We aren't endorsed by this school

ECON 398 - University Of Michigan Study Resources
  • 1 Page Econ398_HW2Solutions
    Econ398_HW2Solutions

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 2 Sketchy Solutions 1. There are four Nash Equilibria; each one involves one of the four writing down $3, while the other three each write down $10. Notice that in a strategy profile where two players, say Alice and Bertha, write do

  • 7 Pages homework6
    Homework6

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    I; NotM.R.: '-uq () M I 0" 0 l, '1. ", 0 H '110.: C( S h. ~ 1'1"L '133~ C(<'1/ tcfw_ oN 3qg HoM wOf( K 0 q, I-t.t IJ ( ffo 0,0 1. I ( J, .2, ! tS )'/ I ,:ts 0,0 (j) v V\L \, "1 ( I I 1., ,1-5 ~-+rvvJ-jJ 'T/ NA(L I CL1t ~ J-fro;1 ) I (. fV1L,.A- ( It I ~ (

  • 4 Pages Strategy11Handout
    Strategy11Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/9/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies In Matching Pennies, we found there was no Nash Equilibrium Guildenstern Heads Rosencrantz Heads Tails 1, -1 -1, 1 Tails -1, 1 1,-1 Why Mixed Strategies? If you were to play the same opponent repeatedly, you wou

  • 5 Pages Strategy12Handout
    Strategy12Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/14/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads H d Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Preferences Involving Gambles We revisit our description of pa

  • 4 Pages Strategy1Handout
    Strategy1Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Personnel for Econ 398: Strategy Econ 398: Strategy A Study of Strategic Interaction in Games Chris Proulx Lorch Hall M107 rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: Tu, Th 10:30-11:30 Instructor: Chris Proulx, rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: TuTh 10:30-11:3

  • 4 Pages Strategy2Handout
    Strategy2Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Analyzing Games We need three things to specify a game Players Possible strategies for each player Payoffs for eac p aye o e ou co es ayo s o each player over outcomes Analyzing Games Players have well-defined and well-behaved preferences over o

  • 3 Pages Strategy15Handout
    Strategy15Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/29/2008 Expert Advice We often rely on professionals to diagnose problems and recommend and carry out fixes Doctors Auto Mechanics and Repair Technicians p Lawyers Financial Advisors and Real Estate Agents Teachers and Researchers Expert Advice A custo

  • 5 Pages Strategy13Handout
    Strategy13Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/16/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads H d Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies Rosencrantz's & Guildenstern

  • 3 Pages Strategy14Handout
    Strategy14Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/23/2008 Your Choice of Gambles A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 Your Choice of Gambles $3000 $0 $3000 $0 B1= B2= .25 .75 1 0 A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 B1= B2= $0 .25 .75 1 0 $3000 $0 $3000 $0 .75 It turns out that if you preferred A1 t

  • 3 Pages Strategy16Handout
    Strategy16Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/30/2008 Midterm 2: Next Tuesday Exam focuses on new material Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 Lectures 8-16, HW 4-6 Signaling with Strategic Uncertainty Otto Stag Ludwig Stag Hare 2,2 1,0 Hare 0,1 1,1 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or i-p

  • 3 Pages Strategy17Handout
    Strategy17Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/10/2008 Spence: Education as a Screen Education does not affect productivity Two types of people Able types worth $150,000 Challenged types worth $100,000 $100 000 Types are indistinguishable, can't be tested Spence: Education as a Screen Self-Selectin

  • 3 Pages Strategy10Handout
    Strategy10Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/2/2008 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday Covers up through Chpt. 5 & HW 3 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or i-pods allowed Calculators must be simple non-graphing simple, non-graphing, non-complex, non-computer-like calculators with one memory registe

  • 3 Pages Strategy9Handout
    Strategy9Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/1/2008 Simultaneous/Sequential Mix Up We might wish to model situations involving both sequential and simultaneous moves We can combine the concepts of Nash Equilibrium with Rollback to analyze such q y games Consider a somewhat complex relationship be

  • 3 Pages Strategy8Handout
    Strategy8Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/24/2008 Upheaval in Financial Markets A panel of distinguished alumni from the Department of Economics will discuss the ongoing crisis in financial markets. Speakers include: David Berson MPP `79; PhD `82 econ D id B Peter Borish, P t B i h AB `81; MPP

  • 1 Page HW3
    HW3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 3 Due Sept. 26, 2008 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 2b, 2c. 2) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 3b, 3c. 3) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problem 10. 4) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 5, problem 3. 5) Alice and Bob are each considering c

  • 1 Page HW6Sol
    HW6Sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 6 Suggested Solutions 1) Use the characterization from class to check for mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria. First note that there are four pure strategy equilibria, each where one person drives Straight, and the other person either swerves

  • 8 Pages roywchen_12608_1534Econ_398_Practice_Exam_3
    Roywchen_12608_1534Econ_398_Practice_Exam_3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Practice Exam 3 (1 3) Mckouwski & Miller, a consulting firm wants to hire some workers for its vacant positions. There are 2 types of jobs: challenging and mundane and two types of workers: highly productive and less productive. In a challenging job, the

  • 1 Page roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2
    Roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398: Summary of topics relevant to Midterm 2 Simultaneous and sequential games Changing the rules/order of play Portraying games in different forms o Sequential games strategic/normal form o Simultaneous games extensive form Subgames Subgame-perfect

  • 3 Pages Strategy3Handout
    Strategy3Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Homework Due Friday 4PM Hand homework into your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4PM Extensive Form Games - Strategies A strategy is a complete plan of action Tells a player

  • 3 Pages Strategy4Handout
    Strategy4Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/11/2008 Simultaneous Move Games Extensive form games capture the timing structure of sequential move games Often games are simultaneous, or the sequential nature doesn't matter q Tennis serve Production planning Bidding for a contract Voting Example Was

  • 3 Pages Strategy5Handout
    Strategy5Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/15/2008 Finding Nash Equilibria We'd like a method for finding NE Player 2 1 A Player 1 B C D 5,7 2,6 3,9 0,0 2 6,4 15 , 3 2,6 0,1 3 11 , 12 1,0 19 , 9 9 , 17 4 8 , 22 7,2 6,5 17 , 12 Example Attributed to A.W. Tucker Two Prisoner's brought in for inter

  • 3 Pages Strategy6Handout
    Strategy6Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/18/2008 MAXIMIN MINIMAX 9 soldiers, three are 5 feet tall, three are 6 feet tall, three are 7 feet tall 5 7 6 6 5 7 7 6 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 A Note About Equilibria Some games Get feel for what an equilibrium might be Show that if everyone does it

  • 3 Pages Strategy7Handout
    Strategy7Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/23/2008 Imperfect Competition We consider competition in a market with a linear demand curve: Q = D( P) = 302 P Inverse demand: P = 302 Q First think of a monopolist with cost C (Q) = 2Q Monopolist seeks to maximize profit: Imperfect Competition: Courno

  • 4 Pages Strategy18Handout
    Strategy18Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/11/2008 Bayes Rule Bayes Rule A B A B Universe of Possibility P[A&B] = P[B|A]P[A] = P[A|B]P[B] P[B|A] = P[A|B]P[B] / P[A] -Bayes' Rule Bayes' Rule P[B|A] = P[A|B]P[B] / P[A] = P[A|B]P[B] / (P[A|B]P[B] + P[A|B]P[B] ) Bayes Rule Consider testing for a pa

  • 3 Pages Strategy19Handout
    Strategy19Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/13/2008 Strategic Moves Change the rules of the game to benefit yourself Usually involves making a pre-game move 1st Actions must be Observable Irreversible Strategic Moves Strategic moves are to deter or compel Unconditional commitments Try to change

  • 3 Pages ch18_solutions_solved edit
    Ch18_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 18 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. The father and daughter were implicitly negotiating about how much freedom from parental control she would have. The fathers BATNA was low: breakdown of negotiation would lead to a tantrum or a scene

  • 2 Pages ch19_solutions_solved edit
    Ch19_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 19 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) The existence of buyer B2 means that buyer B1 will not be able to buy at any price below 200. If B1 tried to strike a deal at (for example) 190, B2 could offer to pay 191; if B2 bought at that pri

  • 2 Pages ch02_solutions_solved edit
    Ch02_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 2 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) Assuming a sufficient supply of yogurt is available for all shoppers, each shopper is simply making a decision. If some flavors of yogurt were in short supply, then it would be a game, because shop

  • 10 Pages ch03_solutions_solved edit
    Ch03_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 3 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) There is one initial node (I) for Hansel making the first move; three decision nodes (D) including the initial node, which represent the points where either Hansel or Gretel make a decision; and si

  • 7 Pages ch04_solutions_solved edit
    Ch04_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. A dominant strategy yields you the highest payoff available to you against each of your opponents strategies. Playing a dominant strategy does not guarantee that you end up with the highest of a

Back to course listings