Econ 421 Nash Equilibrium
You should be able to verify that this is a non-constant sum game, and that
there are no dominant strategy equilibria. If we find the Nash Equilibria by
elimination, we find that there are two of them. The upper middle cell and t
11/9/15
University of British Columbia, VSE
Econ 421: Extensive Form Games
Part II: Repeated Games
Professor Vitor Farinha Luz
Email: [email protected]
Office: 922 Buchanan Tower
Office hours: Th, 2-3pm
Repeated games
Repeated interactions are comm
10/29/15
University of British Columbia, VSE
Econ 421: Extensive Form Games
Part II: Repeated Games
Professor Vitor Farinha Luz
Email: [email protected]
Office: 922 Buchanan Tower
Office hours: Th, 2-3pm
Repeated games
Repeated interactions are com
10/15/15
University of British Columbia, VSE
Econ 421: Topic II
Extensive Form Games and
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Professor Vitor Farinha Luz
Email: [email protected]
Office: 922 Buchanan Tower
Office hours: Th 2-3pm
Announcements
OH change for
University of British Columbia, VSE
Econ 421: Topic II
Extensive Form Games and
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Professor Vitor Farinha Luz
Email: [email protected]
Office: 922 Buchanan Tower
Office hours: Th 2-3pm
Announcements
OH change for this week
ECON 421: Problem Set 1
September 30, 2015
Professor: Vitor Farinha Luz
Due on October 1st, in the beginning of class. No late problem sets will be accepted.
Always show the calculations leading to your nal answer.
Problem 1) Elimination of weakly dominat
ECON 421: Problem Set 2
October 30, 2015
Professor: Vitor Farinha Luz
Due on November 5th, in the beginning of class. No late problem sets will be accepted.
Always show the calculations leading to your nal answer.
Problem 1) Entry with Cournot
An entrant
Econ 421 Backward Induction
Many games involve simultaneous plays, or at least plays in which a player did not know
what strategy the others had followed until after he had made his move. However, many
games are sequential, and if a player knows the strat
Econ421CommonPrior
Akeyissueforthe(epistemic)rationalityofdisagreementiswhetherdifferentBayesians
canrationallyhavedifferentpriors.Bayesianswithdifferentpriorscouldeasilydisagree,
thoughtheywouldseenopointinofferinginformationtoresolveit.Butastandard
prac
ECON 421 Introduction to Game Theory
The Prisoner's Dilemma
We begin by considering a classic example of Bayesian deliberation, the Prisoner's
Dilemma. The statement of this problem is taken from the book The Logic of Decision by
Professor Richard Jeffrey
Incomplete information
Incomplete (or asymmetric) information: if one
player knows something relevant to their
payoffs, but the other players do not know.
May include their preferences, payoffs, their
available options, and even their beliefs.
Classify