Econ 104 - Problem Set 1 Solutions
Lorenzo Braccini
September 22, 2011
Problem 1
First note that if X and Y represent respectively the salary of a scientist
in thousands of dollars and in dollars, when X = x we have that Y =
1000x. This is true for any x

Econ 104 - Problem Set 5
Lorenzo Braccini
November 3, 2011
Question 1
a) As sucient condition for the coecients to be unbiased (jointly)
we can simply take, in this particular case, the usual assumption on
the conditional mean of the errors, i.e.:
E [Ui |

Midterm Solutions
Molin Zhong
October 28, 2011
1
1.1
Question 3
Part A
T estscore = 480.0 5.0 20 = 380 is the prediction of the classrooms average
test score.
1.2
Part B
2 5 = 10
The regression predicts that the average test score decreases by 10.
1.3
Par

Problem Set VI
Economics 212
Fall, 2010
1. Consider a two-person problem in which there is a single seller who owns an indivisible
object and single potential buyer of the object. Each agent has a value for the object that is
known to him but not known to

Econ 104 PS8 Solutions
Molin Zhong
December 17, 2011
1
Problem 1
1.1
Part A
The key conditions for the validity of the instrumental variable is that:
1. cov (z, x) = 0
2. cov (z, v ) = 0 where v is the error term
We know z is correlated with x.
Here, v =

ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 4
1.
a. There are essentially two states: G in which (B, B ) is expected to be played
and B in which (C, C ) is expected. Let Vi , i = G,

Problem Set IV
Fall 2010
Economics 212
1. The normal form game below is repeated innitely. Both players discount payo streams at the
discount factor . Consider the following strategies. Play B in the rst stage, and play B if (B, B )
or (C, C ) was played

Econ 104 - Problem Set 5
Lorenzo Braccini
December 7, 2011
Question 1
a) First note the following:
Qs = Qd 1 Pi = 0 0 + ud us
i
i
i
i
Now consider this fact:
Cov(1 Pi , us ) = Cov(0 0 + ud us , us )
i
i
i
i
= Var(us )
i
= 1 Cov(Pi , us )
i
Hence for 1 = 0

LGST 228: Sports Law
Fall 2011
Professor Andrew Brandt
TA: Hannah Gerstenblatt
Office Hours: By Appointment
COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course will introduce students to the core substantive areas of law relevant to the
business of sports, as well as the prac

Economics 104 Problem Set 4 Solutions
Molin Zhong
October 18, 2011
1
Problem 1
1.1
Part A
n
n
(c2 xi c2 x)(c1 yi c1 y )
1 =
i=1
=
n
(c2 xi c2 x)2
(xi x)(yi y )
c1 c2 i=1
c1
= 1
n
2
c2
c2
(xi x)2
i=1
i=1
0 = c1 y 1 c2 x = c1 y c1 1 x = c1 0
1.2
Part B
n
n

ECON 212 Game Theory (Honors)
Fall 2010
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set #1
1. Gibbons 1.3
Description of the game: I = cfw_1, 2, S1 = S2 = [0, 1], and
si if si + sj 1
ui (si , sj ) =
0 otherwise
Consider player 2s problem. Gi

ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2007
KyungMin Kim (Teddy)
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set #4
1. Let i (pi ; pj ) be rm i prot when rm i and j set price pi and pj respectively, i = 1; 2; i 6= j .
s
a. Suppose (p1 ; p2 ) is a price v

Problem Set I
The rst two problems are from Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics.
1. (Gibbons 1.3) Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar.
Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2 ,
where 0 s1 ,

From Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics
1.3 Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players
simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2 , where 0
s1 , s2 1. If s1 + s2 1, then the players receive the sh

SPAN21295010cotoo212
AdvancedSpanishSyntax
cap
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fecha .
materia
mir. 8
Introduccin al curso
sept.
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ejercicios
descargar y leer el programa y la
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vierne 10
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Lectura: Muerto y resucitado 1-3, Repaso del
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4-5 (A, C),

Math 432 Game Theory Fall 2010
Instructor Information
Professor: Jason Bandlow
Office Hours: W 3-5pm (This may change)
Email: [email protected]
Grader: Peter Du
Website: www.math.upenn.edu/~jbandlow
Grader Office: DRL 4C21
Office: DRL 4N63
Grader Of

Economics 002-2
Introductory Economics: Macroeconomics
Fall 2010
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
Course information
Meeting time & place:
Course website(s):
Monday and Wednesday 2:00-3:00pm, ANNENBERG 110
You need to attend also the rec

University of Pennsylvania
Department of Romance Languages
Spanish 215: Spanish for the Professions
Fall 2011
Instructor: Reyes Caballo-Mrquez, Ph.D.
E-mail: [email protected]
Office: Williams 411
Office Hours: MR 1-2
Course Description:
Spanish for the

STEVEN HOWE
ARBITRATION (1992)
O 1986 Commissioner Peter Ueberroth
wrote policy memorandum placing drug
testing under auspices of Commissioners
Office (Baseballs Drug Policy and
Prevention Program)
O Left-handed pitcher Steven Howe
hospitalized for drug-r

THE ROLE OF THE
COMMISSIONER
AND THE LAW
Chapter 1
The Commissioner
O Who should the commissioner be?
O What kind of power should the
commissioner have?
O What should the commissioners role be?
O What is the purpose of a commissioner?
O What background sh

History 048: Paper Assignment 1
Fall 2011
Please select one of the following questions. The assignment is to compose a six-page paper
requiring analysis and interpretation of key issues in imperial Russian history. Your response
should strive for clarity,

1
History 048: Imperial Russia, 1689-1905
Fall 2011
Professor Peter Holquist ([email protected])
Office hours: Monday,1:00-2:30 PM; Weds., 2:30-3:00PM
Grader: Mr. Hazanov
Office: College Hall 208-D
Mr. Hazanov will be available for office hours in th

Economics 212
Honors Game Theory
Andrew Postlewaite
Fall, 2010
This is an honors game theory class; permission is necessary to enroll.
Department policies: Students are responsible for making sure, at the beginning of the term, that they can attend the

ECON 212 Game Theory
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
FallECON
2010
University of Pennsylvania
KyungMin Kim (Teddy)
212 Game Theory
Fall 2007
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 6
1. a. Announcing his true valuation isSolution for Proble

ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 3
1. Osborne 163.2
The extensive game can be modeled as the following.
Players: i cfw_1, 2
Strategies:
s1 cfw_X, Y, Z
s2 = (s2 (X ), s

ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 2
1. Osborne 48.1
Let 2n + 1 be the number of citizens. The Nash equilibria of the game are as follows.
(i) n + 1 citizens vote for A and