ISyE6230
Midterm 2 Practice 2013
1. Consider a basic supply chain. In the centralized supply chain (CSC), the firm chooses the
quantity q to produce and sell based on a demand curve P = a bq and produ
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Spring 2013
Homework 5
Due: On-campus: April 18, 2013 (Thursday)
Distance-Learning: April 20, 2013 (Saturday)
Question 1 For the following extensive-form game,
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Spring 2013
Homework 1 Solution
1. (15) Consider the following payoff matrix:
Player II
BLUE
RED
blue
0, -2
5, 5
red
0, 3
0,0
yellow
6, 2
2, 0
white
5, 5
1, 0
Y
ISYE 6230-Economic Decision Analysis II
Spring 2013
Homework #3-Solutions
Problem 1. Individual article. (15 points)
Problem 2. A local coffee shop owner is considering introducing a sandwich stall in
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games III
Auctions
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 11, 2014 T
Auctions
A major application of Bayesian games is to auctions
A common method to allocate scare goods to individuals
with different v
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games IV
Auctions and Revelation Principle
Dr. Andy Sun
March 13, 2014 Th
A seller and a buyer have private valuations and :
A Double Auction
2
Assume drawn from independent uniform
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games VI
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Signaling Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Apr. 1, 2014 T
Equilibrium recap
Static games of complete information
Dynamic games of complete information
Su
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games V
Auctions and Revelation Principle
Dynamic Bayesian Games
Dr. Andy Sun
March 25, 2014 T
Bayesian Games
Games with incomplete information
Players do not have complete informat
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games II
Static Bayesian Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 6, 2014 Th
Example: One-card poker
2
A player is dealt an ace or king with equal
probability
One-Card Poker: Game Rule
Two players
On
ISyE 6230
Extensive Form Game IV
Repeated Game I
Repeated Game:
Subgame-Perfect N.E.
Infinitely Repeated Game:
Definition and Examples
Dr. Andy Sun
Feb. 18, 2014 T
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture (Feb 6,
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis
Homework 4 Spring 2016
Due: On-campus: April 14, 2016 (Thursday)
Distance-Learning: April 19, 2016 (Tuesday)
1. We discussed a Cournot game with incomplete informa
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games I
Static Bayesian Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 4, 2014 T
What we have covered:
Static games
Normal-form game
Dominant strategy, iterated dominant strategy
Nash equilibrium (pure and
ISyE 6230
Extensive Form Game V
Infinitely Repeated Game
Infinitely Repeated Game:
Trigger Strategy
Folk Theorem
Dr. Andy Sun
Feb. 20, 2014 Th
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture (Feb 18, T)
Finitely repeate
ISyE 6230
Dynamic Game I
Dynamic Game
Stackelberg Game
Game Tree
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan 28, 2014 Tues
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lectures
Static games: Games are played in one-shot
This Lecture
Dynamic games: G
ISyE 6230
Normal-Form Game V
Oligopoly
Dynamic Game
Bertrand Game
Comsumer surplus
Stackelberg Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 23, 2014 Th
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture:
Monopoly Model (quantity setting)
Cour
ISyE 6230
Normal-Form Game IV
Oligopoly Models: Cournot and Bertrand Competition
Dr. Andy Sun
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture:
This Lecture:
2
Mixed strategy
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
Best respon
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Introduction
Consumer Theory 1
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 12, 2016
1
What is this course about?
Individual Decision Making: Decision Theory
Modern Theory of Choice (Cons
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Consumer Theory 4
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 21, 2016
1
Outline of the lecture
Last lecture:
Given preferences axioms, what properties does utility function
have?
Consum
ISyE6230 Homework 3
Solution
Andy Sun
Problem 1 (a)
(i) Player I eliminates blue that is strictly dominated by white. Player II considers a
strategy that mixes RED and YELLOW by (1/3, 2/3), whose payo
ISyE 6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1 Solution
Spring 2016
Problem 1
1. Completeness satisfies when n = 1 due to the completeness of R. However, it does not
hold when n 2 since there are
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1
Due on Feb 2, 2016 (On-campus)
Due on Feb 9, 2016 (Distance-learning)
Problem 1: Identify preference relations.
As we have learned in class that a pre
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 3
Feb 26, 2016
Due on March 8, 2016 (On-campus) and March 15, 2016 (DL)
1. IESDS and Nash: In each iteration of the iterative elimination of strictly do
ISyE 6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1 Solution
Spring 2015
Problem 1
1. Completeness satisfies when n = 1 due to the completeness of R. However, it does not
hold when n 2 since there are
ISyE6230 Exercises for Final Exam
Spring 2015
Problem 1
Consider the following game:
(1,5)
u
u
[r]
(8,0)
Sender (Type = 1)
(5,2)
R
L
d
[q]
d
(0,0)
[p]
Receiver
Receiver
Nature
(3,8)
u
[1-p]
L
(3,2)
d
Problem 1
Let p = ( e, (1 ) g) and q = ( f, (1 ) h).
By Axiom 3, there exist e , f , g , and h such that e e0 := (e a1 , (1 e ) an ), . . . ,
h h0 := (h a1 , (1 h ) an ).
By Axiom 4, e > f and g > h .
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis
Homework 2
Feb 4, 2016
Due on Feb 16, 2016 (On-campus) and Feb 23, 2016 (DL)
Note: In this homework, the Axioms 1-6 refer to the axioms for the von Neumann-Morgenst
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 3
Feb 26, 2016
Due on March 8, 2016 (On-campus) and March 15, 2016 (DL)
1. IESDS and Nash: In each iteration of the iterative elimination of strictly do