Uponappeal,the CourtofAppealsfor the SeventhCircuit,relyingon Blakely
and Apprendi,held that the sentenceviolatedthe Sixth
235.Seegenerally Booker,125S.Ct. 738.
236.Id. at 742.
had to be provenbeyondareasonabledoubtto ajury at trial.
asentencingfactor,which could be takeninto considerationwithout
provingits existencebeyonda reasonabledo
In Williamsv. New York,
the SupremeCourtheld thatthe rehabilitative
modelgave sentencingjudges broaddiscretionat sentencing, and freedthem
from rigid, proceduraltrial rules thatmight limittheirdiscretionary
The trial ju
Furthermore, crossexaminationcould divulge the intentionalor negligent
abuseof governmentpowerin thecreationof testimonial evidence, which,
ifnot revealed, could lead tothe convictionoftheinnocent.
the Courtdecidedthat the best mode ofensuri
For instance,in UnitedStates v. Hammer,
the EighthCircuit held that the
ConfrontationClause does not apply atsentencing,but facts relieduponby
the DistrictCourtat sentencingmust beprovedbyapreponderanceofthe
However,thesedecisions are on
Forseveralyears,relationsbetweenEritrea andEthiopia werewarm, but they
deterioratedrapidly in1998,leading to arenewedoutbreakofwar. The
specifictrigger ofthe war wasunclear,with Eritreaand Ethiopiaexchanging
Oneof the wars flashpoints,theb
Beginning inthe late nineteenth centuryand throughoutthefirstthree
quarters of thetwentieth century, ahighlydiscretionary,rehabilitative,
medical model wasthe dominantapproachto sentencin
InCrawford, theSupreme Court setsout three standardsthatcould be used
to definetestimonial:(1) ex parteincourttestimonyor itsfunctional
equivalentthatis,materialsuch asaffidavits, custodial examinations,prior
The WashingtonCourtofAppealsreversedthe convictionforthefollowing
reasons.First, the court disagreedwith the states argumentthatthedefendant
waivedhis rightto confrontationby invokinghismaritalprivilege,since a
defendantisnot requiredto waive one right
Though theApprendi decisionwas verysignificantin foreshadowing of
things to come, itsimpact wasdilutedsince itwasbased on a
54split vote with five separateopinions.This resultedin lowerfederal and
statecourtstrying to preservejudicial fact finding by adhe
The Courtstatedthatthe Framersdid not mean to leave the protections of
theSixthAmendment tothevaguerulesof evidence orshapeless notions of
TheCourt explained that theulti
Part II containsahistory ofinternationalborderdisputes,with an emphasison
theAfrican continent,andincludestheprinciples usedbytribunalsto resolve
international arbitration tribunalswith respectto
Nevertheless,moststateswith sentencing guidelinesaremovingtoward
mandatorysystemswith jury factfinding.
In such jurisdictions,
confrontationshouldapply at sentencingfor the reasonsarticulatedin this
article.Withrespect to jurisdictions thatdecidetoimp
tice. In such a case, thedefendantisleft to themercyof thecourt,without
anyprocedural structure inplace toprotect himfrom thewhim ofthe judge
on thatparticularday. Likewise,the use oftestimonialhearsay,which
wouldenablea jury to
the SupremeCourtset astandardto determine ifthe
statementofan unavailablewitness who had not been previously cross
examinedviolatestheprotectionsof theConfrontationClause.Inthat case,
thedefendant was under c
crimesor offensesthatweresimilarto thespecific facts of thecase.
Furthermore,Ring did not challengethe validity ofan entiresentencing
guidelines scheme.Thatissue wouldsquarely face theCourt forthefirsttime
in Blakely, alsoofferin
46.Id. at 5960.
47.Id. at 59.
48.Id. at 70.
49.Id. at 66.
PRACTICE379(2d ed. 2004).
quire the declarantto be unavaila
142.Id. at 245,247.
143.Id. at 244.
144.[N]orshall any Statedepriveany personoflife,liberty,or property,
withoutdue processoflaw. U.S. CONST.amend.XIV,1.
145.Williams,337U.S. at 251.
146.Id. at 245.
147.Berman,supra note136,at 6.