Learning game theory from Reinhard Selten
some thoughts for his 80th birthday
Oct 7, 2010
Roger Myerson
"Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory," J. Econ. Lit. 37 (1999)
http:/home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/research/jelnash.pdf
"Political econom
Stony Brook University, Fall 2014
AMS 335/ECO 355 Game Theory Lecture 01
Instructor: Zhenning Wang
E-mail: [email protected]
Oce Hours: 4:00pm5:00pm, Monday and Wednesday
Oce Address: N605, Social and Behavioral Sciences Building
Textbook: An I
AMS 335/ECO355 Fall 2014
Homework 1
Due Date: Oct. 22nd, 2014
1. Games with mixed strategy equilibria (30 points).
Find all the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the strategic games in Table
1. Keep in mind that pure strategy equilibria are special cases
MODELS OF STRATEGIC RATIONALITY
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY
General Editors: W. Leinfellner and G. Eberlein
Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences
Editors: W. Leinfellner (Technical University of Vienna)
G. Eberlein (Technical Univers
Working Papers
Institute of
Mathematical
Economics
23
August 1974
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept
for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games
Reinhard Selten
IMW Bielefeld University
Postfach 100131
33501 Bielefeld Germany
email: [email protected]
Minimally complex exchange mechanisms:
Emergence of prices, markets and money
Pradeep Dubeyy, Siddhartha Sahiz, and Martin Shubikx
15 April 2015
Abstract
We consider exchange mechanisms that accept oers of commodities and
redistribute everything they rece
On the Borel and von Neumann Poker Models
Chris Ferguson, Bright Trading, Westwood, California
Thomas S. Ferguson, University of California, Los Angeles
1. Introduction and Summary.
The study of two-person zero-sum poker models with independent uniform ha
The computational complexity of trembling hand
perfection and other equilibrium refinements
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen1 , Peter Bro Miltersen1? , and
Troels Bjerre Srensen2?
1
cfw_arnsfelt,[email protected]
Department of Computer Science
Aarhus University
Hello every one today Id like to indtroduce the first paper talked about the trembling
handreexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive
game, shelter,1974. From seltens paper we can know that, before his work, the word of
p
Notes on Strategic Bargaining
Vijay Krishna
March 2015
Two players have to split a pie of size 1: Let ui be player is utility function over
money. We suppose that ui is an increasing, concave function satisfying ui (0) = 0: Both
discount future utilities
AMS 335/ECO 355 Fall 2014
Midterm Exam
Name
: Solutions
ID No. : Solutions
Write your answers legibly and explain them clearly.
1. Prisoners dilemma. (18 points.)
Determine if each of the following game is a prisoners dilemma and explain
why if it is not.