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Organization Science informs Vol. 22, No. 3, May-June 2011, pp. 722-737 issn 1047-7039 eissn 1526-5455 11 2203 0722 doi 10.1287/orsc.0547 2011...

A “mini” literature review that “synthesizes” three  academic articles which together form a good support too-much-effect.  Total of THREE well-written paragraphs of approximately 150 words per paragraph. APA format. Articles attached. 

Basically, a summary of the text and the variables that lead to too-much-talent negatively affecting the sports in three paragraphs.

Organization Science Vol. 22, No. 3, May–June 2011, pp. 722–737 issn 1047-7039 ± eissn 1526-5455 ± 11 ± 2203 ± 0722 inf orms ® doi 10.1287/orsc.1100.0547 © 2011 INFORMS Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How High-Status Individuals Decrease Group Effectiveness Boris Groysberg, Jeffrey T. Polzer Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163 {[email protected], [email protected]} Hillary Anger Elfenbein Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, [email protected] C an groups become effective simply by assembling high-status individual performers? Though an af±rmative answer may seem straightforward on the surface, this answer becomes more complicated when group members bene±t from collaborating on interdependent tasks. Examining Wall Street sell-side equity research analysts who work in an industry in which individuals strive for status, we ±nd that groups bene±ted—up to a point—from having high-status members, controlling for individual performance. With higher proportions of individual stars, however, the marginal bene±t decreased before the slope of this curvilinear pattern became negative. This curvilinear pattern was especially strong when stars were concentrated in a small number of sectors, likely reflecting suboptimal integration among analysts with similar areas of expertise. Control variables ensured that these effects were not the spurious result of individual performance, department size or specialization, or ±rm prestige. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results for the literatures on status and groups, along with practical implications for strategic human resource management. Key words : group effectiveness; group dynamics; individual performance; individual status; stars History : Published online in Articles in Advance August 4, 2010. High-status individual performers are often in demand by organizations seeking to gain a competitive edge. It is easy to understand the intuition that more stars must be better when it comes to performance, given the potential task contributions and enhanced prestige that high-status stars bring to their groups. This intuition is apparently widespread given the bidding wars for star individual players by groups in many domains, including consulting ±rms, sports teams, academic departments, boards of directors, start-up businesses, and investment banks. Advocates of this approach devote their attention to assembling the best possible collection of top-notch individual performers, assuming that the group is well on its way to succeeding once the best and brightest are on board (Boynton and Fischer 2005). This approach undoubtedly has merit; when group effectiveness is partly a function of individual contributions, it should help to have highly talented individuals (West 1994). Beyond contributing to the group’s task performance, individual stars may also directly enhance the group’s perceived standing in the eyes of external constituents (Goode 1978). For groups that work on tasks with subjective and ambiguous effectiveness criteria, success often depends on the perceptions of customers, clients, bosses, lenders, shareholders, governmental agencies, and other external stakeholders (Hackman 2002). On the surface, the “more is better” approach to assembling high-status performers sounds eminently reasonable. Yet, some people question the headlong rush to acquire more stars by groups striving to out- perform their competitors (O’Reilly and Pfeffer 2000). In contexts where people need to collaborate to some degree to perform interdependent tasks, a major con- cern is that high-status individuals may have trouble working together (Overbeck et al. 2005, Tiedens and Fragale 2003). Stars have expectations and egos that may impede their willingness to share information, cooper- ate, make joint decisions, and engage in related inte- grative behaviors that help them perform interdependent tasks (Hambrick 1994). From this viewpoint, the per- ceived effectiveness of a group of high-status, interde- pendent stars may sometimes be less than the sum of its parts. An additional worry is the possibility that once a group has some stars, there will be decreasing returns to adding more stars, making the premium compensation demanded by stars a poor investment for the group. This decreasing return could apply to performance on some group tasks as well as the enhanced prestige that stars bring to groups. The purpose of this study is to formulate and test hypotheses about the ef±cacy of assembling star individ- ual performers in the hopes of increasing group effec- tiveness. In the next sections, we theoretically situate the current study and then develop speci±c hypotheses about how group composition in terms of members’ sta- tus influences perceived group effectiveness. In doing so, 722
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Groysberg, Polzer, and Elfenbein: How High-Status Individuals Decrease Group Effectiveness Organization Science 22(3), pp. 722–737, © 2011 INFORMS 723 we draw connections between the literatures on individ- ual status and group functioning that have been largely overlooked. We test these hypotheses on a sample of analysts belonging to Wall Street equity research depart- ments, contributing empirical evidence that supports our hypotheses. Theoretical Background Our ±rst order of business in theoretically situating this study is to employ a relatively broad construal of what constitutes a group, de±ning it as a social aggregate in which members are mutually aware of their shared mem- bership and of their potential for interaction (McGrath 1984). We draw on Hackman’s (2002, p. 23) widely used de±nition of group effectiveness, which holds as its ±rst criterion that “the productive output of the team (that is, its product, service, or decision) meets or exceeds the standards of quantity, quality, and time- liness of the team’s clients—the people who receive, review, or use the output.” In the groups we study, as in many groups, members produce both individual and joint output, as we describe in the next section. Rather than restrict our study solely to groups with high levels of task interdependence, we make use of naturally occur- ring variation in interdependence and group composition to test how these factors contribute to group effective- ness, as perceived by the clients who use the group’s output. Interdependence among the members of a group can vary by type and amount. One important dimension is task interdependence, which Thompson (1967) character- ized as either pooled (members perform task components separately and in any sequence), sequential (members perform task components separately but in a speci±c sequence), or reciprocal (members perform task compo- nents that depend on inputs from other members, and vice versa). Others have modi±ed and added to these types, but most de±nitions and typologies are in agree- ment that the greater the task interdependence among group members, the greater the need for members to inte- grate their work, and the greater the potential for the group to bene±t from collaboration (Wageman 2001). When task components are interdependent, it is impor- tant to consider the collaborative behaviors that con- tribute to accomplishing those tasks. In formulating our hypotheses, we employ the theoretical concept of “behavioral integration,” which is “the degree to which the group engages in mutual and collective interac- tion” (Hambrick 1994, p. 171). Hambrick (1994) argued that even groups that are not highly cohesive, tight-knit “teams”—such as many top management groups or, in the present case, groups of research analysts—still have the potential to bene±t from engaging in rich, timely, and accurate information exchange, collaborative behav- ior, and joint decision making. For groups that perform interdependent tasks, the composition of group members can influence their abil- ity to integrate their work. Researchers have conducted numerous studies of group composition, including some that examine group members’ individual skills and abil- ities (West and Allen 1997) along with others that test the consequences of functional and demographic diver- sity (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Missing from this literature, however, is research on how the status of individual members—an integral dimension of group composition—influences perceived group effectiveness. This is a particularly striking omission given the impor- tance placed on individual status by those in organiza- tions (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). Our study attempts to ±ll this gap. Fortunately, many researchers have studied the antecedents and consequences of individual status, giv- ing us an abundance of work on which to build our hypotheses. Indeed, scholars in this domain consider the striving for status to be a universal motive (Hogan and Hogan 1991). We de±ne individual status as “the amount of respect, influence, and prominence” people enjoy in the eyes of others (Anderson et al. 2001, p. 117). Researchers have investigated the antecedents of high individual status, such as individual performance, per- sonality, and attractiveness (Anderson et al. 2001), and the individual-level consequences of high status, includ- ing personal well-being and control over resources (e.g., Adler et al. 2000). A distinction has been drawn between global and local status, whereby people’s global status ranking in a larger collective, such as an industry or ±eld, may differ from their local status ranking in a smaller, embedded group, such as an organization or department (Magee and Galinsky 2008, Blau 1964). Global status is likely to be widely known by a broad range of peo- ple compared to local status, which is often of greatest concern only to those in the local group. Another impor- tant distinction is that status hierarchies can be explicitly demarcated and governed by clear rules, so that the sta- tus ranking is consensually understood (Blau and Scott 1962) or implicitly constructed and de±ned by people’s subjective interpretations (Schmid Mast and Hall 2004). When individuals join a group, they tend to be concerned with their local status relative to their fellow members (Bendersky and Hays 2010), causing group members to strive to organize themselves, explicitly or implicitly, into a local status hierarchy that is influenced in part by mem- bers’ standing on dimensions of global status (Berger et al. 1972, Magee and Galinsky 2008, Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). We develop theoretical logic to predict how the com- position of a group, in terms of the global status held by individual members, should influence perceived group effectiveness. To do so, we focus conceptually on two mechanisms through which the global status of the indi- viduals who comprise a group should have an impact.
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INTERNAL STATUS SORTING IN GROUPS: THE PROBLEM OF TOO MANY STARS Jennifer R. Overbeck, Joshua Correll and Bernadette Park ABSTRACT Social and task groups need a few high-status members who can be lead- ers and trend setters, and many more lower-status members who can follow and contribute work without challenging the group’s direction (Caporael (1997). Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 276– 298; Caporael & Baron (1997). In: J. Simpson, & D. Kenrick (Eds), Evolutionary social psychology (pp. 317–343). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; Brewer (1997). In: C. McGarty, & S.A. Haslam (Eds), The message of social psychology: Perspectives on mind in society (pp. 54– 62). Malden, MA: Blackwell). When groups come together without a priori status differentiation, a status hierarchy must be implemented; however, if the new members are too homogeneously status seeking, then it is not clear what will result. We argue that hierarchy will develop even in uniformly status-seeking groups, and that the social context and mem- bers’ relational characteristics – specifically, the degree to which they are group oriented rather than self-serving – will predict which status seekers succeed in gaining status. We discuss why and how a ‘‘status sorting’’ 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 3B2v8 : 06a = w ð Dec 5 2003 Þ : 51c XML:ver:5 : 0 : 1 RMGT : 7008 Prod : Type: pp : 171 2 202 ð col : fig : :NIL Þ - 9/5/05 17:20 Status and Groups Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Volume 7, 171–202 Copyright r 2005 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1534-0856/doi:10.1016/S1534-0856(05)07008-8 171
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1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 process will occur to award status to a few members and withhold it from most, and the consequences of this process for those who are sorted downward. When people enter a new group, they carry expectations about the roles and status that they will occupy. In many cases, these prior expectations may be a problem. Specifically, when too many entering members all expect to have higher status in the group, then what happens? Can all the members simply form a super status ‘‘dream team,’’ or will the group instead Fnd a way of sorting the members so that there is a range of member statuses? In many modern groups, new members have some sense of what their status will be, even as they Frst enter the group. ±or example, when a new player is drafted by a major league baseball team, cues such as salary and press coverage communicate quite clearly how the player ranks among his teammates, at least according to management and outside observers. These cues suggest that the best players will have the highest status. But we can also argue that status will be determined according to group needs, and as such the individual’s status may look very different when observed from within the group. On the baseball team, we might Fnd that there is an extremely competent hitter who lacks social skills and has low status be- cause he is not seen as a good ‘‘team player.’’ The players themselves may grant status to another person who is more congenial. 1 In other groups, it is not clear upon entry how much status an individual member will have. Among newly recruited classes of Frst-year associates in law Frms and consulting Frms, and students in MBA programs and other graduate programs, 2 there are often no differences in titles or overt cues such as salary. Even though diagnostic differences will likely exist, they may be on a number of different dimensions (one student receives more fellow- ship support; another went to a more prestigious school; a third has the most personal income) and it may be harder to combine these into a clear, unidimensional ranking of status. Groups that are new or ad hoc may be likely to lack clarity in how status will be assigned and who will hold it within the group. In these settings, members must negotiate the rankings, implicitly or explicitly, in order to establish a status hierarchy. This chapter is concerned with just such problems. When individuals, particularly those who seek or expect high status, join a group, the group must negotiate the internal process of assigning or withholding status. What happens in a group without a formal status conferring mechanism when too JENNI±ER R. OVERBECK ET.AL 172
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http://pss.sagepub.com/ Psychological Science http://pss.sagepub.com/content/25/8/1581 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0956797614537280 2014 25: 1581 originally published online 27 June 2014 Psychological Science Roderick I. Swaab, Michael Schaerer, Eric M. Anicich, Richard Ronay and Adam D. Galinsky Enough The Too-Much-Talent Effect: Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Association for Psychological Science can be found at: Psychological Science Additional services and information for http://pss.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://pss.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: What is This? - Jun 27, 2014 OnlineFirst Version of Record - Aug 6, 2014 Version of Record >> at COLUMBIA UNIV on September 3, 2014 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from at COLUMBIA UNIV on September 3, 2014 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from
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Psychological Science 2014, Vol. 25(8) 1581 –1591 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797614537280 pss.sagepub.com Research Article I have players playing in Ligue 1, others in big clubs playing in the Champions League. The more I have, the better it is. —French national-team coach Didier Deschamps, denying that the crux of his team’s poor performance during the World Cup qualification stage was a lack of talent (FIFA, 2013) Didier Deschamps’s quote reflects a widely held belief that top-talented individuals are the key to performance of teams, organizations, and even entire societies. This faith in the power of higher and higher levels of talent to produce ever-better performance drives groups to fiercely compete to attract the most talented individuals. Surveys across industries and countries find that organizations identify talent attraction as their top priority (Chambers, Foulon, Handfield-Jones, Hanklin, & Michaels, 1998; Ready & Conger, 2007). These practices are presumably based on the belief that more talent is better, and that the relationship between talent and team performance is lin- ear and monotonic. The current research tested the valid- ity of this widely held intuition. Does bringing together the most talented individuals always produce the best performance? We propose that these widespread intuitions about tal- ent and team performance are not uniformly accurate. Specifically, we argue that more talent often facilitates team performance—but only up to a point. Beyond this point, the marginal benefits of more talent will decrease and eventually turn into detriments. That is, at some point there will be too much talent, which will impair 537280 PS X X 10.1 7 /0956797614537280Swa b et al. Top Talent in Teams research-article 2014 Corresponding Author: Roderick I. Swaab, Boulevard de Constance 77305, Fontainebleau, France E-mail: [email protected] The Too-Much-Talent Effect: Team Interdependence Determines When More Talent Is Too Much or Not Enough Roderick I. Swaab 1 , Michael Schaerer 1 , Eric M. Anicich 2 , Richard Ronay 3 , and Adam D. Galinsky 2 1 Organisational Behaviour Area, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France; 2 Management Department, Columbia University; and 3 Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam Abstract Five studies examined the relationship between talent and team performance. Two survey studies found that people believe there is a linear and nearly monotonic relationship between talent and performance: Participants expected that more talent improves performance and that this relationship never turns negative. However, building off research on status conflicts, we predicted that talent facilitates performance—but only up to a point, after which the benefits of more talent decrease and eventually become detrimental as intrateam coordination suffers. We also predicted that the level of task interdependence is a key determinant of when more talent is detrimental rather than beneficial. Three archival studies revealed that the too-much-talent effect emerged when team members were interdependent (football and basketball) but not independent (baseball). Our basketball analysis also established the mediating role of team coordination. When teams need to come together, more talent can tear them apart. Keywords cooperation, social interaction, open materials Received 12/7/13; Revision accepted 4/19/14 at COLUMBIA UNIV on September 3, 2014 pss.sagepub.com Downloaded from
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Running Head: TOO MUCH TALE EFFECT Too-much-talent effect:
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TOO-MUCH-TALENT EFFECT Too-much-talent effect develops in light of the fact that status...

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