Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Grading works like this: There are 3 questions and each have 4 parts. Each part is worth 4
points, so the total number of points on the exam is 48. Points are awarded in general
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will com
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will com
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will
Problem Set 1
1. Games in Strategic Form: Do questions 1-4 and one of 5a, 5b, or 5c
Underline all best responses, then perform iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. In each case, do you
Problem Set 2: Do one of 3a and 3b, and one of 6a, 6b, or 6c
1. Solve for the row players mixed strategy in the following games:
a.
B
L
R
U 2, 3 0, 0
A D 0, 0 1, 4
For the Row players strategy: Eucolu
Problem Set 3
(1.) Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection: Find all subgameperfect equilibria of the following games. Explicitly write down the behavior
strategies that support a subgame-perfect e
Problem Set 4
1. Imagine an alternating-oer bargain game, but instead of discounting future payos by and
keeping the size of the pie xed at 1, assume that in each period the value of the pie is reduce
Problem Set 5
1. There are two players facing each other in the following random prisoners dilemma:
S
C
S
2,2
xr , 1
C
-1, xc
0,0
With probability p, xc = y , and with probability 1 p, xc = 0. With pr
Problem Set 6
1. There are two types of customers: high value types who occur with probability p and low
types who occur with probability 1 p. A rm sells two kinds of goods: high quality, and low
qual