Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
A.
You can only get so far with strict dominance-type
reasoning. Backwards induction seems impressive at first, but
it only works for fini
Backwards Induction notes
Backwards Induction
A.
In any game of complete and perfect information, each node
marks the beginning of what can be seen as another game of
complete and perfect information.
Infinitely Repeated Games notes
Infinitely-Repeated Games
A.
Few games literally last forever, but many games always
have a chance to continue. As long as they have that chance,
game theorists call th
Extensive and Normal Forms
Extensive and Normal Forms
A.
Standard consumer choice provides the basic building
blocks: game theory retains the standard assumption that
people maximize utility functions
Coordination and Ultimatum games notes
Coordination Games
A.
Another game with a high profile in both theoretical and
policy discussions is the Coordination game. Standard
representation:
Player 2
Pla
Monopoly and Contestability
Monopoly and Contestability
A.
You have all seen the standard monopoly model. The
monopolist maximizes PQ-TC, and sets MR=MC.
B.
Does this make sense in game theoretic term
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
A.
Talking about "pure strategy" NE strongly suggests a
contrasting concept of "mixed strategy" NE. Instead of just
asking whether any p
Subgame perfection
Subgame Perfection
A.
Suppose I threaten to fail any student who leaves early
from any class. If you believe my threat, you will not leave
early, and I will never have to impose my
Strictly and Weakly Dominant Strategies
Strictly and Weakly Dominant Strategies
A.
So what does game theory claim people do? It begins with
some relatively weak assumptions, then gradually strengthens
Reputation notes
Reputation
A.
B.
Cheat
Don't
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Economists frequently invoke reputation to explain seemingly
money-losing behavior. Does this make sense?
Yes. The logic of repeated