1) Suppose that A, B and C are the only people interested in an antique table being auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction.
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1) Suppose that A, B and C are the only people interested in an antique table being auctioned by a second-price

sealed-bid auction. Suppose A's value of the painting is $22,000, B's $18,000, and C's is $15,000. The values are private. What is each bidder's optimal bid? Who wins the auction and what price does she pay? What is each bidder's consumer surplus? 

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A's optimal bid is 22,000 B 's optimal bid is 18,000 C's optimal bid is 15,000 A will... View the full answer

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