Games Without Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Its pretty easy to write down games without PSNEs. For example,
H
T
H
1,-1
-1,1
T
-1,1
1,-1
But it seems like the right answer is that players should use each of their pure
strategies half the time. How do we ma
Econ 414 Midterm Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your ans
Dynamic Games
A dynamic game of complete information is:
A set of players, i = 1, 2, ., N
A payo function for each player that describes his payo as a function of
the decisions of all the players
A description of the timing of the game: Which player is
Example: Cournot
Recall the Cournot game, where there are two rms a and b who each choose
a quantity qa or qb from the set cfw_0, q1 , q2 , ., qN , and the price is set by P =
A qa qb . Before, we solved this with a strategic form, such as
1
2
3
1 4, 4 3,
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Bayes Rule and Adverse Selection
Econ 400
University of Notre Dame
Econ 400
(ND)
Bayes Rule and Adverse Selection
1 / 21
Information and Probability
Suppose you and some friends are competing to see who can hit the bullseye
blindfolded (never do this). Su
Our last equilibrium concept
The last equilibrium concept well study after Nash eqm, Subgame Perfect
Nash eqm, and Bayesian Nash eqm is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Perfect refers to the fact that the game will be dynamic, like the kind we
solved using
Games Without Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Its pretty easy to write down games without PSNEs. For example,
H
T
H
1,-1
-1,1
T
-1,1
1,-1
But it seems like the right answer is that players should use each of their pure
strategies half the time. How do we ma
Games of Incomplete Information
In game theory, there are two sources of uncertainty related to information:
Uncertainty about the preferences or capabilities of an opponent (Incomplete Information)
Uncertainty about the previous actions of other player
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Music Perception and Cognition, Sydney, 2002
C. Stevens, D. Burnham, G. McPherson, E. Schubert, J. Renwick (Eds.). Adelaide: Causal Productions.
REAL-TIME PREDICTION OF MELODIES: CONTINUOUS
PREDICTABILITY
Causing Human Actions
New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action
edited by less H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England 68 ]. Hornsby
an analysis of action is requested (see further no
Prevention better than cure?
The case for Plagiarism
Detection
H.C. Davis
IAM: Learning Technologies
Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
LTSN-ICS Plagiarism
Structure of this Talk
(Largely concerned with Source Code Plagiarism)
What
Computer Systems Architecture
Optimizing Program Performance
Matthew Dailey
Computer Science and Information Management
Asian Institute of Technology
Matthew Dailey (CSIM-AIT)
Optimization
1 / 151
Readings
Readings for these lecture notes:
- Bryant and OH
AUDITORIA,
CONCERT
HALLS, and
CLASSROOMS
REFERENCES:
Science of Sound, 3rd ed., Chapter 23
Springer Handbook of Acoustics, 2007, Chapters 9, 10
Concert Halls and Opera Houses, 2nd ed.,Leo Beranek,
2004
SOUND FIELD OUTDOORS AND INDOORS
p vs r
Free field
Re
Increasing the Bottom Line by Knowing Customers
Better: What Counts Most Today
January 2015
Increasing the Bottom Line by Knowing Customers Better: What Counts Most Today
2
Introduction
As todays organizations focus more intensely on their prospects and c
MUSICAL ACOUSTICS
PITCH AND
TIMBRE
Science of Sound
Chapter 7
PITCH
THAT ATTRIBUTE OF AUDITORY SENSATION IN TERMS
OF WHICH SOUNDS MAY BE ORDERED ON A SCALE
EXTENDING FROM LOW TO HIGH. (ANSI)
THE BASIC UNIT IN MOST MUSICAL SCALES IS THE
OCTAVE. IN MUSIC TH
Incomplete Information
Econ 400
University of Notre Dame
Econ 400
(ND)
Incomplete Information
1 / 25
Games of Incomplete Information
In game theory, there are two sources of uncertainty related to
information:
Econ 400
(ND)
Incomplete Information
2 / 25
G
Games
Recall that a simultaneous-move game of complete information is:
A set of players i = 1, 2, ., n
A set of actions or strategies for each player
A payo or utility function for each player, expressing his payo in terms
of the decisions of all the p
Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Grading works like this: There are 3 questions and each have 4 parts. Each part is worth 4
points, so the total number of points on the exam is 48. Points are awarded in general like this:
4 - The answer is correct, though there mi
Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your an
Econ 414, Exam 1
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk. Make
sure that you defend your answers with e
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Problem Set 1
1. Games in Strategic Form: Do questions 1-4 and one of 5a, 5b, or 5c
Underline all best responses, then perform iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. In each case, do you get a unique prediction for the outcome of the game? Fi
Problem Set 2: Do one of 3a and 3b, and one of 6a, 6b, or 6c
1. Solve for the row players mixed strategy in the following games:
a.
B
L
R
U 2, 3 0, 0
A D 0, 0 1, 4
For the Row players strategy: Eucolumn (L) = Eucolumn (R) , so that 3U + 0D = 0U +
4D . Not
Problem Set 3
(1.) Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection: Find all subgameperfect equilibria of the following games. Explicitly write down the behavior
strategies that support a subgame-perfect equilibrium (dont just point out
the equilibrium path th
Relationships and Long-Lived Institutions
Business (and personal) relationships: Being caught cheating leads to punishment or exclusion
Government: We are willing to give up resources now in the expectation
that we will be paid back later (Fiat money, S