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You need to critically analyse the MAIN argument of The Justice of Fit (Author: Muirhead, Russell) Chapter 3 . Your analysis should respond to the following questions:

i) What is the subject or topic of the argument?
ii) What are the key claims made in the argument?
iii) What evidence is provided to support these claims?
iv) What is the argument's conclusion?
v) What are two objections to, or problem with, this argument?

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An ideal of fitting work has roots in both contemporary conditions or economic life and the culture of American democracy. Yet as a category of political and moral analysis, the concept of fit should arouse deep suspicion, for it seems more at home in an aris— tocratic society of fixed places than in a liberal society of equal op— portunity and "shifting involvements," where freedom and consent would seem more appropriate ideals.1 In an aristocratic society of fixed "stations," individuals do not so much choose their roles as they are recruited, assigned, and coerced. Those on top hear most of the responsibility for great decisions; they chart the course and give direction to the rest. A few steps down are managerial types, who accept direction from above and direct those below. Still fur— ther down are those with no one to manage, who have only to exe— cute and obey. In the aristocratic view, each link in the social chain is necessary and important, though each is not equally authorita— tive, honorable, or desirable. To those who conceive of society in such a way, the task of politics is to somehow manipulate or force individuals to occupy their appropriate social roles—and keep them there. A conception of fit is integral to such a hierarchical view of social order: society is properly ordered when all do the work to which man FL 5 MUIHIEAD. Fl. (nonhuman. Hm mm and mquIMZflEI-IZ-ITIHMS'I. 52 The Justice of Fit they are fitted, even if this requires manipulation and coercion. One of the most notorious examples of this view comes from Aristotle, who argues in The Politics that certain human beings are fitted to slavery, and that slavery is iust when these individuals occupy the role. In this light, the concept of fit seems to stand squarely against the modern affirmation of human freedom and equality. Nonethe— less, a concern with fitting work does not undercut the interest in equal respect and freedom at the core or modern liberal democracy. On the contrary, the concept of fit can corroborate and support these values. To demonstrate this more fully, this chapter turns to the place where the ideal of fit may seem most opposed to liberal and democratic prepossessions, the hierarchical and aristocratic views found in the political thought of Plato and Aristotle. That we do not share many of the ancients' assumptions {princi— pally their profound moral inegalilarianism} amplifies rather than undermines their utility. Because we do not share all their commit— ments, confronting them can reveal something of the partiality and incompleteness of our own assumptions—as it can also deepen and make more explicit the conviction with which we hold our own commitments. In particular; looking to Plato and Aristotle shows how a concern with fit can be consistent with the moral reasons that give freedom and consent such force. This becomes particu— larly evident when we consider the distinct emphases Plato and Ar— istotle each place in their considerations of fitting work. We find in Plato an emphasis on social fit, which involves work's contribution to the common good. In its most unqualified form, social fit might even iustify coercing individuals to perform socially necessary sorts of work. This is the view that Aristotle considers in his analysis of slavery—the injustice of which, in his view, depends on looking beyond social needs to what individuals, taken by themselves, de— serve. By invoking what individuals deserve, Aristotle pointedly is— sues a demanding understanding of fit, one that places even con— temporary work under a heavy justificatory burden. The category of fit more effectively challenged than defended the hierarchy Aris—

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totle examined. But before turning to Aristotle, 1 will first briefly consider Plato's Republic, where the category of fit seems to justify marlipulation and constraint and is invoked for the sake of keeping people in their place. Plato, as we will see, gives more emphasis to what cities need than to what individuals by their nature deserve. Plato's Simple any The most familiar understanding of fit involves an alignment of in— dividual aptitudes and tasks. Indeed, this is the sort of fit that de— fines the simple city of Plato's Republic. The simple city is dedicated to satisfying all the most basic needs, and only those needs. Nothing done is unneeded, and nothing unneeded is done. Yet even this sim— ple city exhibits a division of labor, since when people specialize they do a "finer job," Socrates says, than they would as generalists. For this city to be just, the division of labor must not be arbitrary, which is to say that it must reflect real individual differences rather than create social differences. There needs to be a reason that ex— plains why it is right for this or that particular person to he a shoe— maker, for instance. This reason, according to Socrates in The Re- public, is rooted in differencm in natural aptitude. Each of us, he says, "is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the accomplisl'unent of different jobs."z But even in the simple city, some jobs are more desirable than others. Socratm' interlocutor Adeimantus, for instance, worries that selling in the marketplace—a job he takes to be tedious and re— petitive—is both wasteful and boring. T'his worry raism the ques— tion: who gets the good, desirable work, and who the tedious, or hard work? In the simple city, the matter of distributing good and had work depends on social fit. In "rightly governed cities," Socra— tes says, those whose bodies are useless for other tasks would be tradesmen; similarly, those of weak mind and strong body would be laborers. Social fit dom not require that each does the thing he or she does best in the absolute sense. Steve may be better at building ha WHHEADIHJWJMM WWW unwonml 4241103451. TheJua'IlcaotFl'l than at growing, yet be quite superb at both. And Sally may be an incompetent grower and an average builder. The right social fit here is that Steve be the grower and Sally the builder. Although Steve does not do what he does hm in the absolute sense, this arrange— ment maximizes their contribution to the social needs. The contribution to social needs is what makes social fit not merely a guide to individual choice but also a matter of justice. Where work is fitting in this social sense, each person contributes optimally to the common good. Should one ask, "Why am I a shoe— maker?" the answer would be, "Because that is how you can best serve the common good." Service to the city gives the distribution of roles its justification and also explains why certain individuals fill certain roles. Perfect social fit points to an ideal of an organic soci— ety, where for every social need, no matter how boring or hard, there is someone who by natural aptitude best fits the task. Yet in practice, social fit always falls short ofthe utopian ideal depicted in Plato's simple city. Even in the imaginary city of The Republic, achieving the rudi— mentary fit between individuals and the tasks social life makes ner msary is not easy. It demands both an intrusive education and a per— spicacious discernment of individual aptitudm. In the end, a public lie is needed to justify the distribution of rolm. Part of Plato's far mous "noble lie" claims that the individuals composing the several classes ofthe city are distinguished at birth by metals mined in their souls, and these metals siglify the jobs to which each is suited.3 Yet the invocation of such a myth raises an important question: if the individuals in fact deserve their rolm by virtue of their natural apti— rude, why the lie? The lie miflit be an act of rhetoric or persuasion that starts from a false premise {metals mixed with souls) in order to convince peo— ple of a true conclusion {that some deserve better rolls and others worse roles). The lie is necmsary to persuade individuals to accept only that to which they are suited by aptitude. Yet denying the lim- its of our aptitude is common: we can easily enough convince our»

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selves of an exaggerated assessment of our own talent We also of— ten resist what we are best at, and pursue with ardor what we wish we could do while forsaking what we can in fact accomplish. We fail to recognize our limits both because we are proud and because when we are relatively bad at something we are also often had judges of its quality. The noble lie recog'lizes this tendency to mis— take what we are good at, to reject the limits of our talent, and to insist on doing what we cannot do well. Aside from the difficulty of judging ourselves accurately and re— stricting ourselves to the limits of our aptitude, the noble lie points to a deeper problem with social fit. The lie confesses that, often, do ing what we are aptitudinally suited for {from the perspective of so— cial need] does not malte us happy. We may reject living within the limits of our aptitude because what we are good at, relative to oth— ers, is also something unfulfilling with respect to ourselves. An ex— cellent accountant may fail to find much pleasure or meaning in the task. In The Republic it is again a comment by Adeimantus that suggests this probleirr. In the very simple city, where only rudimen— tary needs are filled, there is little enjoyment. W'hen everyone lives only for the city and not for themselves, the discipline of a division oflabor looks pointless. Artisans and farmers toil from youth on so that the warriors might be educated, but no one seems to have a de— sirable life. Even those on top of the city's hierarchy—especially those—do not live happily, to Adeimantus's eye.' Adeirnantus's objection reminds us that performing the tasks that society requires, even when we perform them efficiently and wonr derf'ully, is no guarantee that we as individuals will thrive. Unless we take the city's prosperity and health as identical with our own, there is no reason to take our hearings only from the corrurron good, To count ourselves as worthy independent of the cmrunon good is normal and right. Even the nobility of sacrifice in the name ofthe common good presupposes the distinction between what is good for society and what is good for us as individuals. Social fit, especially in its extreme forms, asks for too much sacrifice. As & WHHEAD. R. (an?) JWM W mm wonm1-12-l?flflndfil_ TheJuatlceotFil Adeimantus saw, social fit overprivileges the city as it neglects the individual. This is why it offers an incomplete account ofthe justice of work: it takes stock of the need to contribute to the con'unon good, but does not pay sufficient attention to what individuals de— serve. Market: end Social "I This is not to say that the goal of aligning individual aptitudes with the tasks society needs is mistaken. 0n the contrary, it is essential. Not only Plato's imaginary city but every city—every group that co» operates for the sake of common ends like security and comfort— needs to achieve some level of social fit. ln Plato's city, social fit is achieved through politics: it requires a lie issued at the city's found— ing, and relies on political power to assign individuals to their roles. In contemporary politics, we take it that no such lie is necessary, that no visible political power is needed to compel individuals to fill their roles. Instead, individuals choose against a background of the market, which we trust will secure an optimal social fit between persons and roles. As with the social fit of Plato's Republic, one jus— tificatiorn of markets is not that they give individuals all they de— serve, but instead that they recruit individuals to roles in a way that optimizes production toward social needs. Those who defend free markets argue that wages, for instance, should correspond to neither individual effort nor need nor the moral quality of individual character considered more broadly. Friedrich Hayek1 for instance, claims that wages should instead re— Elect contribution understood as "the advantage we derive from what others offer us." In this view, by rewarding the perceived value that one's efforts have for others, free marltets result in a "maximum of usefulness." Markets do this by achieving an opti— mal social fit between persons and jobs. Without markets, "How is it to be decided who is to be the doctor, who the lawyer, who the garbage collector, who the street sweeper," ask Milton and Rose Friedman. Short of free markets, they argue, "only force or the

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threat of force will do." Functionalist sociologists of midcentury argued the same, holding that wage differentials attract people of the requisite talents to jobs that are Emotionally important to soci— ety. Doctors make more than street sweepers, on this view, because society needs to entice those of the right talent to undergo years of arduous education and training." The market performs the same function as the wise rulers in Plato's Republic, but without the lies, the indoctrination, and the elaborate contrivances Plato described. The success of markets at solving the problem of social fit with— out recourse to brute coercion is a crucial part of their legitimacy. Our faith, a faith read back to Adam Smith and confirmed in the collapse of the communist economies, is that market forces will de— fine jobs and recruit individuals to those jobs in such a way that neither any redistribution nor redefinition of jobs could make the economy more productive. While this faith has been amply sup— ported by experience, the social fit markets achieve is never perfect On the contrary, in a variety of ways they fail to optimally match individual skill and talent to tasks. For instance, windfall wages in some sectors can attract a disproportionate share of talent: too many, from a social point of view, may aim to be "master of the universe" investment bankers or Academy Award-winning stars. At the same time, markets may fail to offer enough opportunity to the less skilled—especially when firms can easily move operations abroad.a lWhat markets elicit is never identical to the corru'non good, because markets function to satisfy the demand {whatever it is} of those who can afford satisfaction. The satisfaction of wants may or may not be good for society: the trade in weapons, for in— stance, and the market for gambling on scratch cards contribute nothing to society and yet are profitable. Sometimes socially imporv tant work receives little or no market reward because those who di— rectly benefit cannot afford to pay for it. Banking services in poor neighborhoods and childcare services are ready examples. But the more central problem with the justice of markets is simi— lar to the problem ofPlato's social fit. As the social fit of Plato's firm I. H..& WHHEAD. H. Em. JMM W mom hunnworl 2021 42-1? 003451. i8 TheJua'IlcaofFl'l ple city gave insufficient consideration to what individuals deserve, so market wages are vulnerable to the same objection. They direct effort to social needs, but they do not offer a very profound reason for an individual to do this sort of work rather than that. They say nothing about why a person should find work meaningful or fulfill— ing, or about why it is an appropriate expression of one's identity. All that markets can offer is a wage. Wages give people an incentive to do this job rather than that, and they offer a convincing sign that our work makes a contribution (someone, after all, is willing to payl. But they neither establish much of a connection between one's identity and one's work nor, by necessity, do they adequately reflect the social contribution of work. From the dawn of the industrial age many have recognized that market wages fail to adequately recognize the social contribution that individuals make throufi] their work. This insight is what ani— mates arguments for legislating a living wage, for instance. In the nineteenth century, Pope Leo XII held that those who contribute to society through honest work deserve not whatever wage the market sets but a wage sufficient to satisfy basic needs. Responding to the new conditions of industrialism, where "workingmen have been given over, isolated and defenseless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition," Pope Leo rejected the notion that the justice of wages is "fiited by free consent." Citing a "dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any barv gain between man and man," Pope Leo held that every wage should be sufficient to "support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort." ln the United States, the living wage argument was ex— tended to cover the support of the family. A family wage, argued Father John Ryan, was owed to any "laborer who complies in a reasonable degree with nature's law orfwork."m The case for a liv— ing wage has again found currency in recent years, especially in ef— forts focused on local governments." The idea underlying the living wage is that those who contribute to society—who comply with the "law ofwork"—deserve to share

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in the goods that social cooperation makes possible. Although sub— ject to competing interpretations of what counts as "living," the case for a living wage involves a critique ofthe social fit. It is not enoufl: for justice that people are successfully recruited to roles aligned with their skills and talents. Nor is it sufficient if the distri- bution of work maximizes the productivity. Justice requires that the interests of individuals count, and for this social fit is insufficient. Even when social fit is satisfied, some may give more than they get. This may be just in that it serves the conunon good, and yet be un— just in that those who contribute get less than they deserve. The liv— ing wage aims to bring these two sides into some alignment by ask— ing that those who comply with the "law of work" make enough to live in good health, to sustain families, and to participate in the common life of the society. For advocates of a living wage, a fit between aptitudes and tasks that maximizes contribution to social needs is insufficient to satisfy the demands ofjustice. Nor, aswe will see, was social fit enough to satisfy Aristotle. In discussing one of the worst and most violent rolls in Athens—slavery—Aristotle introduced an important modi— fication of the standard of fit. '3 For Aristotle, it is not a sufficient justification to claim that society gets something important if some are forced to be slaves. For a role like slavery to be just, it must also be the case that the role is aligned with the best purposes of those who fill it. In this case, Aristotle asks not only for a social fit but also for a personal fit between persons and their work. Because jus— tice, in Aristotle's argument, demands more than a social fit, Aris— totle placed slavery under a severe burden of justification. Indeed, by raising the standard beyond social fit, be undermined his own ef— fort to defend that role. Mantle and. Personal l'lt Given that he did not take human beings to be moral equals in the first place, we migrt think Aristotle would not be troubled by slav— ery. After all, his idea] political regime—the regime we would pray »&WI1HEAD. H. IMJWMWMM .mnnml-Ifl-fl'mmfil. ThaJuatlcooiF'll for but cannot attain—contains slavery." Mloreoveg the practice of slavery was useful, perhaps so useful as to seem necessary—not only to Athens but also to the virtues that Aristotle praised. As Berv nard Williams claims about fifthwcentury Athenians, "No way of life was accessible that preserved what was worthwhile to them and did without slavery?" The citizen's practice of deliberation, and the cultivation of courage, friendship, and the other virtues of Aris— totle's Ethics all required leisure. Yet because the working life pre— cluded leisure and a broad education, it was irreconcilable with liv— ing a full and excellent life. '5 The good life for some required the oppression of others, for the good life needed leisure, which in turn required that others take care ofthe work—the growing, the min— ing, the caretalting and cleaning, the building and making—that liv— ing together generated. There seemed no way for all simultaneously to develop the virtues and share in excellence. Any critique of slavery therefore would have to call into question not only slavery but also the life it supported, a life Aristotle en— dorsed. Indeed Aristotle defends slavery—but curiously, he defends slavery only of a sort, and not the sort practiced in Athens. His parr tial defense invokes not the social fit we saw in Plato's account but a kind of personal fit that gives more emphasis to what individuals deserve, independent of what they contribute. For slavery to be just, Aristotle argum, those who occupy the role must also fit it, meaning not only that the role equips those in it to contribute maximally to society, but also that the role develops their best capacities To jus— tify a role like slavery in terms of personal fit, the usefulness of the role must be complemented by its beneficial effect on those in it. The justice of slavery thus depends on whether slaves find their best expression in the role. Aristotle ranks human capacities hierarv chically: the physical capacitim of movement and yowth, for in— stance, are of a lower order than the intellectual capacitim. Because slavery, as Aristotle sees it, demands the work of the body but not ofthe mind, it can be justified only if slaves are those for whom the "best that can come from them" is "the use of the body."" From

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the perspective of Plato's social fit, it would be enough if those with weaker intellectual capacities than others inhabited the role, for such a distribution of talent would be socially optimal But Aris— totle pointedly asks for more. He insists that slavery can be justified only if individual slaves develop the best capacities they contain, irv respective of social need. His hierarchical ranking of human capaci— ties serves as a standard of judgment that is independent of social needs. Thus slavery requires persons in whom the intellectual ca— pacities are not merely weak in comparison to others but are nearly absent. They are, in Aristotle's terms, "natural slaves," as different from others as "the soul from body or man from beast." For them, Aristotle claims, slavery would be a better condition than freedom Although not established for the sake of slaves, slavery is, for them, "both advantageous and just?" Here we see what irretrievably separates Aristotle's moral world from ours: he thought some human beings were in fact "slaves by nature," so limited that slavery, for them, would he an advantage." Even on his own terms, this standard raises practical difficulties for Aristotle's defense. How beings of such linlited intellect could in fact carry out their work—which involved more intellectual de— mands than Aristotle was prepared to recognize—renders the anal— ysis nearly incoherent. Apart from this, another difficulty arises from his recognition that those who in fact were enslaved were not natural slaves. As Aristotle remarks, slaves came to their role not tl'u'ough some mechanism that efficiently picked out: those with very limited capacities but rather throuyi bad luck. Suffering defeat at war, for instance, is not, as Aristotle must concede, an accurate way of identifying those who fit the category of the natural slave. There— fore, according to the standard Aristotle imposes—personal fit— slavery was unjust. This is why Aristotle notes that those who assert slavery to be un— just "are in a certain manner correct."19 Yet having rerngnized something of slavery's injustice, Aristotle does not suggest the role might be eradicated, or even that its violence be ameliorated. For lui WHHEAD. H. Em. JWM W mm in rem on 2021-12-1? 003451. TheJua'IlneofFi'l one, Aristotle's political theory was not aimed at reform. He did not suppose himself on a mission, uncovering the truth for the sake of remaking the world in its image; on the contrary, he had a keen ap— preciation of the world's resistance to good intentions." And urllike moral philosophers who think their knowledge equips them to dic— tate to legislators, he admitted the partial autonomy of politics. Yet aside from his conservatism and philosophic modesty, Aristotle thought slavery a necessary injustice. To the extent that he saw slav— ery as an injustice—and to an extent be did—he did not see any way around it. Doing away with slavery or its functional equivalent would not have extended the good life to those who lacked it. As he saw it, either some must live like slaves so that others may tran— scend toil, or all must engage in toil and forsake any possibility of living well. The defense of slavery rests not on its justice but its so— cial necessity. Later defenders ofslavery and oppressive work invoked a similar kind of necessity. For example, Bernard Niandeville's eighteenth— century argument against charity schools took this form. All luxury and comfort, Mandeville claimed, sit on a foundation of hard, mundane, dirty work. The advantages of leisure—comfort, educa— tion, sport, art, and science—depend on this foundation. But be— cause such work is undesirable, because it does not fit well with hur man capacities and aspirations, it is avoided whenever it can be. "No Body will do the dirty slavish Work that can help it," Mande— ville asserted. Therefore it is necessary, he argued, that politics "cul— tivate the Breed" of those so poor and ignorant that they cannot help but be grateful for even the worst work, for "if no body did want no body would work."I American defenders ofslavery offered a similar argument. For in— stance, unlike those defenses that claimed slaves did in fact fit their role, Senator James Henry Harmnond's 1853 "mud—sill" speech looked to the social necessity of oppressive working conditions. In every society, he argued, "there must be a class to do mean duties, to perform the drudgeries of life," to make possible the relief from

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labor that civilization requires. Every society, he said, needs a class with "a lower order of intelligence and but little skill." He enrr plained: "Such a class you must have, or you would not have that other class which leads progress, refinement, and civilization. lt constitutes the very mud-sills of society and of political govern— ment; and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build either the one or the other, except on mud—sills." Ham— mond overlooked the issue of fit and focused on the social necessity that renders inevitable a class of "poor hardworking people, who support everybody, and starve themselves": For Hammond, as for Mandeville and Aristotle, part of the busi— ness of politics is to opprms. The oppression is not without a point, as they would describe it. It is necessary for the best things and the greatest human achievements: no oppression, no progrms. Yet the category of personal fit shows us why the oppression, whatever it brings, is at the same time unjust. The problem is not only that workers on the bottom fail to give their full consent but also that the work is fundamentally misaligned with their capacities as hu— man beings. It neither develops what is best in them nor facilitates their individuality nor serves their independent purposes; rather, it constrains and prohibits their development as human beings. With— out the category of fit that Aristotle introduces in his discussion of slavery, the very problem at stake diminishes. With it, the problem is stark. And from it arises a dilemma: does the best that society is capable of require constraining some so they fill roles that neither they nor anyone can be said to fit? For a nineteenth-century utopian socialist such as Charles Fou— rier, no such dilemma is inevitable, no injustice necessary. For each necmary task there is someone fit to carry it out. All work could be made attractive—to someone. Even "loathsome tasks that ordinary workers would find debasing,' he says, like cleaning stables and slaughtering animals, would attract young children "who love to wallow in the n1ire and play with dirty things."33 The expectation that social needs and individual fulfillment could be wholly harmo— nu. ma WEHEAD. a. cam). roam mu mm ammunmvmnmmm. 641 TheJua'IlceotFEl'l nixed is but one aspect of Fourier's utopianism. Like all modern socialists, Fourier placed his hope in the expectation that a social organization of work would radically increase productivity: And in- creasing productivity, more than anything else, is what would ame— liorate the nasty trade—off that Aristotle and other preindustrial thinkers faced, where sorneone's advantage came at anotlier's ex— pense. What was once seen as a necmary coru1ection between oppres— sion and progress has been immensely related by the productive ca— pacity of modern economies. The elixir of productivity growth, by which the vast enrichment of some corresponds to the moderate en— ricbment of all, does much to mitigate the grim social facts that Hammond, Mandeville, and Aristotle faced. At the same time, we have not completely escaped Aristotle's predicament. Advanced in— dustrial economies also create a variety of necessary tasks, not all of which are good to perform; even with great advances in productiv— ity, economic need itself remains a necessary spur to getting these jobs done. The promise of growth is that all can become wealthy to— gether, yet still the profits of some are related to the low wages of others, as the resistance to increasing the minimum wage, the finanr Cial markets' celebration of layoff announcements, and the export oflaboruitensive jobs abroad all testify. The legions of workers im— ported to work the fields that Americans are affluent enough to shun, to drive taxis and to stitch suburban clothes, all reveal some— thing of the old logic of work. That such work is so useful as to seem necessary, while also so undesirable as to require economic necessity to prod people to do it, suggests that the regime of eco— nomic gowth has not fully transcended the logic ofwork that Aris— totle identified. The category of personal fit reminds us that what— ever norninal consent people give, still the worst sort of work, to which no one seems "fitted," often needs compulsion. Natural Identifies Aristotle's category of personal fit illuminates a particular kind of injustice, where some are constrained in order that others may

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thrive. Yet the category, in Aristotle's rendering, seems to depend on a strange assumption about human nature: it supposes that individ- uals have a highly specific and rather fixed natural identity. Individ- uals fit their roles, in this view, when natural identities and social roles align, as when the natural slaves are those who fill the social role of slaves. Ascriptive natural identities serve as the basis for a social hierarchy. As the "natural slave" is born to do the work of the body, so others are born to think, or to command, or to make: they ought to be the philosophers, the generals, the artisans. The modern affirmation of human equality rejects the notion that social inequality could ever have such a natural basis. Human beings are not marked by nature to fit one station in the hierarchy of social places: "The mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs," Thomas Jefferson insisted, "nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them."24 Natural identities and the in- equality they presuppose thus seem fundamentally opposed to dem- ocratic equality. Yet we might accept the idea of "natural identities" without mapping it onto any social hierarchy, and instead see it as the basis of individuality and social diversity. The idea of natural identity can even motivate egalitarian aims, as for instance in the way it informs a concept of alienation. For example, consider the experience of alienation as it appears in the film Being John Malkovich, in which a character who takes himself to be a puppeteer by nature tries to find his place in a world that will not employ him as a puppeteer, that offers no social space to accommodate his natural identity. The protagonist's natural identity has no social location; only the iden- tity's residual skill (dexterity) has market value (he forsakes puppe- teering for an office filing job). In the most radical extension of this, society suffocates our natural identity: to be human is to be alien- ated. In a less extreme way, this experience-possessing a nature so- ciety cannot accommodate-is recognizable enough. Often we feel that something in our nature cannot find its right expression in the social world; while this can make the world seem to be strange and radically at odds with who we are, still we must adapt ourselves so MUIRHEAD, R. (2007). Just work. Harvard University Press. mqu on 2021-12-17 00:34:51. The Justice of Fit we can make our way in the world. This feeling of possessing a nat- ural identity (disjoined from any corresponding assumptions of nat- ural inequality) helps make sense of the experience that social roles and social constraints impede us from being who we are-when, in short, our roles do not fit us. Yet it is one thing to conceive of oneself as a puppeteer, another to think that in some metaphysical or essential sense one is a puppe- teer. Conceiving of fit as entailing a very specific natural identity leads to both exaggerating and understating human alienation. The more precisely we conceive of a natural identity, the more difficult it becomes to map the identity onto a social role, and the more exten- sively (and exaggeratedly) we perceive our alienation. To think that for every social role there is a "natural fit" (as if there might be nat- ural systems analysts, welders, window washers, or grocery bag- gers) makes much of worldly life and perhaps all of the working life seem alienating. Perhaps there is some truth in this extreme picture of alienation, but practically, the effect of casting human alienation so broadly undercuts the critical leverage a concept like alienation might possess, and at the same time it misconceives what it means to fit a role. To imagine that we might conform so exquisitely with the social world makes social roles seem more fixed than they actually are. Social roles are in flux-they differ in industrial, postindustrial, and agrarian economies. There is no reason to suppose that the natural identities we might possess should change across time and space to accommodate particular economic systems. That individuals might be imprinted by nature with specific job descriptions thus imposes an absurd degree of coherence on human nature and the social world. No one is a puppeteer by nature in the sense that he was "made" to play with puppets. Puppetry is a social practice, in- vented by human beings, with standards specific to it that are sus- tained by human beings. Neither it nor other roles that entail a divi- sion of labor are natural categories merely awaiting the individuals designed for them.

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Madden and l'lt The idea of fit is better conceived without assuming that people have some specific natural identity that society might acconunodate or frustrate. Indeed.l aside from his curious claim about natural slaves, even Aristotle does not suppose there might be natural iden— titirs that align with every job. He does not imagine therecould be natural shoemakers, for instance, nor that there ought to be for shoemaking to be justified." More to the point for Aristotle—even in his assessment ofslavery—is the general relationship between ca— pacities and roles. In the Politics, Aristotle singles out only several human capacities: physical growth, desire or appetite, and reason. These capacities generate claims. Reason, he claims, enjoys a natu— ral superiority to the other capacities; as such, it ought to guide and constrain their exercise. The ideal relationship between reason and the passions is the subject of the Ethics, in which the virtues (courv age, generosity, pride, justice, and so on} describe the ways reason and passion wig]: bestcooperate in action. Yet this ideal relation— ship eludes most; either badly habituated or lacking in an authorita— tive rational capacity, they act out of passion in ways destructive to others. ln Aristotle's Politics this comes to be the decisive fact that governs the allocation of social roles. Those roles that most require reason ouflit to be filled by those who most completely possess it. In this way, Aristotle's hierarchical conception of human nature corresponds to an aristocratic politics, where some are coerced to occupy roles that l"fit" them regardless of what they would choose. The trouble for Aristotle was that a seemingly necessary role— slaveryhboth required reason and insulted it. The condition of slavery stunts the capacities ofthose who do not lit the role and pre— cludes living a life defined by its own ends. Thus he said it would be better if necessary tasks were done automatically—if "the shuttles would weave themselves." But in fact these taslts required self-di— recting human beings, capable at least of understanding and ertecut— ing directions. While one completely bereft of reason is incapable of doing the slave's work, possessing reason renders him unworthy of Hui WHHEAD. fi. [m7]. me W mm mllwp all 2021-12-1?m34£l. I TheJua'IlcootFi'l the conditions such work imposes. Aristotle tries to find his way out of this problem by positing an incoherent ltind of being, one who shares in human traits enough to carry out tasks yet is so lacking in rational capacity as to be inhuman. These are difficulties Aristotle creates for himself by invoking the standard of fit, which turns out to be a profoundly critical standard. Only the fact that Aristotle identifies the human soul as something independent of societybgrounded in human nature, which consists ofvarious capacities that generate their own claims—allows him to conceive that a socially beneficial division of labor is also unjust. Without such a standard rooted in an individual's claims indepen— dent of society, he could not have located any basis for questioning the system of social fit in which society's tasks are optimally carried out. At its core, personal fit is not about natural identities but gen— eral human capacities and the claims they generate. The basic in— sight is that individuals deserve something simply by virtue of the capacities they bear. In particular, they deserve that these capacities be cultivated and facilitated rather than thwarted and suffocated by the roles society offers. This basic insight is in no way specific to an aristocratic world— view, and is available—and indeed in soune sense supports—in the liberal and democratic affirmation of human equality. This affirmar tion does not say that human beings are identical land that there— fore any variation in their roles or social condition is unjust} but rather that each has a claim justice cannot overlook. To be sure, the democratic perspective is less discriminating than the aristocratic, for it distributes the claim to rule more broadly and thus elevates the capacities of self—direction and self~expression, feeling, and imagination, along with reason. But it cannot do without the basic insigit that our capacities generate claims, and that this has moral consequences for the sorts of social roles that we take to be fitting This insight, for instance, characterizes Martha Nussbaum's dis— cussion of human functioning. Broadly following Aristotle, Nuss— baum singles out a variety of facts and capacities that define the

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"human form of life": mortality, bodily necessity, sensation, cogni- tion, infant development, practical reason, affiliation, relatedness, play, and separateness.2 These involve "certain functional capaci- ties at which societies should aim for their citizens." Together they establish a minimal threshold, for without their satisfaction life "will be lacking in humanness."27 They point to a minimal thresh- old of fit that applies to human beings in general and affirms that each, from the richest to the poorest, "hath a life to live."28 Follow- ing this approach, the category of fit can be used to assess whether a role gives so little space to elemental human capacities that it fails to fit human beings in general. This is what Aristotle showed about slavery, and it is also what many claim about contemporary sweat- shop work. Other roles, too, might so deform our humanity by stunting basic human capacities that, when considered from the perspective of fit, we conclude they ought to be abolished if at all possible. Insofar as they are so useful or necessary as to make eradi- cation seem impossible, the basic standard of fit nonetheless shows them to be unjust. They offer less than any human being deserves. In such cases, the standard of fit asks that we consider some way of ameliorating the injustice, such as sharing the role or restructuring it. This minimal standard of fit is the subject of the next chapter, which investigates the problem of service work. Beyond issuing in a minimum threshold, an account of human capacities also points to a more ideal standard of fulfillment. It is one thing to satisfy those basic functions that define a human form of life but another to fully exercise the most distinctive or most cherished human capacities. Work that meets this more exalted standard is not merely acceptable but fulfilling; it is not a regretta- ble necessity so much as a good thing in itself, worthy in its own right of some devotion. All ideals, even the ideal of freedom, privi- lege certain capacities over others. Freedom particularly elevates the capacity to choose, the act through which, as John Stuart Mill says, all the other human capacities come into focus. We care about choice, for instance, in part because we think individuals are best ., & MUIRHEAD, R. (2007), Just work. Harvard University Press. n mqu on 2021-12-17 00:34:51. The Justice of Fit positioned to decide for themselves what best fits them; but we care about choice also because we hope people will decide well, that they will find and decide on roles that fit them.2 A world of choice makes fitting work more relevant rather than less, at least for those who find themselves with some latitude in their decisions. More- over, we might care that more people have more latitude in their choices from a conviction that the social world can offer some roles that are especially fitting, and that this is the basis for a worthwhile and satisfying life. In this way, consent and fit work together-each gives the other more urgency. The possibility of an excellent or opti- mal fit that goes well beyond a minimal threshold of generic hu- manness will be the subject of Chapters 5 through 8.

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s, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Don
tesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus effici

lestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congu

dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vita


lestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ips
s ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
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consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. P

cing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque dapibus efficitur laoreet. Nam risus ante, dapibus a molestie consequat, ultrices ac magna. Fusce dui lectus, congue vel laoreet ac, dictum vitae odio. Donec aliquet. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nam lacinia pulvinar tortor nec facilisis. Pellentesque d

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