Lecture 4: Monday, January 26th, 2015
From Millers reading contd
On a whole, there are advantages that allow one to make decisions for themselves. Free markets
allow this. Free markets produce better outcomes than not having its presence.
Examples where f
Lecture 8: Monday, February 23rd, 2015
Before 1840s, US economy had the following characteristics.
small producers of less than 50 employees
large distribution of network (brokers, specialized middlemen linking producers to
Lecture 10: Monday, March 16th, 2015
Problems with Decentralization
Example with Sears Roebuck (developed m-divisional form, decentralized very
Turn over responsibility to lower units, which they might act against in some of centrals
Lecture 12: March 30th 2015
Early 20 century, you find number of firms developing welfare work
taking different approach with employees like providing cafeterias, garden, profit-sharing
plans, athletic facilities, rudimentary pension plans
Lecture 13 : April 13th
Capital Markets regulations of unflexibility for managers, which helps reduce the principle-agent
Miller: True that capital markets does this, but they do so imperfectly because cost of takeovers
will be very high if manage
Lecture 11: March 23rd
Problems with Cooperatives (Examples from Scavenger firm continued)
Tend not to expand output when demand goes up, profit opportunities foregone >
deal with it by hiring external employees
Cooperatives work best with social control
Lecture 5: Monday, February 2nd, 2015
Observations of Organizations
Notion of Externality
Cooperation requires Coordination
Development of a set of Incentives, or method of persuasion through organization of
Prerequisites for Organi
Lecture 6: Monday, February 16th, 2015
SECTION 4: MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
We started looking at Barnard > Herbert Simon > Williamson
What is it about these stream of writings that hold it together?
Barnard was a rate setting economist. How do you consti
Lecture 3: Monday, January 19th, 2015
Continuing from TCE: Transactional Cost Economics Asset specificity (When a contract is
signed, investments are made in the execution of contract which reduces cost of the contracting
Asset specificity: When
Lecture 9: Monday, March 9th, 2015
Why did we need a large number of intermediaries?
Each party was dealing with a lot of uncertainty
Limited information of the market on each sides party. Brokers were a way of dealing
with the gap between producers/puc
Lecture 7: February 16th
SECTION 4: GROWTH & SIZE OF ORGANIZATION
Why do organizations grow?
What limits organizations growth and size?
How is growth and size managed?
Incentive problems created by large size
Econ: MC&AC Curve
Lecture 1: Monday, January 5th, 2015
SECTION 1: PROBLEMATIC CONTRACTS: A CASE STUDY
Levee failed Failure of organization and administration:
1. Leadership (Michael Brown not experienced)
2. Poor communication (across the board)