ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 3
1. Shy6.8.3. Consider a 3-rm version of the Stackelberg game. Assume
that market inverse demand is given by p = 120 Q, and suppose that
there are three rms that
ECON 321, Professor Hogendorn, Spring 2013
Midterm Exam
Each part of each question (a, b, c, etc.) is worth 5 points. Make sure to
allot your time accordingly. Total of 30 points, -1 for messiness, -2
ECON 321, Professor Hogendorn, Spring 2013
Midterm Exam Answers
1. In an address model, each consumers ideal product is located at
their address or location in a product space. When consumers
travel t
ECON 321, Class 21: Shy, Network Eects
1. Read Section 1.
2. Read Section 2. ese are oen called direct network externalities.
3. Read Section 3.0 and 3.1 carefully. Look at the review problem below
ca
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 1 Answers
1. Shy5-3_a.
1
2. KmartWalMart_a. In this case, Wal-Mart has M CW = 0.9 while Kmart has M CK = 1. So to begin, we nd the Cournot reaction function for a
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 3 Answers
1. Shy6.8.3_a. We have to work backwards, starting with stage 3. At that point, q1 and q2 are given, and firm 3 maximizes: max 3 = (120 - q1 - q2 - q3 )
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn, Spring 2009
Midterm Exam Answers
1. Chocolate. Two firms supply cacao at a wholesale market in Trinidad. Firm 1 has always had lower costs than firm 2, reflected by constant
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn, Spring 2009
Midterm Exam
Each part of each question (a, b, c, etc.) is worth 5 points. Make sure to allot your time accordingly. Total of 30 points, -1 for messiness, -2 for
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 1
1. Shy5-3. Suppose that a monopoly can price discriminate between two
markets: market 1 where the demand curve is given by q1 = 2 p1
and market 2 where the dema
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 4
1. AccBert. Suppose that in period 2 of a game, there are two firms that are differentiated Bertrand competitors with the demand system we worked with before: q
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 2 Answers
1. BertrandCollusion_a. (a) Firm 1's prot maximization problem is: max 1 (p1 , p2 ) = (p1 1)(1 0.3p1 + 0.1p2 )
p1
Its rst order condition is: = 1.3 0.6p
ECON 321, Prof. Hogendorn
Problem Set 2
1. BertrandCollusion. ere are two rms which are dierentiated Bertrand
competitors. ey have demand curves:
q1 = 1 0.3p1 + 0.1p2
q2 = 1 0.3p2 + 0.1p1
e rms have i
Economics 311
Problem Set 2
Prof. Jeffrey Naecker
1
Hot Hands and Misguided Fans
(a) Suppose that basketball players are, during any given game, in one of three states:
(a) Hot (they make 80% of their