1. A rich man is facing the risk of being ruined. He is an expected utility
maximizer. His initial wealth is 310 million. He has the option to fully
insure himself against the risk of ruin. It is known that when the risk
of ruin is 1/8, he is willing to p

1. Where possible apply the iterated elimination of sfrfctbr dominated strategies to
the sllowing strategic forms
[$.51]? E33] [LL-1) (1,-2) (0:2:
Prisoners'Dile1nmab cfw_2.11 cfw_at (we) .
cfw_LE (015') [37-1)
cfw_(1,0) (1,1) (2,1)]
(Hint: Remember tha

Also, would Lisa have made the same decision of her initial wealth was $1000000 instead? Note how the
initial wealth makes a difference in her choices.

Practice Problems
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
April 13th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
Problem 0.1. Solve the game on page 14 of the simultaneous game slides, i.e. compute all
Nash equilibria of this game, mixed or pure
Solution.
The normal form representation of th

Choice Under Uncertainty
Sam Hwang
January 14, 2016
1 / 76
Welcome to Econ 303-002
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Instructor: Sam Hwang (hwangii@mail.ubc.ca, IONA 205)
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TA: Anujit Chakraborty (anujit2006@gmail.com)
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Lecture: Tuesdays and Thursdays 12:30 to 14:00
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Instructor office

Practice Problems
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
April 13th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
Problem 0.1. Solve the game on page 14 of the simultaneous game slides, i.e. compute all
Nash equilibria of this game, mixed or pure
Problem 0.2. Represent the Bank Run game (on p

Problem Set III
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
March 11th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
This problem set is due on Friday March 18th. Slide it under my office door (IONA 205).
Problem 0.1. Find ALL Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the market entry game between Save
on Food

Problem Set V
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
March 25th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
This problem set is due on Friday April 1st. Slide it under my office door (IONA 205).
Problem 0.1.
(a) Find all Nash equilibria of the following game
(b) Find all subgame perfect equ

Problem Set 2
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
January 29th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
Submit your solution individually. You can either type or handwrite. The deadline is
February 5th, Friday.
1
Definitions
Problem 1.1. Let cfw_$x1 , $x2 , . . . , $xn denote a set o

Problem Set I
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
January 16th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
Submit your solution individually. The deadline is January 22nd, Friday. Throughout
this problem set, We are always going to assume that all decision makers Bernoulli utility
functi

Problem Set III
Intermediate Microeconomics 2
February 12th, 2016
Sam Hwang1
This problem set is due on Tuesday, February 23rd in class.
1
Definitions
Problem 1.1.
(a) In a game, what does it mean for X to be common knowledge?
(b) What does it mean for a

Econ 303 (001)
Winter Session, Term II, 2016
M. Vaney
Problem Set 2
This problem set is due Thursday February 4:
3
1. Market demand is Q = 300 2 P: In a duopoly market, rm 1 has marginal costs
c1 = 40 and rm 2 has marginal costs c2 = 40. There are no xed

Economics 303 (001)
Winter Session, Term II, 2016
M. Vaney
Extra Problems - A
This problem set is NOT due for marks. Solutions will be posted before February
22.
1. Bertrand with capacity constraints: Market demand D(p) is q = 10 p. Two rms
compete in pri