Econ166a Fall2010
1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
ProblemSet4a
Sinervo/Musacchio
Harrington7.1 Harrington7.2 Harrington7.5 Harrington7.6 Considerthefollowinggame: R P S D R 0,0 2,2 1,1 2,3 P 2,2 0,0 1,1 2,3 S 1,1 1,1 0,0 2,3 D 3,2 3,2 3,2 4,4 FindanypureNEoranysymmetricm
Game Theory (econ 414)
Problem Set 2: Stable play in discrete games
Relevant reading: Harrington chapters 4, 5 and lectures 7-9.
Due date: Mar 4th
Instructions (read these carefully before starting):
Write your name (last name, rst name) and page number o
2
SOLUTIONS MANUAL
CHAPTER 3: ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE
3. For the Team-project game, suppose a jock is matched up with a sorority girl as shown in FIGURE PR3.3.
FIGURE PR3.3
Low Low 3,0 2,2 1,6
Sorori
Game Theory (econ 414)
Problem Set 3: Continuous games and mixed strategies
Relevant reading: Harrington chapters 6, 7 and lectures 10,11,13,14.
Due date: Mar 29th
Instructions (read these carefully before starting ):
Write your name (last name, rst name)
2-8
SOLUTIONS MANUAL
CHAPTER 2: BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION
request; (3) the UN requested inspections, Iraq acquiesced to the request, and WMD
were not found (that is, either Iraq doesnt have them or has them and hid them);
and (4) the UN re
Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete
Games with Two or Three Players
4
1. One of the critical moments early on in the The Lord of the Rings trilogy is the meeting in
Rivendale to decide who should take the ring to Mordor. Gimli the dwarf wont hear of
2-6
SOLUTIONS MANUAL
CHAPTER 2: BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION
5. The city council is to decide on a proposal to raise property taxes. Suppose Ms. Tuttle is
the chair and the Councils other two members are Mr. Jones and Mrs. Doubtfire. The
voti
SOLUTIONS MANUAL
CHAPTER 6: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES
ANSWER: A Nash equilibrium has both firms charging a common price p, where
10 p 15. Let us first convince ourselves that any such strategy pair is a Nash
equilibrium. It will be
First Midterm Review
About This Review Presentation
This presentation is to help you
understand the important concepts that
will be covered in the first mid-term.
This presentation reiterates key concepts,
but is not intended to cover every single
detai
Game Theory (econ 414)
Problem Set 3: Continuous games and mixed strategies
Relevant reading: Harrington chapters 6, 7 and lectures 10,11,13,14.
Due date: Mar 29th
Instructions (read these carefully before starting):
Write your name (last name, rst name)
Problem Set 2: Do one of 3a and 3b, and one of 6a, 6b, or 6c
1. Solve for the row players mixed strategy in the following games:
a.
B
L
R
U 2, 3 0, 0
A D 0, 0 1, 4
For the Row players strategy: Eucolumn (L) = Eucolumn (R) , so that 3U + 0D = 0U +
4D . Not
Suggested Solutions to Final Exam
ECON414: Game Theory
Spring 2011
1
1.1
Question 1
Part a
Since this game is symmetric, we can focus on the payoffs for firm A. When firm B plays High, firm A
should play High because she gets a payoff of -2 instead of -3;
First Exam
Solutions
ECON 414
Fall, 2016
1. Jim and Mike are going to play the following game. Mike has two strategies: Left and Right.
Jim has two strategies: Top and Bottom. They will choose their strategies simultaneously. Their
payoffs are
Mike
Jim
To
Problem Set 1
ECON 414
Fall, 2017
Problem Set 1 is due at 2:00 PM on Tuesday, September 19. You need to submit your
solutions through ELMS in a single PDF file.
1. Answer Problem 5 on page 89 in Harrington.
2. Answer Problem 10 on page 91 in Harrington.
3