Game Theory Practice Questions for Repeated Games
Answer key
1. Calculate the future value of $100 dollars deposited today, receiving 10% interest at the end of
each of three time periods.
FV = principal* (1+r)n = 100*(1+.10)3 = 100*1.331 = $133.10
2. Wha
1
Introduction to Game Theory
Practice Questions for ESS & Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
1. Review example 409.1 on page 409 in Osborne text.
2. Management schemes in capitalist businesses in the United States predominantly rely on strict job
ECON 190FS.01: An Intro to Game Theory
Find the traditional Nash equilibria for the following sequential game. Use backward induction
to show which ones are subgame prefect.
1
A
B
2
E
F
1
(5, 5)
G
(6, 8)
2
C
D
(10, 2)
H
1
I
(8, 5)
(2, 8)
Answer key:
For t
Keynes. General Theory
(I apologize for the sexist and heteronormative remarks though)
Or,tochangethemetaphorslightly,professionalinvestmentmaybelikenedtothosenewspaper
competitionsinwhichthecompetitorshavetopickoutthesixprettiestfacesfromahundred
photo
Ordinary Least Squares
(Based on a presentation by Dr. Robi Ragan)
 The question that OLS lets us ask is Holding everything else constant, what is the
effect of X on Y?
What is the effect of an increase in a childs allowance on the amount of
chores/tasks
1
Economics 190FS.01: An Introduction to Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium (From Osborne text)
Definition 23.1: Nash Equilibrium
ui (a*) ui (ai , a i*)
for every action ai of player i, where ui is a payoff function representing player is preferences.
Best Res
Economics 99FCS.01: An Introduction to Game Theory
Economics 99FCS.01: An Introduction to Game Theory
Name:_ Player: _
Partner's Name:_
Classic Games
Classic Games
Prisoner's Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma
Player 1
Confess
Don't Confess
Player 2
Confess
Don't
Emilia Sadni
October 16, 2012
Economics 190FS
Game Theory Project
ECON 190FS.01 An Intro. To Game Theory
Thesis for Research Project
The Nash equilibrium solution to the classic Prisoners Dilemma game
predicts that all players will defect and thereby, not
Introduction to Game Theory
Practice Questions for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Note: A symmetric, pure strategy set, (a*, a*), is an evolutionarily stable strategy if:
 (a*, a*) is a Nash equilibrium
AND

ui(b, b) < ui(a*, b) where b a* and b is a