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2. Agents 1 and 2 plan to arrive at an event. Each of them can arrive at any of the times
in T = {0, 1, . .., 10}. If agent i E {1, 2} arrives at to and agent j # i arrives at t;,
then the payoff of agent i is
ui(t1, t2) =
[ 2 - (ti - t;)2, ifti <t;
-(ti - t;)2 otherwise.
Carry out Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS). Which strat-
egy profiles survive IESDS ?

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The strategy profile where... View the full answer

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