Repeated Games
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Repeated Games
In the original prisoners dilemma game, both players have strictly
dominant strategies; and the equilibrium that arises when both use
their dominant strategies provides a worse outcome for every pla
Problem Set 1
Introduction and Sequential Games
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. P
Class : ECON 221 003
Name: CHOI HAEWON / Student Number : 71567144
<Solutions to the Fable of Monks>
1. Two will commit suicide simultaneously after the announcement is made. The two monks will
check the mark on each others forehead on the first day. And
CHAPTER 2
U1. (a) This is a game, because the choice of funding may hinder or help the candidate run
against her opponent. For example, if her opponent had committed to public financing and
the public viewed private financing as serving special interests,
Econ 221 Notes
Juliana Kozak Rogo
email: [email protected]
Sept. 9/11
Chapter 2
1) Decisions vs. Games
Pre-conditions for a game
(1) Cross-effect of actions: what one does must affect the outcome for the other.
(2) Mutual awareness of the cross-effect:
Problem Set 4
Due Nov. 21
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. Please provide complete
Solutions to Chapter 8 Exercises
SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. False. A players equilibrium mixture is devised in order to keep her opponent indifferent among all of her (the
opponents) possible mixed strategies; thus, a players equilibrium mixture yields the oppo
Incomplete
Information Games
Incomplete Information Games
In our effort to develop models of games that allowed us to
understand more complex situations, we introduced the notion of
imperfect information.
In a game with imperfect information, a player doe
Problem Set 2
Due Oct. 11 (Friday)
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. Please provide
Problem Set 3
Due Nov. 18
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. Please provide complete
Repeated Games
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Repeated Games
In the original prisoners dilemma game, both players have strictly
dominant strategies; and the equilibrium that arises when both use
their dominant strategies provides a worse outcome for every pla
Solutions to Chapter 11 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. False. The players are not assured that they will reach the cooperative outcome. Rollback
reasoning shows that the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finitely played repeated prisoners dilemma will enta
Solutions to Chapter 10 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES
S1. The statement is true because promises, when successfully used as strategic moves, require that
you follow through on the promised action; you will not promise an arbitrarily large reward. You may thr
ECON 221
Introduction to Strategic
Thinking Mixed Strategies
Empirical Evidence
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
In soccer, penalty kicks pit the goalkeeper against a lone striker in a
mentally demanding contest.
Once the penalty-taker strikes the ball, it
University of British Columbia
Econ 221: Section 003
Introduction to Strategic Thinking
MIDTERM EXAM
Fall 2011
You have 50 minutes to complete this exam.
Please do not turn to page two until asked to.
Please provide the following information.
Last Name: .
Problem Set 3
Due Nov. 18
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. Please provide complete
14.12 Game Theory Lecture Notes
Reputation and Signaling
Muhamet Yildiz
In these notes, we discuss the issues of reputation from an incomplete information
point of view, using the centipede game. We also introduce the signaling games and
illustrate the se
Problem Set 4
Due Nov. 18
The assignment can be submitted individually or in groups of up to 4 students (one per group). Please
include the names and student ID of every member. The problem set must be typed or clearly handwritten. Please provide complete
Introduction to Strategic Thinking - Econ 221
Assignment 4: Due on Tuesday July 30th at the beginning of the lecture
Question 1
A kidnapper (lets call him K from now on) is deciding whether to kidnap a very important
businessman (lets call him B from now
Introduction to Strategic Thinking - Econ 221 summer 2013
Assignment 5: Optional - Due on Tuesday, August 6th at the beginning of the lecture
Question 1
There is a dispute in a local saloon in the Wild West, the Marshal arrives to restore order when
one o
Econ 221 Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Assignment 3 Mixed Strategies
Due Date: July 23rd at the beginning of the lecture
1. In this game two generals must decide to either attack or retreat, staying in place is not
an option. Each general would prefe
Econ 221 Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Assignment 2 Summer 2013
Due Date: July 16th at the beginning of the lecture
1. Mark and Julie play a simultaneous move game. Mark has three strategies: Top,
Middle and Bottom. Julie also has three available str
Econ 221 Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Summer 2013
Assignment 1 Sequential Games
Due: Tuesday July 9th at the beginning of the lecture
1) In the following games
Game 1
Game 2
a) How many pure strategies (complete plans of action) are available to eac
Repeated Games
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Repeated Games
In the original prisoners dilemma game, both players have strictly
dominant strategies; and the equilibrium that arises when both use
their dominant strategies provides a worse outcome for every pla
University of British Columbia
Vancouver School of Economics
Economics 221 (002 & 004)
Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Winter Session, Term 1, 2013
M. Vaney
Midterm Examination
S
NAME
Part Points Available
A.1
5
A.2
5
B.1
20
B.2
20
Total
50
Points Earn
University of British Columbia
Department of Economics
NAME:
Economics 221 (004)
STUDENT NUMBER:
Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Winter Session Term I, 2012
DISCUSSION GROUP / T.A.:
Midterm Examination
Time Allowed: 50 Minutes
Total Marks: 40
Answer BO
University of British Columbia
Department of Economics
NAME:
Economics 221 (002 & 003)
STUDENT NUMBER:
Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Winter Session Term I, 2010
DISCUSSION GROUP / T.A.:
Midterm Examination
Time Allowed: 75 Minutes
Total Marks: 60
ANS
University of British Columbia
Vancouver School of Economics
Economics 221 (002 & 004)
Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Winter Session, Term 1, 2014
M. Vaney
Midterm Examination
name
Part Points Available
A.1
5
A.2
5
B.1
20
B.2
20
Total
50
Points Earned
University of British Columbia
Econ 221 Introduction to Strategic Thinking
Name_Student ID_
Quiz 2 50 POINTS
Take home quiz Must be submitted individually. At the beginning of the class on Thursday. Point
penalization for every minute late.
Academic hones
Potential Test Questions:
1. What is source criticism? Include in your answer an overview of the documentary
Hypothesis?
2. Where and how does the concept of covenant figure within the Torah?
3. Explain the theory that there is a difference between the re
Complete INSTRUCTOR
MANAUL+SOLUTION MANUAL
for
Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition,
Avinash K. Dixit, David H. Reiley
Jr., Susan Skeath, ISBN-10:
0393931129, ISBN-13:
9780393931129
Ultimate Studying Resources
For Contact:
Email: [email protected]
Problem Set 2 (30 points)
Public Economics
DUE: October 20, 2014
Instructions: Finish all of the problems. I will only grade a selected few, but will check for
completion on all others.
1
By completion I mean showing all of your work and by selected few
t