The Setup
Monday, November 18, 2013
11:37 AM
Model Setup Page 1
Model Setup Page 2
S2
Monday, November 18, 2013
11:44 AM
Model Setup Page 3
Model Setup Page 4
Efficiency
Monday, November 18, 2013
11:56 AM
Efficiency Page 5
Efficiency Page 6
E2
Monday, Nov
Welfare Theorems in Exchange Economies
Monday, October 21, 2013
10:54 AM
New Section 1 Page 1
New Section 1 Page 2
W2
Monday, October 21, 2013
11:01 AM
New Section 1 Page 3
New Section 1 Page 4
New Section 1 Page 5
W3
Monday, October 21, 2013
11:09 AM
New
Value Maximization and the Coase Theorem
Robert Becker
Econ E521 Fall 20101
These notes summarize some comments made in class about Value Maximization and the Coase Theorem.
Notation the same as in class. The commodity space is R+ R. Commodity bundles are
On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
Author(s): Lionel McKenzie
Source: Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr., 1954), pp. 147-161
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stable/1907539 .
The Variance Drain and Jensens Inequality
Robert A. Becker
Indiana University
March 19, 2012
Abstract
The well-known approximation of the dierence between the arithmetic average and geometric average returns as one-half of the variance
of the underlying r
American Economic Association
Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved
Author(s): Mark J. Machina
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer, 1987), pp. 121-154
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL:
Economic Theory 17, 739752 (2001)
Comparing risk aversion in a probability triangle
Robert A. Becker
Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
(e-mail: becker@ucs.indiana.edu)
Received: December 30, 1998; revised version: Feb
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4.1
BIMATRIX GAMES
INTRODUCTION
If the set of players of a normal form game is Q = cfw_1, 2 and strategy sets S1 , S2 are
nite, we talk about a bimatrix game. Although it is only a special case, we give here
fundamental denitions from the previous pa
G. Sagnol & R. Borndrfer
o
LV 19081: Lecture #2 Notes
Oct. 23, 2013
Lecture #2 Notes Summary
Zero-Sum matrix games: Saddle points, Minimax theorem
Bimatrix games: Classical examples, graphical method to nd mixed equilibria of 2 2games
A game in normal f
Bimatrix Games
R. Chandrasekaran
,
1
Bimatrix Games
These are two person non-zero-sum games in which each player has nitely
many pure strategies. We call these non-zero-sum games because the interests of the players is not required to be exactly opposed t
Economics E521
Theory of Prices and Markets I
(Microeconomic Theory)
Fall 2013
Instructor: Robert A. Becker, WY 214 (: 855-3014), email: becker@indiana.edu.
Time and Location: M, W: 2:30 - 3:45, Wylie Hall 101.
Review & Problem Session: F: 1:45 - 2:45 Bal
Indirect Utility Problem Set 2
Robert Becker
Econ Fall, 2013
There are three parts to these exercises the rst is about representation of preferences with indirect
utility. The second and third yield proofs that the indirect utility function is quasi-conve
E521 Minimum Income and Expenditure
Function Problems
Robert A. Becker
Indiana University
FALL 2013
1. Duality Theory I: Expenditure and Indirect Utility
Consider the following expenditure function dened for positive prices of
goods 0, and a given level
E521 Problem Set: Direct & Indirect Utility Theories
Professor Becker
Econ E521 Fall, 2013
1. Do the following problems in Riley.
(a) 2.2.4, page 64
(b) 2.2.6, page 65
(c) 2.3.2, page 72
2. Utility Theory I
There are goods and commodity vectors are points
Direct Utility Theory
Saturday, September 28, 2013
2:33 PM
Direct Utility Page 1
Direct Utility Page 2
Du2
Saturday, September 28, 2013
2:37 PM
Direct Utility Page 3
Direct Utility Page 4
Du3
Saturday, September 28, 2013
2:42 PM
Direct Utility Page 5
Du4