Homework #4 Solutions
Problem 1
a. The lower bound is 1. If n is even, let X be (c, c), ., (b, b).), where
(c, c) is played for n/2 periods and (b, b) is played for n/2 periods. For n odd,
X = (c, c), ., (b, b), ., (a, a), where (c, c) is played for (n 1)
Exam 3
14.30 Fall 2003
Inst.:Herman Bennett
Instructions: This exam is closedbook and closednotes. You may use a simple calculator.
Please read through the exam in order to ask clarifying questions and to allocate your time
appropriately. You must show al
14.30 Exam 3 Solutions
Fall 2004
Bilal Zia
Question 1
(i) FALSE. Knowing the null distribution of a hypothesis test and the decision rule allows on to calculate but not .
(ii) FALSE. MLE estimators are consistent but not always unbiased. For
instance, the
14.30 Statistics - Fall 2003
Exam #3 Solutions
Prepared by Eric Moos
1. True, False, or Uncertain:
(a) False - Consistency does not necessarily imply unbiasedness. Consider the following estimator for
2 :
n
2
1 X
c
2 =
Xi X
n i=1
1
1
Since this estimator
14.12 Game Theory Midterm I
10/19/2010
Prof. Muhamet Yildiz
Instructions. This is an open book exam; you can use any written material. You have one
hour and 20 minutes. Each question is 25 points. Good luck!
1. Consider the following game.
(a) Using backw
14.44/14.444 Energy Economics, Spring 2006
Problem Set 2
Due Friday February 23, 2006 in class or Arthur Campbells mail folder
Late problem sets are not accepted
This problem set reviews your knowledge of multivariate regression analysis. It re
quires you
14.12 Game Theory
Muhamet Yildiz
Fall 2012
Homework 2
1. Consider the following game.
w
x
y
z
a
2,0
4,1
2,1
0,0
b
0,5
2,1
5,0
1,0
c
1,0
0,2
0,0
4,1
d
0,4
1,0
0,3
0,0
(a) Compute the set of rationalizable strategies.
We nd the rationalizable strategies by
Homework #3 Solutions
Problem 1
There are two subgames, or stages. At stage 1, each ice cream parlor i (I call it
rm i from now on) selects location xi simultaneously. At stage 2, each rm i
chooses prices pi . To nd SPE, we start from stage 2.
At stage 2,
14.12 Game Theory
Muhamet Yildiz
Fall 2012
Homework 1
Due on 9/25/2012
1. Consider a homeowner with Von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function u, where u (x) =
1 e x for wealth level x, measured in million US dollars. His entire wealth is his house.
The
Homework #5 Solutions
1. 1. As we are looking for symmetric BNE, suppose that in the equilibrium both players play
bidding strategy b that each type vj bids b(vj ) for some increasing dierentiable function.
From player is point of view, if he bids bi , hi
Exam 3
14.30 Fall 2004
Herman Bennett
Instructions: This exam is closedbook and closednotes. You may use a simple calculator.
Please read through the exam in order to ask clarifying questions and to allocate your time
appropriately. You must show all your