ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Spring 2013
Homework 5
Due: On-campus: April 18, 2013 (Thursday)
Distance-Learning: April 20, 2013 (Saturday)
Question 1 For the following extensive-form game, derive the normal-form game and find all the purestrate
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Spring 2013
Homework 1 Solution
1. (15) Consider the following payoff matrix:
Player II
BLUE
RED
blue
0, -2
5, 5
red
0, 3
0,0
yellow
6, 2
2, 0
white
5, 5
1, 0
YELLOW
0, 0
5, 5
1, 3
0, 1
WHITE
2, 0
1, 0
1, 3
0, 6
1)
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis
Homework 4 Spring 2016
Due: On-campus: April 14, 2016 (Thursday)
Distance-Learning: April 19, 2016 (Tuesday)
1. We discussed a Cournot game with incomplete information in class, where firm 1 has a
constant marginal cos
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games V
Auctions and Revelation Principle
Dynamic Bayesian Games
Dr. Andy Sun
March 25, 2014 T
Bayesian Games
Games with incomplete information
Players do not have complete information about other players
payoff functions
Players privat
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games VI
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Signaling Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Apr. 1, 2014 T
Equilibrium recap
Static games of complete information
Dynamic games of complete information
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
Static games of incomple
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games IV
Auctions and Revelation Principle
Dr. Andy Sun
March 13, 2014 Th
A seller and a buyer have private valuations and :
A Double Auction
2
Assume drawn from independent uniform distributions on [0,1]
Seller names an asking price ;
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games III
Auctions
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 11, 2014 T
Auctions
A major application of Bayesian games is to auctions
A common method to allocate scare goods to individuals
with different valuations for these goods
Players have incomplete infor
ISyE 6230
Extensive Form Game IV
Repeated Game I
Repeated Game:
Subgame-Perfect N.E.
Infinitely Repeated Game:
Definition and Examples
Dr. Andy Sun
Feb. 18, 2014 T
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture (Feb 6, Th)
Extensive-form game:
Backward induction for perfec
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games II
Static Bayesian Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 6, 2014 Th
Example: One-card poker
2
A player is dealt an ace or king with equal
probability
One-Card Poker: Game Rule
Two players
One deck of cards, half aces, half kings
Each player puts
ISyE 6230
Bayesian Games I
Static Bayesian Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Mar. 4, 2014 T
What we have covered:
Static games
Normal-form game
Dominant strategy, iterated dominant strategy
Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed strategy)
Oligopoly markets: Cournot game, Bertr
ISyE 6230
Extensive Form Game V
Infinitely Repeated Game
Infinitely Repeated Game:
Trigger Strategy
Folk Theorem
Dr. Andy Sun
Feb. 20, 2014 Th
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture (Feb 18, T)
Finitely repeated game:
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
Properties of
ISyE 6230
Dynamic Game I
Dynamic Game
Stackelberg Game
Game Tree
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan 28, 2014 Tues
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lectures
Static games: Games are played in one-shot
This Lecture
Dynamic games: Games are played dynamically
Stackelberg game
Backward i
ISyE 6230
Normal-Form Game V
Oligopoly
Dynamic Game
Bertrand Game
Comsumer surplus
Stackelberg Game
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 23, 2014 Th
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture:
Monopoly Model (quantity setting)
Cournot Model
This Lecture:
Monopoly Model (price setting)
ISyE 6230
Normal-Form Game IV
Oligopoly Models: Cournot and Bertrand Competition
Dr. Andy Sun
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture:
This Lecture:
2
Mixed strategy
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
Best response correspondence
Implications on strictly dominated st
ISyE 6230
Extensive Form Game II
Understanding Extensive-Form Game:
Equilibrium Concepts for Extensive-Form Game:
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Backward Induction and Generalization
Dr. Andy Sun
Feb 4, 2014 Tue
1
Lecture Outline
Last Lecture
Dynamic ga
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Introduction
Consumer Theory 1
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 12, 2016
1
What is this course about?
Individual Decision Making: Decision Theory
Modern Theory of Choice (Consumer Theory)
Bayesian Decision Theory (Decision Making
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Consumer Theory 4
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 21, 2016
1
Outline of the lecture
Last lecture:
Given preferences axioms, what properties does utility function
have?
Consumers utility maximization problem
Derive demand function
ISyE6230 Homework 3
Solution
Andy Sun
Problem 1 (a)
(i) Player I eliminates blue that is strictly dominated by white. Player II considers a
strategy that mixes RED and YELLOW by (1/3, 2/3), whose payoff is (3, 7/3, 8/3)
if Player I chooses red, yellow, an
ISyE 6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1 Solution
Spring 2016
Problem 1
1. Completeness satisfies when n = 1 due to the completeness of R. However, it does not
hold when n 2 since there are uncomparable vectors. For example, (2, 1) and (1, 2)
ar
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1
Due on Feb 2, 2016 (On-campus)
Due on Feb 9, 2016 (Distance-learning)
Problem 1: Identify preference relations.
As we have learned in class that a preference relation % is a binary relation that at least s
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 3
Feb 26, 2016
Due on March 8, 2016 (On-campus) and March 15, 2016 (DL)
1. IESDS and Nash: In each iteration of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), any strictly dominated pure
ISyE 6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 1 Solution
Spring 2015
Problem 1
1. Completeness satisfies when n = 1 due to the completeness of R. However, it does not
hold when n 2 since there are uncomparable vectors. For example, (2, 1) and (1, 2)
ar
ISyE6230 Exercises for Final Exam
Spring 2015
Problem 1
Consider the following game:
(1,5)
u
u
[r]
(8,0)
Sender (Type = 1)
(5,2)
R
L
d
[q]
d
(0,0)
[p]
Receiver
Receiver
Nature
(3,8)
u
[1-p]
L
(3,2)
d
u
(2,0)
R
[1-r]
[1-q]
Sender (Type = 2)
(2,7)
d
Assume
Problem 1
Let p = ( e, (1 ) g) and q = ( f, (1 ) h).
By Axiom 3, there exist e , f , g , and h such that e e0 := (e a1 , (1 e ) an ), . . . ,
h h0 := (h a1 , (1 h ) an ).
By Axiom 4, e > f and g > h .
By Axiom 5, p p0 := ( e0 , (1 ) g 0 ) and q q 0 := ( f
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis
Homework 2
Feb 4, 2016
Due on Feb 16, 2016 (On-campus) and Feb 23, 2016 (DL)
Note: In this homework, the Axioms 1-6 refer to the axioms for the von Neumann-Morgenstern
(VNM) expected utility theory, i.e., completeness,
ISyE6230 Economic Decision Analysis II
Homework 3
Feb 26, 2016
Due on March 8, 2016 (On-campus) and March 15, 2016 (DL)
1. IESDS and Nash: In each iteration of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), any strictly dominated pure
ISyE 6740
Instructor:
Ben Haaland ([email protected]) 344 Groseclose
Class Meets:
Office Hours:
MWF 11:05am-11:55am (Mason 1133)
MWF 12:15pm-1:00pm. Please come prepared.
Web Address:
T-square
Class material available on our website includes:
S
ISyE 6230
Economic Decision Analysis II
Consumer Theory 2
Dr. Andy Sun
Jan. 14, 2016
1
What is this course about?
Individual Decision Making: Decision Theory
Interactive Decision Making: Game Theory
Modern Theory of Choice (Consumer Theory)
Bayesian Decis