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_____________________________ SID:_______________________ Tutor's Name:_______________________ Tutorial Day &amp; Time:_________________ SCHOOL OF...

I've completed the practice exam and wasn't sure if i had the right answers.Would you mind just stating the answers. eg. I think 1.A and 2. B
1 Name:_____________________________ SID:_______________________ Tutor’s Name:_______________________ Tutorial Day & Time:_________________ SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS ECONOMICS 2112 GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS STRATEGY S1 2011 MIDTERM EXAM This exam comprises of 12 pages including this cover page. There are 10 questions . Answer all 10. Questions answered correctly are worth 3 marks . Questions answered incorrectly are worth -1 mark . Questions not answered are worth 0 mark . Total time allowed: 60 minutes Report your Student ID number (SID) at the top of each page. Any evidence of dishonesty will be punished by failure and reported to the appropriate authority
SID:_________________________ 2 1. Consider the following three-player game: L C R L C R T 1,2,2 0,3,2 1,2,9 T 0,3,0 ,3,1 1,2,2 B 2,1,7 ± ,1,0 2,2,1 B 2,1,2 3,1,4 2,2,3 X Y For which values of ± and is the strategy ² weakly dominated but not strictly dominated? a) ± ³ ´ and ³ µ . b) ± ³ ³ ¶· . c) ± ³ ³ ´ . d) ± ³ ³ · . 2. A normal form game is defined by: a) A payoff matrix. b) A set of players, a strategy profile for each player, and a Bernoullian utility function for each player defined over the set of strategy profiles. c) A set of players, a strategy profile for each player, a Bernoullian utility function for each player defined over the set of strategy profiles and a Nash equilibrium. d) Two players and a matrix. 3. Let ¸ ³ ¹±º º »¼ and suppose that an agent’s preferences are characterized by a Bernoullian utility function ½¾ ¸ ¿ À that satisfies ½Á±Â ¶ ½Á Â Ã ½Á Â ¶ ½Á»Â Ã ´ . Select the correct statement. a) The agent strictly prefers the lottery Ä Å ± Æ Ä Å » to the certain outcome . b) The Bernoullian utility function Ç¾ ¸ ¿ À defined by ÇÁ±Â ³ È , ÇÁ Â ³ µ and ÇÁ»Â ³ · represents the same preferences over lotteries as ½ . c) The agent strictly prefers the lottery Ä Å Æ Ä Å » to the certain outcome ± . d) The agent is risk averse.
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