Wittman Ignorance notes
How to Think Like Wittman, I: Voter Ignorance Is Not a Serious Problem
Many public choice arguments, according to Wittman,
assume "extreme voter stupidity."
Normally, of course, public choice economists talk about
Voter Motivation and Cognition notes
The Interaction Between Voter Motivation and Cognition
Whey they analyze politics, economists standardly make two
I have argued that BOTH assumptions are wrong
Unpopular Policies notes
Does Policy Match Public Opinion? What Are the Unpopular Policies?
Now that we have a better grip on voter motivation, let
us return to the earlier question: Is the median voter model
It is hard to do formal empiric
Term and Spending Limits notes
Restrictions on Political Competition: Term Limits and Spending Limits
So far we've implicitly assumed that politicians compete
But elections have been increasingly regulated over the past
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics notes
Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics
There are many subject matters where irrational beliefs may
lead to inefficient policy.
But one subject matter that seems especially interesting for
Wittman Lack of Competition notes
How to Think Like Wittman, II: "Serious Lack of Competition"
Many other public choice arguments assume, in Wittman's
phrase, a "serious lack of competition."
While public choice economists spend a great deal of ener
State Level Policy notes
Application: State-Level Policy
There have been a number of empirical studies of state-level
Main findings: Variations in degree of liberalism are strong
predictors of variation in state policy. When public opinion i
Wittman Bureaucracy notes
Wittman's Sampler, III: Bureaucracy
Public choice economists have spent a lot of energy arguing
that the popular suspicions about "bureaucracy" are justified.
Bureaucracies supposedly exploit their monopoly power and
Voter Motivation and the SIVH notes
Is the Median Voter Model Correct?
In order to determine whether or not the median voter model is
we must first find out "What voters want."
Once we know what voters want, we can see whether actual
Sociotropic and Group Interested Voting notes
One major alternative to the SIVH, popular among many
political scientists, is called "sociotropic voting."
Sociotropic voting means voting for policies that maximize