Class 19: Courts & judges
Can we apply the rational choice approach to explain judicial behavior?
How does modeling judicial behavior differ from modeling other political actors?
Are judges more similar to politicians or private sector actors?
Class 9: Analyzing Conflict and Cooperation: the prisoners dilemma
- In game theory, the result isnt only a factor of
your choice, but of the other players choice
Class 10: Collection Action pt. 1
Pluralist Theory: People join groups for the shared benefits that come from the
groups efforts to gain influence in the political environment.
Olsons challenge to pluralists
Common interests do not automatically lead to t
Class 13: Tragedy of the commons
When individuals share a common depletable resource, private and social
incentives will conflict
i.e. common grazing areas
o 100 ranchers and 200 cattle 1 rancher wants to add 1 cow 201
o But if everyone is thinki
Class 17: Political Influence in Legislatures
Conflict over pharmaceutical regulation FDA
Consumers want lower drug prices (generics)
Regulation limits supplymonopolieshigh prices
Brand firms want incentives for research
Class 18: Bureaucracy and Intergovernmental Relations
Model bureaucrats as rational agents
Motives differ from politicians what are their objectives?
Cant model bureaucrats independent of the legislature, must model the
legislatures relations with bure
Class 16: Legislatures
The Legislative Setting
Preferences over policy goals
Heterogeneity of preferences in legislature (incentive conflicts)
Majority coalitions needed to pass policy legislators must engage in collective action
We assume that actors are goal-oriented and rational, and that their goals will
influence the choices they make.
How do key political institutions affect the choices they make? Why is it so
difficult to change the status quo?
Utility Maximizing Behavior I
Class 11: Large Scale Collective Action pt.2
More theories to explain collective action:
Political Entrepreneurs: Leaders who help to organize latent groups by
bearing the burden/cost of participation so more people are inclined to
Class 12: Market failures and political solutions
Individual incentives dont always lead to the choice that is better for society
- Markets dont always work well for certain goods (i.e. market failure)
o In these cases, there can be a role for government
Class 15: North and Weingast
NW article considers the evolution of new institutional arrangements following the
Glorious Revolution in England
Key questions to consider:
- What were the new institutions that emerged as a consequence of the
Class 14: Institutions
Shepsle argues that communities will develop institutionalized responses to
problems requiring collective action that are recurring over time.
- Institutions save costs and challenges of collective action
Doug North: Institutions ar