Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty Personal Identity: Parfit, cont'd 1. Parfit's Fission Case
October 10, 2007
Parfit's conclusion: i. You bear all the relations that matter to PB and PC. Neither PB nor PC are identical to you. Identity is, after all, a o
Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty Plato's Forms There are certain forms, whose names these other things have through getting a share of them-as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by getting a share of largeness, and j
Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty The Causal Theory of Knowledge Goldman proposes a fix for the Traditional Analysis.
November 9, 2007
S knows that p iff the fact p is causally connected in an `appropriate' way with S's believing p. Why an `appropriate'
Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge" 1. Internalism and Externalism about Justification
November 16, 2007
Internalism: the view about justification according to which all of the factors required for justifi
Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty Foundationalism and Coherentism Bonjour, "The Elements of Coherentism"
November 30, 2007
1. Foundationalism and coherentism are views about the structure of justification. Foundationalism: (1) not all justified beliefs
Philosophy 351 Prof. Clare Batty Universals Metaphysical Realism (cont'd)
August 29, 2007
Metaphysical realists claim that their two category framework provides us with the machinery for dealing with a set of otherwise irresolvable (they claim) philoso