We aren't endorsed by this school 
ECON 398  University Of Michigan Study Resources

Econ398_HW2Solutions
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
Econ 398 Homework 2 Sketchy Solutions 1. There are four Nash Equilibria; each one involves one of the four writing down $3, while the other three each write down $10. Notice that in a strategy profile where two players, say Alice and Bertha, write do

Homework6
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
I; NotM.R.: 'uq () M I 0" 0 l, '1. ", 0 H '110.: C( S h. ~ 1'1"L '133~ C(<'1/ tcfw_ oN 3qg HoM wOf( K 0 q, It.t IJ ( ffo 0,0 1. I ( J, .2, ! tS )'/ I ,:ts 0,0 (j) v V\L \, "1 ( I I 1., ,15 ~+rvvJjJ 'T/ NA(L I CL1t ~ Jfro;1 ) I (. fV1L,.A ( It I ~ (

Strategy11Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/9/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies In Matching Pennies, we found there was no Nash Equilibrium Guildenstern Heads Rosencrantz Heads Tails 1, 1 1, 1 Tails 1, 1 1,1 Why Mixed Strategies? If you were to play the same opponent repeatedly, you wou

Strategy12Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/14/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bimatrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1p Heads H d Tails 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 1q Tails 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 Preferences Involving Gambles We revisit our description of pa

Strategy1Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/10/2008 Personnel for Econ 398: Strategy Econ 398: Strategy A Study of Strategic Interaction in Games Chris Proulx Lorch Hall M107 rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: Tu, Th 10:3011:30 Instructor: Chris Proulx, rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: TuTh 10:3011:3

Strategy2Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/10/2008 Analyzing Games We need three things to specify a game Players Possible strategies for each player Payoffs for eac p aye o e ou co es ayo s o each player over outcomes Analyzing Games Players have welldefined and wellbehaved preferences over o

Strategy15Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/29/2008 Expert Advice We often rely on professionals to diagnose problems and recommend and carry out fixes Doctors Auto Mechanics and Repair Technicians p Lawyers Financial Advisors and Real Estate Agents Teachers and Researchers Expert Advice A custo

Strategy13Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/16/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bimatrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1p Heads H d Tails 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 1q Tails 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies Rosencrantz's & Guildenstern

Strategy14Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/23/2008 Your Choice of Gambles A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 Your Choice of Gambles $3000 $0 $3000 $0 B1= B2= .25 .75 1 0 A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 B1= B2= $0 .25 .75 1 0 $3000 $0 $3000 $0 .75 It turns out that if you preferred A1 t

Strategy16Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/30/2008 Midterm 2: Next Tuesday Exam focuses on new material Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 Lectures 816, HW 46 Signaling with Strategic Uncertainty Otto Stag Ludwig Stag Hare 2,2 1,0 Hare 0,1 1,1 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or ip

Strategy17Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
11/10/2008 Spence: Education as a Screen Education does not affect productivity Two types of people Able types worth $150,000 Challenged types worth $100,000 $100 000 Types are indistinguishable, can't be tested Spence: Education as a Screen SelfSelectin

Strategy10Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/2/2008 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday Covers up through Chpt. 5 & HW 3 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or ipods allowed Calculators must be simple nongraphing simple, nongraphing, noncomplex, noncomputerlike calculators with one memory registe

Strategy9Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
10/1/2008 Simultaneous/Sequential Mix Up We might wish to model situations involving both sequential and simultaneous moves We can combine the concepts of Nash Equilibrium with Rollback to analyze such q y games Consider a somewhat complex relationship be

Strategy8Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/24/2008 Upheaval in Financial Markets A panel of distinguished alumni from the Department of Economics will discuss the ongoing crisis in financial markets. Speakers include: David Berson MPP `79; PhD `82 econ D id B Peter Borish, P t B i h AB `81; MPP

HW3
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
Econ 398 Homework 3 Due Sept. 26, 2008 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 2b, 2c. 2) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 3b, 3c. 3) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problem 10. 4) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 5, problem 3. 5) Alice and Bob are each considering c

HW6Sol
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
Econ 398 Homework 6 Suggested Solutions 1) Use the characterization from class to check for mixedstrategy Nash Equilibria. First note that there are four pure strategy equilibria, each where one person drives Straight, and the other person either swerves

Roywchen_12608_1534Econ_398_Practice_Exam_3
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
Practice Exam 3 (1 3) Mckouwski & Miller, a consulting firm wants to hire some workers for its vacant positions. There are 2 types of jobs: challenging and mundane and two types of workers: highly productive and less productive. In a challenging job, the

Roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
Econ 398: Summary of topics relevant to Midterm 2 Simultaneous and sequential games Changing the rules/order of play Portraying games in different forms o Sequential games strategic/normal form o Simultaneous games extensive form Subgames Subgameperfect

Strategy3Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/10/2008 Homework Due Friday 4PM Hand homework into your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4PM Extensive Form Games  Strategies A strategy is a complete plan of action Tells a player

Strategy4Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/11/2008 Simultaneous Move Games Extensive form games capture the timing structure of sequential move games Often games are simultaneous, or the sequential nature doesn't matter q Tennis serve Production planning Bidding for a contract Voting Example Was

Strategy5Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/15/2008 Finding Nash Equilibria We'd like a method for finding NE Player 2 1 A Player 1 B C D 5,7 2,6 3,9 0,0 2 6,4 15 , 3 2,6 0,1 3 11 , 12 1,0 19 , 9 9 , 17 4 8 , 22 7,2 6,5 17 , 12 Example Attributed to A.W. Tucker Two Prisoner's brought in for inter

Strategy6Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/18/2008 MAXIMIN MINIMAX 9 soldiers, three are 5 feet tall, three are 6 feet tall, three are 7 feet tall 5 7 6 6 5 7 7 6 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 A Note About Equilibria Some games Get feel for what an equilibrium might be Show that if everyone does it

Strategy7Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
9/23/2008 Imperfect Competition We consider competition in a market with a linear demand curve: Q = D( P) = 302 P Inverse demand: P = 302 Q First think of a monopolist with cost C (Q) = 2Q Monopolist seeks to maximize profit: Imperfect Competition: Courno

Strategy18Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
11/11/2008 Bayes Rule Bayes Rule A B A B Universe of Possibility P[A&B] = P[BA]P[A] = P[AB]P[B] P[BA] = P[AB]P[B] / P[A] Bayes' Rule Bayes' Rule P[BA] = P[AB]P[B] / P[A] = P[AB]P[B] / (P[AB]P[B] + P[AB]P[B] ) Bayes Rule Consider testing for a pa

Strategy19Handout
School: University Of Michigan
Course: Strategy
11/13/2008 Strategic Moves Change the rules of the game to benefit yourself Usually involves making a pregame move 1st Actions must be Observable Irreversible Strategic Moves Strategic moves are to deter or compel Unconditional commitments Try to change

Ch18_solutions_solved Edit
School: University Of Michigan
Solutions to Chapter 18 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. The father and daughter were implicitly negotiating about how much freedom from parental control she would have. The fathers BATNA was low: breakdown of negotiation would lead to a tantrum or a scene

Ch19_solutions_solved Edit
School: University Of Michigan
Solutions to Chapter 19 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) The existence of buyer B2 means that buyer B1 will not be able to buy at any price below 200. If B1 tried to strike a deal at (for example) 190, B2 could offer to pay 191; if B2 bought at that pri

Ch02_solutions_solved Edit
School: University Of Michigan
Solutions to Chapter 2 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) Assuming a sufficient supply of yogurt is available for all shoppers, each shopper is simply making a decision. If some flavors of yogurt were in short supply, then it would be a game, because shop

Ch03_solutions_solved Edit
School: University Of Michigan
Solutions to Chapter 3 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) There is one initial node (I) for Hansel making the first move; three decision nodes (D) including the initial node, which represent the points where either Hansel or Gretel make a decision; and si

Ch04_solutions_solved Edit
School: University Of Michigan
Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. A dominant strategy yields you the highest payoff available to you against each of your opponents strategies. Playing a dominant strategy does not guarantee that you end up with the highest of a