1.
Given a duopoly, under a Cournot game, players (firms) compete in _,
while in a Bertrand game, they compete in _.
A prices, qualities
.
B prices,
. quantities
C qualities,
. quantities
D quantities
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 9
Due Date: May 6th, 2015
1. Extensive game with simultaneous moves
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the following game. First player
1 chooses either A or B.
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2015
Homework 2
Due Date: Feb. 18th, 2015
1. Variant of Prisoners Dilemma with altruistic preferences (80 Points)
Each of two players has two possible actions, Quiet and Fink ; each
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 4
Due Date: March 23rd, 2015
1. Approval voting (40 points)
In the system of approval voting, a citizen may vote for as many candidates as she wishes. If there are t
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 9
Solution
1. Extensive game with simultaneous moves
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the following game. First player
1 chooses either A or B. After either ch
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 2
Due Date: Oct. 29th, 2014
1. Approaching cars (100 points)
Two cars are approaching an intersection from dierent directions. The
driver of each car can either stop o
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 4
Due Date: Nov. 25th, 2014
1. Extensive game with simultaneous moves
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the following game. First player
1 chooses either A or B.
AMS210 Homework 1
due Friday 1/9
Sec 1.2, Problem 4a
Consider the oil renery model. There are three reneries: 1,2, and 3 and from each barrel of
crude petroleum, the dierent reneries produce the follo
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 3
Due Date: Nov. 5th, 2014
1. Examples of extensive games with perfect information (45 points.)
(a) Represent in a diagram (see the following diagram for the entry gam
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2015
Homework 3
Due Date: Feb. 25th, 2015
1. A joint project (50 Points)
Two people are engaged in a joint project. If each person i puts in the
eort xi , a nonnegative number equal
Mixed Strategies
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
The Princess Bride (video)
The battle of wits: the man in black (Wesley) is to poison one of two
wineglasses out of Vizzinis sight
AMS 335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 1
Due Date: Oct. 22nd, 2014
1. Games with mixed strategy equilibria (30 points).
Find all the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the strategic games in Table
1. Keep i
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 4
Due Date: Nov. 19th, 2014
1. (Subgame perfect equilibria of the ultimatum game with indivisible units)
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the variant of the ulti
GEPA Life Practice Assessment! :)
Multiple Choice
Identify the letter of the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
1. A cat hisses when it sees a dog. The
Earth Science!
Multiple Choice
Identify the letter of the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.
_
_
_
_
_
_
1. The point beneath Earths surface where rock breaks under stre
10
Games with incomplete information:
the general model
Chapter summary
In this chapter we extend Aumanns model of incomplete information with beliefs in
two ways. First, we do not assume that the set
MaxMin Strategies
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
MaxMin Strategies (The Safety
Level)
Consider
a game, G, in strategic form. Namely, G = (, ) where N = cfw_1, 2, is the set
of p
Strategic Form Games
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
Games in Strategic Form
These games are characterized by
a set of players that are relevant to a specific conflict situation
Mixed Strategies
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
The Princess Bride (video)
The battle of wits: the man in black (Wesley) is to poison one of two
wineglasses out of Vizzinis sight
Extensive form games
Dynamic Games
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
Instructor: Tilsa Ore Monago
In the previous slides we dealt mostly with simultaneous strategic interactions
wh
Extensive form games
Dynamic Games
Game Theory
Stony Brook University
Prof. Yair Tauman
Instructor: Tilsa Ore Monago
In the previous slides we dealt mostly with simultaneous strategic interactions
wh
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 7
Due Date: April 22nd, 2015
1. Finding subgame perfect equilibria (30 points)
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the game in Figure 1.
Figure 1
2. Voting by alt
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 8
Due Date: April 29th, 2015
1. Subgame perfect equilibria of the ultimatum game with indivisible units
Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the variant of the ult
AMS335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 4
Due Date: March 23rd, 2015
1. Approval voting (40 points)
In the system of approval voting, a citizen may vote for as many candidates as she wishes. If there are t
AMS335/ECO355 Fall 2015
Homework 3
Due Date: Feb. 25th, 2015
1. A joint project (50 Points)
Two people are engaged in a joint project. If each person i puts in the
eort xi , a nonnegative number equal
AMS 335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 2
Due Date: Feb 18th, 2015
1. Variant of Prisoners Dilemma with altruistic preferences (40 Points)
Each of two players has two possible actions, Quiet and Fink ; ea
AMS 335/ECO355 Spring 2015
Homework 1
Due Date: Feb 11th, 2015
1. Another way of modeling working on a joint project (30 points)
Formulate a strategic game that models a situation in which two people