
CHAPTER 4
4.8.1 By Rays identitj.r [Prcpesitien 3.6.4} and viip,wil = aiip] + mpjwi.
1 1 wi
xiEp,wi] = - vw viEpwi} Jpviip,wi] : _ Mp} 'paifpl - hip]
i
Vb.
pip]
7.? hip} far all i. Since the rig
Solutions Manual
for
Microeconomic Theory
MasColell, Whinston, and Green
Prepared by:
Chiaki Ham
Cambridge Universizy
I lya Sega}
LHEVEHEQ» afCaffrm} Berkezey
S'tavé Tadelis
Hawaii-d Univemfry lNTROD
CHAPTER 2
2.13.1 Let 132 he the price cf the ccnsumpticn gccd iri hericd 2. measured in
units cf the cchsurhptich gccd in pericd 1. Let it], a2
levels in pericds l and 2. respectively. Then his lifeti
Chapter 9
Monopoly
As you will recall from intermediate micro, monopoly is the situation where there is a single seller
of a good. Because of this, it has the power to set both the price and quantity
Chapter 8
Externalities and Public Goods
8.1
What is an Externality?
We just showed that competitive markets result in Pareto optimal allocations that is the market
acts to make sure that those who va
Chapter 5
Producer Theory
Markets have two sides: consumers and producers.
Up until now we have been studying the
consumer side of the market. We now begin our study of the producer side of the market
Chapter 4
Topics in Consumer Theory
4.1
Homothetic and Quasilinear Utility Functions
One of the chief activities of economics is to try to recover a consumers preferences over all bundles
from observa
Chapter 2
Consumer Theory Basics
Recall that the goal of economic theory is to account for behavior based on the assumption that
actors have stable preferences, attempt to do as well as possible given
Chapter 7
Competitive Markets and Partial
Equilibrium Analysis
Up until now we have concentrated our eorts on two major topics - consumer theory, which led to
the theory of demand, and producer theory
Chapter 3
The Traditional Approach to
Consumer Theory
In the previous section, we considered consumer behavior from a choice-based point of view. That
is, we assumed that consumers made choices about