Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Problem Set 1: Suggested Answers 1.
Prof. Peter Cramton
All the pure strategy equilibria are symmetric (i.e., each player plays the same strategy), since otherwise there exists a player that can do better by deviating
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PS 1, Q3 partial answers
Neil White
September 11, 2015
Since I didnt have time either of my sections to go over transitivity, local non-satiation, or continuity on
question 3, Ive written out the solutions below.
The preference relation given in the probl
Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Problem Set 4: Suggested Answers
Prof. Peter Cramton
1. & 2. Consider an n-bidder auction with valuations vi independently and identically distributed according to F(vi) on support [v, v] . Let the highest bidder pay
Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Problem Set 3: Suggested Answers 1.
Prof. Peter Cramton
Rubinstein's bargaining solution is (1 - - 2) where = e - t i , t>0 is the time between offers 2)/(1 1 i and i is player i's interest rate. We are interested in
Economics 703 Advanced Microeconomics Problem Set 2: Suggested Answers
Prof. Peter Cramton
1. By backward recursion, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is cfw_R, rl, indicated by in the extensive form.
1 L 2 l 1: 3 2: 1 r 1 4 l 2 3 R 2 r 4 2
Using the
In Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, Chapter 5, 115-138, 2006.
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom
Abstract We pr
The Optimality of Being Efficient
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton* University of Maryland 18 June 1999
Abstract In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by with
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton* University of Maryland 27 July 2002 (first draft: 8 November 1995)
Abstract Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and e