Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your an
Bargaining
Econ 400
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Bargaining
1 / 16
The Coase Theorem
A popular idea in economics is called, the Coase theorem, and it goes
like this:
Suppose all the parties to a negotiation are completely informed and
there are
Econ 414 Midterm Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your ans
Econ 414, Exam 1
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk. Make
sure that you defend your answers with e
Continuous Games
Econ 400
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Continuous Games
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Best-Response Functions
Another way of thinking about Nash equilibrium is by thinking about
player i s best-response function
Bi (i ) = cfw_ Player i s best-response
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Econ 400, Midterm Exam
Grading works like this: There are 3 questions and each have 4 parts. Each part is worth 4
points, so the total number of points on the exam is 48. Points are awarded in general like this:
4 - The answer is correct, though there mi
Econ 414, Exam 1
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answers
Game Theory
Econ 400
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Econ 400
(ND)
Game Theory
1 / 32
Firm behavior
Suppose you are a rm that receives a price p per unit of a good it sells,
c
and it costs C (q) = q 2 to produce q units. We dene:
2
Total revenue of q units is pq
Dynamic Games
Econ 400
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Dynamic Games
1 / 18
Dynamic Games
A dynamic game of complete information is:
A set of players, i = 1, 2, ., N
A payo function for each player that describes his payo as a
function of the decis
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Problem Set 1
1. Games in Strategic Form: Do questions 1-4 and one of 5a, 5b, or 5c
Underline all best responses, then perform iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. In each case, do you get a unique prediction for the outcome of the game? Fi
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Econ 400
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Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
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Games Without Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Its pretty easy to write down games without PSNEs. For example,
H
T
Econ 400
(ND)
H
1,-1
-1,
Problem Set 5
1. There are two players facing each other in the following random prisoners dilemma:
S
C
S
2,2
xr , 1
C
-1, xc
0,0
With probability p, xc = y, and with probability 1 p, xc = 0. With probability p, xr = y, and
with probability 1 p, xr = 0. A
Strategy Dominance and Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Econ 400
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Strategy Dominance and Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
1 / 30
Games
Recall that a simultaneous-move game of complete information is:
A set of players i =
Problem Set 3
(1.) Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection: Find all subgameperfect equilibria of the following games. Explicitly write down the behavior
strategies that support a subgame-perfect equilibrium (dont just point out
the equilibrium path th
Problem Set 4
1. Imagine an alternating-oer bargain game, but instead of discounting future payos by and
keeping the size of the pie xed at 1, assume that in each period the value of the pie is reduced
by one In the rst period, v1 = V , in the second v2 =
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ
Problem Set 6
1. There are two types of customers: high value types who occur with probability p and low
types who occur with probability 1 p. A rm sells two kinds of goods: high quality, and low
quality. The high value types have value 10 for the high qu
Econ 400, Final Exam
Name:
There are three questions taken from the material covered so far in the course. All questions are
equally weighted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk.
Make sure that you defend your answ