Econ142
ProblemSet#6Solutions
Summer2013
1. For each of the following simultaneous, independent games (i) identify all pure strategy
Nash equilibria, (ii) identify the Nash equilibria (if any) that are payoff dominant, (iii)
and identify the Nash equilibr
Econ 142
Problem Set 1 Solutions
Summer 2013
1. Tom is a risk neutral, expected utility maximizer and cares only about his (final) income.
With probability p, he will catch a disease that reduces his income from y, its level when
he is healthy, to y k, wh
Econ 142
Problem Set 2: Probabilistic Judgment
Summer 2013
1. Anna (strictly) prefers lottery A = ($0, 0.1; $3000, 0.9) over lottery B = ($0, 0.55;
$6000, 0.45). She also (strictly) prefers lottery C = ($0, 0.99; $6000, 0.01) over lottery D
= ($0, 0.98; $
Econ 142
Problem Set 2 Solutions
Summer 2013
1. Anna (strictly) prefers lottery A = ($0, 0.1; $3000, 0.9) over lottery B = ($0, 0.55;
$6000, 0.45). She also (strictly) prefers lottery C = ($0, 0.99; $6000, 0.01) over lottery D
= ($0, 0.98; $3000, 0.02).
a
Econ 142
Problem Set 1: Uncertainty/Certainty
Summer 2013
1. Tom is a risk neutral, expected utility maximizer and cares only about his (final) income.
With probability p, he will catch a disease that reduces his income from y, its level when
he is health
Econ142
PracticeFinal
Summer2013
1. (From Crawfords 2008 Final) Consider the following 3 x 3 game.
2
1
T
M
B
L
7, 0
5, 0
0, 7
C
0, 5
2, 2
0, 5
R
0, 3
5, 0
7, 3
a. Find each players strictly dominated strategy or strategies, if any, and each
players strate
Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Midterm Solutions: Summer 2013
1. (18 pts) Lottery A = ($75, 1), lottery B = ($25, 0.2; $75, 0.6; $115, 0.2) and
lottery C = ($25, 0.6; $115, 0.4). Sheila prefers A over B and she also prefers C
over B.
a. Graph lotteri
Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Final Exam Solutions: Summer 2013
1. (16 pts) Consider two-person guessing game in the table below. In each game,
each player has her/his own target, lower limit, and upper limit. Players make
simultaneous guesses, whic
Econ 142
Problem Set 3: Probabilistic Judgment (Part 2)
Summer 2013
1. Consider a lottery that costs $1 to play. There are three urns, each with balls numbered 0
through 9. One ball is drawn from each urn, in effect generating a random three digit
number.
Econ 142
Problem Set 3 Solutions
Summer 2013
1. Consider a lottery that costs $1 to play. There are three urns, each with balls numbered 0
through 9. One ball is drawn from each urn, in effect generating a random three digit
number. The lottery is played
Econ 142
Problem Set 4: Intertemporal Preferences
Summer 2013
1. Consider a consumer faced with a vice good like potato chips, which he is tempted to
consume rapidly. The consumer can buy a large (2-serving) or small (1-serving) pack at
period 0. In perio
Econ 142
Problem Set 4: Intertemporal Preferences
Summer 2013
1. Consider a consumer faced with a vice good like potato chips, which he is tempted to
consume rapidly. The consumer can buy a large (2-serving) or small (1-serving) pack at
period 0. In perio
Econ100C
ProblemSet#5:GameTheoryReview
Summer2013
1. For each of the following simultaneous, independent games (i) identify any strategies that
are (strictly) dominated, (ii) find the set of rationalizable strategies, (iii) and identify the
Nash equilibri
Econ100C
ProblemSet#5Solutions
Summer2013
1. For each of the following simultaneous, independent games (i) identify any strategies that
are (strictly) dominated, (ii) find the set of rationalizable strategies, (iii) and identify the
Nash equilibrium.
a. B
Econ100C
ProblemSet#6:EquilibriumSelection&InitialPlayinGames
Summer2013
1. For each of the following simultaneous, independent games (i) identify all pure strategy
Nash equilibria, (ii) identify the Nash equilibria (if any) that are payoff dominant, (iii
Econ 142
Problem Set 7: Learning
Summer 2013
1. Consider a large population of people that are repeatedly paired at random to play Stag
Hunt. They adjust their strategies over time in a way that increases the population
frequency of the pure strategy that
Econ 142
Problem Set 7 Solutions
Fall 2012
1. Consider a large population of people that are repeatedly paired at random to play Stag
Hunt. They adjust their strategies over time in a way that increases the population
frequency of the pure strategy that h
Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Midterm 2 Solutions: Fall 2012
1. (25 pts) Mary is a basketball player that makes 75% of her free throws. Mark is a
fairly typical human being without knowledge of behavioral economics. He
incorrectly believes that she
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Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Midterm 2
November 16, 2012
Herb Newhouse
Your exam has 4 questions. Including this cover page the exam has 5 pages.
You can use a 8.5 by 5.5 sheet of
Name: _
(Please print neatly.)
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Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Midterm 1
October 22, 2012
Herb Newhouse
Your exam has 5 questions. Including this cover page and the table at the end, the exam
has 7 pages.
You can
Economics 142: Behavioral Economics
Final Solutions: Fall 2012
1. (14 pts) Lottery A = ($40, 1), lottery B = ($0, 0.25; $40, 0.5; $100, 0.25) and
lottery C = ($0, 0.5; $100, 0.5).
a. Graph lotteries A, B and C in our standard probability triangle with p1