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EXERCISE 6 I C R. U 5 , 7 / 8 , 2 | 3 , 4 M | 2 , 1 | 0 , 2 | 4 , 3 D | 4 , 0 | 6 , 2 | 2 , 5 Consider the two-player simultaneous - move game

Screen Shot 2019-05-02 at 2.31.40 PM.pngPlease answer all of the parts to the question, thanks!

Screen Shot 2019-05-02 at 2.31.40 PM.png

EXERCISE 6
I
C
R.
U
5 , 7 / 8 , 2 | 3 , 4
M | 2 , 1 | 0 , 2 | 4 , 3
D | 4 , 0 | 6 , 2 | 2 , 5
Consider the two-player simultaneous - move game defined by the above payoff ma-
trix . Player I has pure strategies\ U], [ MJ , and [ D] , and Player 2 has pure strategies
, [C) , and [ R ] .
( 1 ) Are there pure strategies for Player I and Player 2 which are strictly dominated
by some other pure strategies ? If so , which ones and which strategies dominate
them ?
( 2 ) Find all pure- strategy Nash equilibria of this game .
( 3 ) In addition to the equilibria you found in part ( 2 ) , find all mixed- strategy Nash
equilibria of this game .

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