Lecture 3 Notes: Expected Utilities
In the previous lecture, we considered decision problems in which the decision maker
does not know the consequences of his choices but he is given the probability o
Lecture 5 Notes: Stochastic Dominance
In this lecture, I will introduce notions of stochastic dominance that allow one to determine the preference of an expected utility maximizer between some lotteri
Lecture 6 Notes: Alias Paradox
In this lecture, I describe some well-known experimental evidence against the expected
utility theory and the alternative theories developed in order to accommodate thes
Lecture 2 Notes: Difficult Decisions
In the previous lecture I considered abstract choice problems. In this section, I will focus on
a special class of choice problems and impose more structure on the
Lecture 4 Notes: Risk Averse
In the previous lecture, we explored the implications of expected utility maximization. In
this lecture, considering the lotteries over money, I will introduce the basic n
Lecture 10 Notes: Information Game
In a complete information game, it is assumed that the players know exactly what other
players payos are. In real life this assumption almost never holds. What would
Lecture 9 Notes: Correlated Equilibrium
In this lecture, I will cover two important equilibrium concepts, namely correlated equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Correlated equilibrium relaxes the a
Lecture 8 Notes: Rational Decisions in Game Theory
The definition of a game (N, S, u1, . . . , un) implicitly assumes that
1. the set of players is N, the set of available strategies to a player i is
Lecture 1 Notes: Economic Preferences
1.1
Alternatives
Consider a set X of alternatives. Alternatives are mutually exclusive in the sense that one
cannot choose two distinct alternatives at the same t