1. They may seek to (1) reconcile their underlying interests, (2) determine who is right, and/or (3) determine who is more powerful.
2. Rights are rarely clear. There are often different and sometimes contradictory— standards that apply.
3. Determining who is the more powerful party without a decisive and potentially de¬structive power contest is difficult because power is ultimately a matter of perceptions.
4. Lumping it and avoidance may also occur before a claim has been made, thus fore¬stalling a dispute.
5. Satisfaction depends not only on the perceived fairness of the resolution, but also on the perceived fairness of the dispute resolution procedure.
6. Effect on the Relationship A third criterion is the long-term effect on the parties' re¬lationship.
7. The final criterion is whether a particular approach produces durable res¬olutions.
8. Sometimes one cost can be reduced only by increasing another, particularly in the short term.
9. Interests versus Rights or Power A focus on interests can resolve the problem un-derlying the dispute more effectively than can a focus on rights or power.
10. Rights versus Power Although determining who is right or who is more powerful can strain the relationship, deferring to a fair standard usually takes less of a toll than giving in to a threat.
11. Rights contests differ from power contests chiefly in their transaction costs. A power contest typically costs more in resources consumed and opportunities lost.
12. Because focusing on rights and power plays an important role in effective dispute reso¬lution, differentiating rights and power procedures on the basis of costs is useful.
13. Rights and power procedures can sometimes accomplish what interests-based procedures cannot. The problem is that rights and power procedures are often used where they are not nec¬essary.
14. We recognize that in defining rights to include both legal entitlements and generally ac¬cepted standards of fairness, we are stretching that term beyond its commonly understood meaning.
15. A court procedure may determine not only who is right but also who is more powerful, since behind a court decision lies the coercive power of the state.
16. Deception: An act or statement intended to tausleagthe opponent about the nego-tiator's own intent or future actions relevant to the negotiations.
17. Weakening the opponent: Actions or statements designed to improve the negotia-tor's own relative strength by directly undermining that of the opponent.
18. Strengthening one's own position: Actions or statements designed to improve the negotiator's own position without directly weakening that of the opponent.
19. Nondisclosure: Keeping to oneself knowledge that would benefit the opponent.
20. Information exploitation: Using information provided by the opponent to weaken
him, either in the direct exchange or by sharing it with others.
21. Change of mind: Engaging in behaviors contrary to previous statements or positions.
22. Distraction: Acts or statements that lure the opponent into ignoring information or alternatives that might benefit him.
23. Consider the dilemma of downsizing. Universalism would permit downsizing for sound economic reasons, but it would require informing all those being laid off of that decision when it is made.
24. In contrast to universalism, utilitarianism judges the rightness or wrongness of actions and decisions by their consequences.
25. Having delineated these four standards, we shall now apply them to the 10 questionable negotiation tactics, from lying to maximizing.
26. A lie is a statement made by a negotiator that contradicts his knowledge or beliefs about something material to the negotiations.
27. Puffery is exaggerating the value of something, such as its cost, condition, or worth.
28. A deception is an act or statement intended to mislead another about one's own intent or future actions relevant to the negotiations.
29. Power Negotiators know that first offers seem extreme but are only the beginning; they know that they will work their way toward a solution both sides can accept.
30. Always react with shock and surprise at the other side's proposals. The truth of the matter is that when people make a proposal to you, they are watch¬ing for your reaction.
31. What you say in the first few moments often sets the chmate of a negotiation. That's one problem I have with the way lawyers negotiate.
32. Pause to examine the crestfallen expression on the salesman's face as he slowly puts away his presentation materials.
33. The Vise is this simple little expression: "You'll have to do better than that."
34. After two decades of sales training, I am convinced that price is a bigger concern to the people selling than it is to those they're selling to. People want to pay more, not less.
35. As negotiations proceed, don't narrow the negotiation down to just one issue. If everything is resolved and the only issue left is price, then clearly, somebody has to win. and clearly, somebody does have to lose.
36. Once you're in negotiations, it's always good for you to postpone a decision and plead that you have to run the deal by some outside person with Higher Authority.
37. When you are negotiating price, don't offer to split the difference that is keeping you and the person on the other side from agreement.
38. In negotiations, you will often find that you are in complete disagreement on one issue
39. Change the people in the negotiating team. Remove any member who may have irritated the other side. Change the venue by proposing to continue over lunch or dinner.
40. Don't lay yourself open to last-minute Nibbles—some of which could negate the benefit of the deal for you.
41. There are as many specific reasons for bad outcomes in negotiations as there are in¬dividuals and deals. Yet broad classes of errors recur. In this article, I'll explore those mistakes, comparing good negotiating practice with bad.
42. Understanding your counterpart's interests and shaping the decision so the other side agrees for its own reasons is the key to jointly creating and claiming sustainable value.
43. Social psychologists have documented the difficulty most people have understand¬ing the other side's perspective.
44. Negotiators who pay attention exclusively to price turn potentially cooperative deals into adversarial ones.
45. In reality, however, most players turn down proposals that don't let tiiem share in at least 35 percent to 40 percent of the bounty—even when much larger stakes are involved and the amount they forfeit is significant.
46. The Social Contract Similarly, negotiators tend to focus on the economic contract— equity splits, cost sharing, governance, and so on—at the expense of the social contract, or the "spirit of a deal."
47. The Interests of the Full Set of Players Less experienced negotiators sometimes be¬come mesmerized by the aggregate economics of a deal and forget about the interests of players who are in a position to torpedo it.
48. A negotiator can often influence whether price will dominate or be kept in perspec¬tive. Consider negotiations between two companies trying to establish an equity joint venture.
49. Consider a dispute over a dam project Environmentalists and farmers opposed a U.S. power company's plans to build a dam.
50. Not using the pamphlets at all would damage Roosevelt's election prospects. Yet, if they went ahead, a scandal could easily erupt very close to the election, and the campaign could be liable for an unaffordable sum.
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This question was asked on Jan 03, 2013.
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