Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Grading works like this: There are 3 questions and each have 4 parts. Each part is worth 4
points, so the total number of points on the exam is 48. Points are awarded in general like this:
4 - The answer is correct, though there mi
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Problem Set 1
1. Games in Strategic Form: Do questions 1-4 and one of 5a, 5b, or 5c
Underline all best responses, then perform iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. In each case, do you get a unique prediction for the outcome of the game? Fi
Problem Set 2: Do one of 3a and 3b, and one of 6a, 6b, or 6c
1. Solve for the row players mixed strategy in the following games:
a.
B
L
R
U 2, 3 0, 0
A D 0, 0 1, 4
For the Row players strategy: Eucolumn (L) = Eucolumn (R) , so that 3U + 0D = 0U +
4D . Not
Problem Set 3
(1.) Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection: Find all subgameperfect equilibria of the following games. Explicitly write down the behavior
strategies that support a subgame-perfect equilibrium (dont just point out
the equilibrium path th
Problem Set 4
1. Imagine an alternating-oer bargain game, but instead of discounting future payos by and
keeping the size of the pie xed at 1, assume that in each period the value of the pie is reduced
by one In the rst period, v1 = V , in the second v2 =
Problem Set 5
1. There are two players facing each other in the following random prisoners dilemma:
S
C
S
2,2
xr , 1
C
-1, xc
0,0
With probability p, xc = y , and with probability 1 p, xc = 0. With probability p, xr = y , and
with probability 1 p, xr = 0.
Problem Set 6
1. There are two types of customers: high value types who occur with probability p and low
types who occur with probability 1 p. A rm sells two kinds of goods: high quality, and low
quality. The high value types have value 10 for the high qu