n
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 9, due Tuesday April 24.
Question 1 )
Watson, chapter 26, question 2
Question 2 )
Watson, chapter 27, questions 2 and 6
Question 3 ) (Information might be harmful!)
Consider the following two-player game: Pla
n
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 6, due Thursday, March 22
Question 1 )
Watson, chapter 15, question 2 and 4
Question 2 )
Watson, chapter 16, questions 2, 7, and 8
Question 3 )Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling once proposed a solution to the p
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 6, answer key
1. Problem 2 on page 176 (chapter 15)
1. This game has 3 subgames: (1) the subgame following the move W by player 1;
(2) the subgame following the move Z by player 1; and (3) the game itself. The
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 4, answer key
1. Problem 3 on page 129 (chapter 11)
1. The normal-form game we are analyzing is
X Y
L
N
L
5; 5 x 15; 0
N
0; 15
10; 10
This game has two Nash equilibria: (L; N ) and (N; L).
The best response to
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2011
Problem set 7, answer key
1. Problem 1 on page 212 (chapter 18)
1. dJ = 0; dR = 0; vJ (x) = 10; 000
1
1
f0; 1g; J = 2 ; R = 2
6; 000x, vR (x) = 40; 000 + 4; 000x, x 2
The bargaining set is graphed below:
The joint value wh
Economics 212
Problem Set 5 Solutions
December 2, 2012
Steven Matthews
1. Problem 1 on chapter 18
(a) dJ = 0, dR = 0, vJ (x) = 10, 000 6, 000x, vR (x) = 40, 000 + 4, 000x, x cfw_0, 1, J =
R = 1
2
The bargaining set is graphed below:
The joint value when x
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2013)
Midterm exam #1
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators,
computers, phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3]
Answer all questions. [4] For full credit, you must show your
Economics 212
Fall 2012
Steven A. Matthews
University of Pennsylvania
Solutions to Exam 1
1
Closed books, notes, and calculators. 1 4 hours. 100 points.
Indicate your reasoning. Read all questions before answering any.
1. (30 pts) Dorothy (D) and John (J)
1
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2011)
Midterm exam #1
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full credit, you
Economics 101
Problem Set 2 Answer Key
Due September 25, 2012
Please indicate your recitation time/number and recitation instructor on your answer.
1
Denitions and Reading Comprehension
For each of the following, write a short denition, in words (one sent
Economics 101
Problem Set 6
Due November 21, 2012 at noon
Please indicate your recitation time/number and recitation instructor on your answer.
1
Denitions and Reading Comprehension
For each of the following, write a short denition, in words (one sentence
ECON 212 Game Theory
Spring Term 2012
PROBLEM SET 4
Due in class on Thursday February 23
Question 1
Watson, chapter 11, questions 3, 4, and 8
Question 2
An attack group commander has a single plane which can strike one of three possible targets.
The defen
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 5, answer key
1. Problem 2 on page 153 (chapter 13)
The partnership game we are analyzing is:
1 2
I
N
I
4,4 -4,9
N
2,-4 0,0
1. If the court imposes expectation damages, the induced game is represented by the
fo
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 3, answer key
1. Problem 3 on page 87 (chapter 8)
1. In the political game where each candidate seeks to maximize the number of votes
received, the preferences are the same as in the basic location game. Howeve
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 8, answer key
1. Problem 1 on page 271 (chapter 22)
We are analyzing a two-period repetition of the following stage game:
1 2 L
M R
U
8,8 0,9 0,0
C
9,0 0,0 3,1
D
0,0 1,3 3,3
Note that this stage game has 3 Nash
ECON 212 Game Theory
Spring Term 2012
PROBLEM SET 5
Due in class on Thursday March 1
Question 1
Watson, chapter 13, questions 2, 3, and 9
Question 2
Each of three players is deciding between the pure strategies go and stop. The payoff to go is
120/m where
ECON 212 Game Theory
Spring Term 2012
PROBLEM SET 2
Due in class on Thursday February 2
Question 1
Watson, chapter 4, questions 1 and 2
Question 2
Watson, chapter 6, questions 1, 2, and 7
Question 3
Watson, chapter 6, question 4 (the game of RockPaperScis
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 2, answer key
Question 1)
Watson, chapter 4, question 1: We are analyzing the following normal form game:
1 2 L
U
10, 0
M
2, 10
D
3, 3
1.
C
0, 10
10, 2
4, 6
R
3, 3
6, 4
6, 6
1. u1 (U; C) = 0
2. u2 (M; R) = 4
3.
ECON 212 Game Theory
Spring Term 2012
PROBLEM SET 1
Due in class on Thursday January 26
Question 1
Watson, chapter 2, questions 3 and 5
Question 2
Watson, chapter 3, questions 2, 3 [parts (a), (c), (e), and (f)], and 4
Question 3
Consider a setting in whi
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 9, answer key
1. Problem 2 on page 317
A strategy for player 1 is a number x1 , his contribution. A strategy for player 2 is
a pair (xL ; xH ), where xL is the contribution he makes when his type is 2 and xH is
1
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2012)
Midterm exam #2
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full credit, you
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2012)
Midterm exam #2 Answer key
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full cre
1
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2012)
Midterm exam #1 Answer key
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full c
1
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2012)
Midterm exam #1
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full credit, you
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2012)
Final exam
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 120 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full credit, you must s
Economics 212 Honors
Spring 2009
Steven A. Matthews
University of Pennsylvania
Solutions to Midterm 1
1
Closed books, notes, and calculators. 1 4 hours.
Indicate your reasoning.
100 points total.
1. (15 pts) Consider the following game.
X
Y
Z
A
0; 2
3; 1
1
ECON 212- Game Theory (Spring 2011)
Midterm exam #1
Important: [1] This is a closed-book exam. No books, notes, calculators, laptop
computers, cell phones. [2] You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. [3] Answer
all questions. [4] For full credit, you
ECON 212-Game Theory
Spring 2012
Problem set 1, answer key
Question 1)
Watson, chapter 2, question 3: (Note that we have not specied payos)
Watson, chapter 2, question 5: Amy moves rst and chooses H or F. Then Bart
moves and chooses H or F; if he chooses