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What are the merits and drawbacks of considering states torn by violent conflict as 'failed states'? :  The case of Iraq after 2003 [22475 characters]

 

Introduction

 

In October 2019, one the largest protest movements in Iraqi history unseated the government and forced parliament to adopt a new electoral law. Until 2021, in a series of uprisings consisting of sit-ins, marches or civil disobedience, civilians protested unemployment, inefficient public services, widespread corruption and insecurity. Besides emphasizing a political system's legitimacy crisis, the riots reveal that even though Iraq is considerably better than it was ten years ago, the country is still a failed state. 

The notion of  "state failure" emerged centuries ago as a justification for powerful countries to occupy certain territories. In fact, they used it as an argument to bring "civilization" to uncouth regions. However, the academic debate on "failed states" came on the scene in the 1990's as some weak, newly independent states could not guarantee any economic, social or political stability to their population, giving away to institutional multiplicity, informal patron-client networks, corruptions, poverty and conflicts (Di John, 2008).  As a matter of course, the notion of a failed state is fundamentally linked, though opposed, to that of "sovereign states". Hence, prior to properly defining the idea of "failed states", it is necessary to define that of "state" or "sovereign state".

A "state" is usually described as "a group of domination of an institutional nature that has successfully sought to monopolize within a territory legitimate physical violence as a means of domination and for this purpose has gathered in the hands of the leaders the material means of management" (Weber, 1946). Consequently, in order to be able to exercise its legitime prerogative, a state should have a permanent population, a territory clearly defined by borders, an established government and sovereignty. 

Sovereign states are expected to meet the basic needs of their population in terms of wellbeing and security. However, those leaving their citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks, have been described as "poorly performing" or fragile". In the most extreme cases, they are qualified as "collapsed" or "failed". The concept of "failed nation-state" was first used by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner in 1993 to describe a phenomenon of by which a state is " incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community" (Helman, Ratner, 1993).This inability results in an atmosphere of "violence" and "anarchy" with negative internal and external political and security consequences such as: civil wars, corruption, economy collapse but also refugee crisis. Another definition of failed state can be that of Rotberg (2002) saying "nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens". 

While in the beginning, the concept essentially focused on African countries, the Fragile States Index 2021 powered by the Fund for Peace, show that a considerable number of failed states are located in the Middle East such as Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Libya and Iraq that are known for having a distorted development in which external factors played key roles. Among these, Iraq ranks as the 20th most fragile state, not to mention its trajectory has been positive since the creation of the Fragile States Index in 2003 when it ranked 4th. In fact, Iraq has been called "failed state" since the late 1980s when ethinic and sectarian issues erupted within the country. Moreover, the situation worsened during the 2003 military intervention which was the starting point of a number of domestic failures. As a matter of fact, the intervention and the withdrawal of the United States in Iraq show that the United States did not have any feasible plan to build a strong post-conflict Iraq and "abandoned" the country to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2011. However, despite the chaotic situation in 2003, over the course of nearly twenty years Iraqi gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) increased by 386.35 % (World Bank, 2022).

Therefore, bearing in mind that in spite of the improvement of Iraq, many scholars and political scientists continue to qualify the country a "failed state", to what extent is the notion of "failed state" relevant to describe countries  torn by violent conflict ? 

To answer the question, this paper will essentially analyze the concept of "failed states" and its limits, using Iraq as a case study. In order to achieve this we will first examine the concept of "failed states" as a mean of understanding the complexity of state fragility and its consequences on a national and international level.  Then, we will explain why this catch-all concept requires a new multidimensional approach. 

 

1. The concept of "failed states", analytical tool allowing to understand the complexity of state fragility and its consequences on national and international level.

 

1. The multiple characteristics of the "failed state" concept : a recognition of the deep-rooted causes

 

As we saw in the introduction, the concept of state failure has the particularity to cover a significant number of areas that can be responsible for state failure. In fact, unlike using terms such as "domestic conflicts", "ungoverned spaces" or "disintegration of state", when using "failed states" we recognize that the central government of a particular state does not have full control of the regalian functions and that these issues persisted over time. In the specific case of Iraq,  though the country was completely disorganized after 2003, the state was neither strong nor sovereign under Saddam Hussein, it was only functional. In fact, the country was stable on a political stage but the level of insecurity for Shia muslims, Kurdish, political opponents was high as shown by the Dujail massacre. Moreover, lack of economic diversification led to an impoverishment of the population, famine and severe economic crises after the international community imposed sanctions against Iraq  following its invasion of Kuwait. Thus, prior to the US invasion of Iraq the institutions were not reliable enough to resist a regime collapse. This helps us to understand that state fragility which often leads to state failure is a dynamic interplay between both internal and external factors. These factors can be organized between groups to give us an analytical framework to study Iraq or any fragile failed state: 1) structural and economic factors, 2) institutional characteristics, 3) social factors (Mcloughlin, 2012).

The first group concerns structural and economic factors, mainly poverty, economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, lack of natural resources and demographic stress (Mcloughlin, 2012). In fact, in any case, failed states are characterized by a conflict environment ruled by insurgents and militias that creates a vicious cycle which weakens the authority of governments and states.

The second group is about institutional factors, mostly institutional multiplicity,  neo-patrimonialism and "exclusionary elite bargains". Actually, these factors result in decline of any legitimate power by the claim of power by several small competing groups or by exclusionary access to state structures for the benefit of the elite. 

The last group of factors include every reason why the state struggles to establish social control because other social organizations apply different rules in parts of the society. It is usually characterized by a huge social, ethinic or religious fragmentation causing a polarization of the population or an absence of a strong civil society. 

 

That being said, despite an increase of Iraqi GDP over 20 years we are able to say why Iraq can be considered as a failed state using the analytical grid mentioned above. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the country suffered from a devastating civil war between 2003 and 2010 that had long lasting consequences on the economy and political sphere. While the United States ended the long ruling era of the Ba'ath party, it also created a political vacuum no other political party could fill. Therefore, apart from taking power out of the hands of Ba'ath members, the situation has allowed insurgent and minority factions to emerge, reducing the power of the central government even more, as it was the case of ISIS or Kurdistan. In fact, " Sunni tribes in Iraq began to support al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, predecessor of ISIS) due to "systematic discrimination, marginalization and a series of broken promises" on the part of the government in Baghdad" (Oosterveld, Bloem, 2017). Yet the war against ISIS in Iraq inhibits the poor recovery due to the chronic bombings destroying the majority of public infrastructures and any perspective of a long term development. Also, there is a deeper division between the Shi'ite, Sunni, and Kurdish areas and political structures (Cordesman, 2020), causing us to be pessimistic about Iraq's future. Even more, the chaotic situation of Iraq is destabilizing the surrounding countries especially Syria, making it difficult to coordinate any front action at the scale surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, how can a divided, poor and unstable country in conflict that has not seen a glimpse of peace since 1980 become a successful developing country or even recover in the short-term ?  Here Iraq encompasses almost all the characteristics used to qualify a failed state if to stick to a strict view of how a sovereign state should work. It is also of great help when it comes to organizing any international intervention since the needs and issues Irad face are clear. 

 

1. A stepping stone for coordinated efforts for state-building and nation-building?

 

Labeling countries have always been a way to classify them in the global system. Since fragile states do not belong to Weberian bureaucracies, international aid is a way to "lead them on the right path". In fact, during the last decades, the notion has gained such prominence that a large number of multilateral and bilateral actors consider it to be one of their priority agenda (Mcloughlin, 2012) . That is easily understandable knowing that within the international community states rely on each other consequently a collapse of one of them jeopardizes the entire system (Thürer, 1999). In that regard, the international community implemented a number of mechanisms to help failed states recover.

First, after 2003, at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) under the leadership of the UK delegation experts on governance and post-conflict reconstruction from the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP and the European Commission formed the Fragile States Group, which was given the task of compiling data and knowledge on fragile states and of establishing sound arguments for the inclusion of the new issue of 'fragility' in the OECD- Development Assistance Committee policy agenda. In Iraq, the efforts of the international Community to rebuild the country intensified in 2006 when the Iraqi government and United Nation created the International Compact with Iraq, a five-year plan for a new partnership between Iraq and the international community in order to help Iraq getting on the path towards economic reconstruction, peace and governance. According to the agreement, the government of Iraq would continue to receive funds under supervision of the IMF as long as the government of Iraq: "progress on political inclusion and consensus-building, on the rule of law and on the establishment of professional security forces". The government also had to commit against corruption and to respect all the principles of good governance (United Nations, 2007). Although the agreement adoption process has been speedy, the compact was financed by an existing tool, the International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq (IRFFI), has brought legitimacy to the government and has been a leverage to reduce Iraqi debt by $30 billion (Bennett, 2012). The document was also at the origin of the creation of other peacebuilding initiatives such as Iraq Joint Monitoring Matrix or the Baghdad Coordinating Group to support each ministry. The International Compact with Iraq did not reach all its goals mainly because the international community made the mistake of intervening in the context of war.

 

Nevertheless it has been more beneficial for Iraq than other programs or peace-building missions that have resulted in interference as it was the case with the United States. In fact, following the invasion of Iraq, the United States and the international community planned to create a political independent system for Iraqis before establishing a sort of neo-colonial system led by the US (Scholvin, 2011). In fact, the first nation-building attempt by the United States was the regime change concept: the United states thought it could change the entire political system, imposed new elites that adapted the western idea of democracy without creating political or social issues. The fact is, the United States was wrong and what was supposed to be a quick nation-building/state building operation, led to long interferences in Iraq. The entire process of statebuilding through the implementation of strong liberal and democratic institutions has been skipped in the very beginning, making it more difficult to promote change on a large scale and from international aid only. In light of the analytical framework described above, we can tell that a strong nation-building and state-building and state building in Iraq will go through a pacification of political and social relations, the end of sectarianism and corruption and free competition between parties (Hoop Scheffer, 2011).

 

As we have demonstrated the relevance of the notion, it is important to analyze its limits and to see how to overcome the current conception of the term failed state.

 

1. A catch all concept requiring a new multidimensional approach

 

1. An ill-defined concept reflecting a euro-centric vision of state

 

As we saw earlier, the concept of failed states is too broad for the scholars to agree on a single definition or indicators. In fact, W. Zartman tried to define the failed state using the extreme example of Somalia, while in 2006 Noam Chomsky qualified the United States as a failed state due to a lack of democracy (Gaulme, 2011).

Over the years, this has led to analytical errors that now reveal the limitations of this rhetoric. In Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids, Olivier Nay points out the major limitations of the concept listed and developed below. 

The first limitation is political labeling. As a matter of fact, the prescriptive use of 'state fragility' freezes a country in a negative way. By assigning it as "fragile", there is a snapshot associated with this State. The notion has been more fatalistic than relying on an idea of continuum. Another issue is that it happens essentially when the country threatens Western interests. The notion of a fragile state cannot be isolated from the conditions under which it emerged. It came out in the post-Cold War and 9/11 context when new development aid strategies were being developed. It was used to justify forms of interference. The concept is not really scientific but more motivated by strategic and financial concerns by Westerners. Indeed, it is interesting to see that the idea of failed states emerged almost the moment the notion of rogue states emerged. While the Clinton administration defined rogue states as a nation or state regarded as breaking international law and posing a threat to the security of other nations, a certain number of initiatives were created to solve the specific problems posed by the failed states with a unique goal: fixing failed states (Gaulme, 2011). Or, fixing failed states induced state-building and nation-building missions in a post-conflict environment that also required peace-building actions. However, state-building often follows normative standards based on Western-like statehoods that contrasts with the idea of a community-based state that persisted for centuries. In their book  "Fixing failed states", Ghani & Lockhart (2008, 124) said that "today states must fulfill their citizens' aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions" [...] states should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start "fixing ?". However, apart from the humanitarian and democratic missions, fixing failed states is also a good excuse to justify interference and military operations in a given country, as did the United States in Iraq. 

The term is also extremely Western-centric since the characteristics of failure and fragility are based on a uniform view of what should be the state. This way, it promotes a Wesphalian model, based on the idea of an independent sovereign state, that contrasts with the idea of a community-based state that persisted for centuries. To achieve that, the practices of strong states are transferred into the fragile or failed states without taking into account its history, its cultural specificities, economy or trauma. These policies result in the failure of the "fixing failed states'' actions. Furthermore, talking about failed states leads to an analytical reductionism. Indeed, the international community is so focused on building formal state institutions that non-state networks and informal economies are completely overlooked and left out. Finally, the concept lacks empirical evidence, especially concerning state fragility  and international security threats. For example, a transnational terrorist networks do not flourish only in impoverished and unstable states like Iraq but also in functioning states like Turkey (Nay, 2013). 

 

1. Towards a new dimensional approach ?

 

With the limits of the concept of failed states in mind, there is a need to go beyond this notion in order to create more universalized categories without leaving those failed and fragile states behind. If it is important to continue to study state weaknesses and capacity, it is necessary to find new precise concepts appropriate for each particular situation. For this purpose, the author Charles Call (2011), suggests the creation of three new categories in addition to the "collapsed state" category: "the weak state" (where informal networks and institutions have become the main channels of services and allocation of public resources), "the work-torn states" where the where the country is confronted with armed conflicts and extensive civil war and "the authoritarian state' where the ruling political elite retains power through the use of coercion and violence (Call, 2011). To categorize each state, Charles Call takes into account what he calls the "gaps" responsible for state fragility and the territorial variation ( the portion of the territory affected). Three gaps namely, the "capacity gap" (exists when the states are incapable of providing public services), "the security gap" (exists when the state cannot protect their people against armed groups) and the "legitimacy gap" (exists when there is no distribution of wealth). Olivier Nay (2013) on the other hand, lists areas to analyze centered on the "social vulnerabilities" of the so-called failed states. In doing so, he focuses on the historical and social factors that contribute to increased violence and the weakening or collapse of the political system and he stands out of the "the pressing policy demands".  

 

If we had to apply Nay's and Call's categories to the case of Iraq, we can identify four majors historical causes that led Iraq to this unstable situation: the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait which contributed to the weakening of Saddam Hussein's political system, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq that symbolizes a long period of interference and instability, the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive by ISIS that reinforced terrorism in the country and in the region after the creation of a califate and 2019 uprisings which shows a clear mistrust of the people towards the government. Furthermore, the FSI shows that the fragility in Iraq  in terms of public services increased  from 8.4 to 8.8 between 2020 and 2021 but also that this steep increase started back in 2015 after ISIS took control on the Northern part. Therefore, the "capacity gap" has not been filled yet. Moreover, the FSI reveals that the security in Iraq improved since 2017. In fact, the security apparatus went from 10 in 2017 to 7.9 in 2021. In addition to that other social indicators such as the refugees indicator and the external intervention indicator are also decreasing since 2017. Finally, the legitimacy of the government is improving significantly as well, given that the state legitimacy slightly decreased between 2018 when it was 9.5 and 2021 when it was 8.8. On another level, the legitimacy improved thanks to a low economic inequality score of 6.2, almost as equal as a more stable country such as Israël which is 5.9.  As a result, instead of qualifying Iraq as a failed state, it might be more appropriate to use "war-torn state" because the major issues the state and the political class face are the war against ISIS. In that regard, it might be better to support Iraq against ISIS than change its entire political system. 

 

Conclusion 

 

Through this essay, we have tried to demonstrate the implications of using the term "failed states" to describe the situation of Iraq since the 2003 United States invasion. Even if the idea of "failed states'', that describes a specific situation of a state where the government does not have control anymore, is a way for the international community to take actions, it does not have much benefits on the ground. Indeed, it appears to be too generic or not precise enough to take into account any kind or amelioration within Iraq.

 

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