Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 1 Answers
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your
full name. Your answers are due the week of January 19 in your discussion section.
Late homeworks are not accepted. For
HW 5/6 Selected Ans:
Q1) Strategies: Pepsi : Accommodate, Tough Coke: [EAA, EAT, ETA, ETT, NAA, NAT, NTA, NTT] Normal Form : Construct an eight by two matrix and fill in the payoffs as follows. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. (EAA, A) , (EAT, A) : (1,2) (ETA, A), (ETT, A)
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 2 Answers
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your
full name. Your answers are due the week of January 26 in your discussion section.
Late homeworks are not accepted. For
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 1 1. IEDS: Find the outcomes for the following games. Show all the stages and clearly mention the dominated and the dominating strategies. GAME I :
L
T -1, 1 M 4, -2 B 3, 0
C
0, -33 2,1 4, 3
R
1, -10 1.5, 3 3, 1
GAME II :
L
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 6
Answer Key
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of March 2 in your discussion section. Late homeworks
are not accepted. For
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 2 1. Find the Nash equilibria of the following game. Note that NE will depend upon value of a.
2 C 1 C D
2 + 2a, 2 3, 0
D
3a, 3 1+ a, 1
2. Textbook, Exercise 42.1 3. Practice Question (Do not submit): Exercise 37.1. Verify
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 5
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of February 23 in your discussion section. Late
homeworks are not accepted. For full c
HW Solutions HW 1 1. Game I a. M strictly dominates T eliminate T. b. R and C strictly dominate L eliminate L. c. B strictly dominates M eliminate M. d. C strictly dominates R eliminate R. Thus the IEDS solution for this game is the strategy profile (B,C)
Econ 116A
Review for the Final
The Final Exam
Thursday, March 12, 2015 5-6:20pm in SSH 100 (regular class meeting).
Bring a blue book and something to write with.
You can bring a calculator and straight-edge if you like.
No notes or open book.
Sit every o
Game Theory, Econ 116A
Midterm Exam, Fall 2010
Instructions: You must keep your notes and books closed. Switch off your cell phones, laptops and any other electronic device that you may be carrying. The exam is of 50 points and the maximum time allowed is
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 4
Answer Key
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of February 9 in your discussion section. Late
homeworks are not accepted.
Economics 116A
Winter Quarter 2015
Midterm Examination
Answer Key
Instructions: Write your answers to all questions in your blue book. For full credit,
explain your answers carefully and be sure to show all of your work. Good luck!
1. Consider the followi
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 3
1. Exercise 31.2 2. Exercise 27.2 3. Practice Questions (Do not submit): Exercises 5.3, 6.1, 60.2. Verify your answers on the text website.
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 8 1. Exercise 173.4 2. (a) Find all the subgames of the game in Exercise 156.2c. (b) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. 3. Practice question: Exercise 210.2
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 5
Answer Key
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of February 23 in your discussion section. Late
homeworks are not accepted.
Economics 116A
Winter 2015
Homework # 7
Answer Key
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of March 9 in your discussion section. Late homeworks
are not accepted. For
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #4
Further Applications of
Simultaneous-Move Games
Why Best Response Functions?
As the number of players gets larger, it is
difficult to write a simultaneous move game in
strategic or normal form.
A two player game is
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #5
Expected Values and
Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Probability
Probability is a way of measuring the likelihood
of uncertain outcomes.
A probability is a number between 0 and 1,
inclusive.
A zero probability event never
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #6
Further Generalizations
of Nash Equilibrium and
Learning Nash Equilibrium
Generalizations of Nash Equilibrium
We have seen how the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium is a generalization of the pure strategy.
A pure str
Economics 116A
Winter 2016
Homework # 4
Answer Key
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are in lecture (not discussion section) on Tuesday, February 9, 2016. Be
sure to indicate yo
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #3
Continuous Action Games,
Best Response Functions and
Oligopoly Models
Best Response Functions
Last week we introduced the notion of a best
response function.
This week we are going to explore economic
applications o
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #1
Basic Game Theory Concepts
What is a Game?
There are many types of games, board games, card games, video
games, field games (e.g. football), etc.
We focus on games where:
There are 2 or more players.
There is some
Economics 116A
Winter 2016
Homework # 1 Answers
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your
full name. Your answers are due the week of January 18 in your discussion section.
Late homeworks are not accepted. For
Economics 116A
Winter 2016
Homework # 3 Answers
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your full
name. Your answers are due the week of February 1 in your discussion section. Late
homeworks are not accepted. For
Economics 116A
Winter 2016
Homework # 2 Answers
Write your answers to the following questions on separate sheets of paper. Include your
full name. Your answers are due the week of January 25 in your discussion section.
Late homeworks are not accepted. For
Economics 116A
Lecture Slides Week #2
Simultaneous Move Games,
Nash Equilibrium
Two Player Games in Normal Form
In introducing the concept of equilibrium, we are
going to start with 2 player, normal form games,
i.e., simultaneous move games with two play
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 5/6
1. Consider the three stage entry game number two (between coke and pepsi) discussed in class. a. Draw the game tree and write down the strategies of the two players. b. Solve the game by backward induction method. c. W
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 9 1. Consider the following extensive form game. Player 1 chooses between actions L and R. If L, then player 2 observes that and chooses between X and Y. If R, then the two play a simultaneous game 1 chooses between l and r
Econ 116A, Fall 2010 Homework # 7 1. (Centipede Game) Consider a two player game in which the players move alternately. On each move a player can either stop the game (S) or continue (C). A three stage game is played as below. If player 1 chooses S, the g