Sample Midterm Answers (Given 2003)
1
Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common mistakes that students made in trying to answer the
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Sequential Equilibrium
In multi-stage games with incomplete information, say where payo s depend on initial
moves by nature, the only pr
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Normal Form Games
A normal (or strategic) form game is a triplet (N, S, U ) with the following properties
N = cfw_1, 2, . . . , n is a
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Existence and Continuity of Nash Equilibria
Follow Muhamets slides. We need the following result for future reference.
Theorem 1. Suppos
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2001 Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common
mistakes that students made in trying to answer the questions.
Pr
15.010/15.011
Sample Mid-Term Exam (given in Fall 2002)
Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common
mistakes that students made in tr
15.010/15.011
p. 1
2000 Sample Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
1) True, False, Uncertain
1a) TRUE. Without a log calculator, this problem requires that you translate a
percentage change in W to a percentage
15.010/15.011 Sample Mid-Term Exam (given in 1999)
1999 Sample Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
1) True, False, Uncertain
a) TRUE. Videos supplied by the two stores are substitutes. As the price charged by
t