University of Pennsylvania
Department of Romance Languages
Spanish 215: Spanish for the Professions
Fall 2011
Instructor: Reyes Caballo-Mrquez, Ph.D.
E-mail: reyca@sas.upenn.edu
Office: Williams 411
Office Hours: MR 1-2
Course Description:
Spanish for the
LGST 228: Sports Law
Fall 2011
Professor Andrew Brandt
TA: Hannah Gerstenblatt
Office Hours: By Appointment
COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course will introduce students to the core substantive areas of law relevant to the
business of sports, as well as the prac
STEVEN HOWE
ARBITRATION (1992)
O 1986 Commissioner Peter Ueberroth
wrote policy memorandum placing drug
testing under auspices of Commissioners
Office (Baseballs Drug Policy and
Prevention Program)
O Left-handed pitcher Steven Howe
hospitalized for drug-r
THE ROLE OF THE
COMMISSIONER
AND THE LAW
Chapter 1
The Commissioner
O Who should the commissioner be?
O What kind of power should the
commissioner have?
O What should the commissioners role be?
O What is the purpose of a commissioner?
O What background sh
History 048: Paper Assignment 1
Fall 2011
Please select one of the following questions. The assignment is to compose a six-page paper
requiring analysis and interpretation of key issues in imperial Russian history. Your response
should strive for clarity,
1
History 048: Imperial Russia, 1689-1905
Fall 2011
Professor Peter Holquist (holquist@sas.upenn.edu)
Office hours: Monday,1:00-2:30 PM; Weds., 2:30-3:00PM
Grader: Mr. Hazanov
Office: College Hall 208-D
Mr. Hazanov will be available for office hours in th
Economics 212
Honors Game Theory
Andrew Postlewaite
Fall, 2010
This is an honors game theory class; permission is necessary to enroll.
Department policies: Students are responsible for making sure, at the beginning of the term, that they can attend the
ECON 212 Game Theory
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
FallECON
2010
University of Pennsylvania
KyungMin Kim (Teddy)
212 Game Theory
Fall 2007
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 6
1. a. Announcing his true valuation isSolution for Proble
ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2007
KyungMin Kim (Teddy)
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set #4
1. Let i (pi ; pj ) be rm i prot when rm i and j set price pi and pj respectively, i = 1; 2; i 6= j .
s
a. Suppose (p1 ; p2 ) is a price v
ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 4
1.
a. There are essentially two states: G in which (B, B ) is expected to be played
and B in which (C, C ) is expected. Let Vi , i = G,
ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 3
1. Osborne 163.2
The extensive game can be modeled as the following.
Players: i cfw_1, 2
Strategies:
s1 cfw_X, Y, Z
s2 = (s2 (X ), s
ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 2
1. Osborne 48.1
Let 2n + 1 be the number of citizens. The Nash equilibria of the game are as follows.
(i) n + 1 citizens vote for A and
ECON 212 Game Theory (Honors)
Fall 2010
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set #1
1. Gibbons 1.3
Description of the game: I = cfw_1, 2, S1 = S2 = [0, 1], and
si if si + sj 1
ui (si , sj ) =
0 otherwise
Consider player 2s problem. Gi
Problem Set VI
Economics 212
Fall, 2010
1. Consider a two-person problem in which there is a single seller who owns an indivisible
object and single potential buyer of the object. Each agent has a value for the object that is
known to him but not known to
Problem Set IV
Fall 2010
Economics 212
1. The normal form game below is repeated innitely. Both players discount payo streams at the
discount factor . Consider the following strategies. Play B in the rst stage, and play B if (B, B )
or (C, C ) was played
Problem Set V
Fall, 2010
1. Consider an industry characterized by Bertrand competition with dierentiated products in which two rms choose prices p1 and p2 . Demand for rm is output is qi (pi , pj ) =
12 pi + 1 pj , where pi and pj are respectively rm is p
Economics 212
Fall 2008
Problem Set II
Osborne:
48.1
49.1
69.1
114.3
(From Gibbons, 1.12)
Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the following normal-form game.
L
R
T 2, 1 0, 2
B 1, 2 3, 0
Problem Set I
The rst two problems are from Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics.
1. (Gibbons 1.3) Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar.
Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2 ,
where 0 s1 ,
From Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics
1.3 Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players
simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2 , where 0
s1 , s2 1. If s1 + s2 1, then the players receive the sh
Econ 104: Introduction to Econometrics
University of Pennsylvania, Fall 2011
Instructor: Xu Cheng
E-mail: xucheng@econ.upenn.edu
O ce: 3718 Locust Walk, McNeil Building, Room 527
Lecture: Tuesday and Thursday 10:30am-12:00pm
O ce Hours: Tuesday and Thursd
Econ 104 - Problem Set 3 Solutions
Lorenzo Braccini
October 4, 2011
Problem 1
a) First note that:
E [Yi |Xi ] = 0 + 1 Xi
Therefore we have that:
E [Yi |Xi = 1] E [Yi |Xi = 0] = 1
where Yi is the probability of causing an accident and Xi is the color
of th
Econ 104 - Problem Set 5
Lorenzo Braccini
December 7, 2011
Question 1
a) First note the following:
Qs = Qd 1 Pi = 0 0 + ud us
i
i
i
i
Now consider this fact:
Cov(1 Pi , us ) = Cov(0 0 + ud us , us )
i
i
i
i
= Var(us )
i
= 1 Cov(Pi , us )
i
Hence for 1 = 0
Econ 104 - Problem Set 5
Lorenzo Braccini
November 3, 2011
Question 1
a) As sucient condition for the coecients to be unbiased (jointly)
we can simply take, in this particular case, the usual assumption on
the conditional mean of the errors, i.e.:
E [Ui |
Problem Set 2 Solutions
Molin Zhong
September 25, 2011
1
1.1
Problem 1
Part A
The coecient of the regression is 0.10, which is positive. This makes sense,
as one would expect that as a students ACT score goes up, her GPA should
increase as well. The inter
Econ 104 - Problem Set 1 Solutions
Lorenzo Braccini
September 22, 2011
Problem 1
First note that if X and Y represent respectively the salary of a scientist
in thousands of dollars and in dollars, when X = x we have that Y =
1000x. This is true for any x
Midterm Solutions
Molin Zhong
October 28, 2011
1
1.1
Question 3
Part A
T estscore = 480.0 5.0 20 = 380 is the prediction of the classrooms average
test score.
1.2
Part B
2 5 = 10
The regression predicts that the average test score decreases by 10.
1.3
Par
Econ 714 - Midterm Solutions
Lorenzo Braccini
October 28, 2011
Question 1
Let X be a Bernoulli distributed Random Variable with parameter p.
Dene Z = 3X 1.
First note that Z is a Random Variable taking values on the set cfw_0, 2
with probability:
P(Z = 0)