Sample Midterm Answers (Given 2003)
1
Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common mistakes that students made in trying to answer the questions. Problem #1. True, False, Uncertain 1a) Unce
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Sequential Equilibrium
In multi-stage games with incomplete information, say where payo s depend on initial
moves by nature, the only proper subgame is the original game, even if players obse
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Normal Form Games
A normal (or strategic) form game is a triplet (N, S, U ) with the following properties
N = cfw_1, 2, . . . , n is a nite set of players
Si is the set of pure strategies o
14.126 GAME THEORY
MIHAI MANEA
Department of Economics, MIT,
1. Existence and Continuity of Nash Equilibria
Follow Muhamets slides. We need the following result for future reference.
Theorem 1. Suppose that each Si is a convex and compact subset of an Euc
15.010/15.011
p. 1
2001 Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common
mistakes that students made in trying to answer the questions.
Problem #1. True, False, Uncertain
1a) (Note: Problem 1a
15.010/15.011
Sample Mid-Term Exam (given in Fall 2002)
Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
Below you will find the answers to the mid-terms as well as a listing of some common
mistakes that students made in trying to answer the questions.
Problem #1. True, False,
15.010/15.011
p. 1
2000 Sample Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
1) True, False, Uncertain
1a) TRUE. Without a log calculator, this problem requires that you translate a
percentage change in W to a percentage change in price, and then compare the
resulting price
15.010/15.011 Sample Mid-Term Exam (given in 1999)
1999 Sample Mid-Term ExamAnswer Sheet
1) True, False, Uncertain
a) TRUE. Videos supplied by the two stores are substitutes. As the price charged by
the Hollywood store in Somerville increases, some people