"What Makes a Public Leader?" Based on the e-Activity articles, please respond to the following:
•Analyze how the articles shed light on the paradigm shift in our definition of a public leader.
•Speculate and explain how the models and/or theories of leadership have influenced public leaders during the Carter, Clinton, Bush, and now Obama administrations
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•Analyze how the articles shed light on the paradigm shift in our definition of a public leader.
•Speculate and explain how the models and/or theories of leadership have influenced public leaders during the Carter, Clinton, Bush, and now Obama administrations
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Public Administration Review • September/October 2003, Vol. 63, No. 5
Arjen Boin
Leiden University
Paul ‘t Hart
Utrecht University
Public Leadership in Times of Crisis:
Mission Impossible?
Crisis management (prevention, preparedness, response, and reconstruction) is a tough task for
political and bureaucratic leaders. This article documents the persistent tensions between the
expectations and realities of crisis leadership. It explores the popular notion that crises provide
key opportunities for reform. The very occurrence of a crisis is then thought to expose the status
quo as problematic, making it easier to gain momentum for alternative policies and institutions.
We argue that the opportunities for reform in the wake of crisis are smaller than often thought.
The prime reason is that the requisites of crisis leadership are at odds with the requirements of
effective reform.
Crisis: A Window for Leadership?
In the days following September 11, 2001, President
Bush saw his domestic approval ratings and international
standing soar to unprecedented levels. Similarly, New York
mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s
Zivilkourage
during the first days
of the World Trade Center tragedy propelled him back into
the folk-hero status he once had enjoyed when taking the
mayoral office on the wings of his crime-fighting reputa-
tion; gone was his image as a weary politician wounded
by scandal. Their personal reputations boosted, both lead-
ers were able to muster strong political and societal sup-
port for the drastic measures and budget claims they pro-
posed in response to the crisis.
President Bush’s favorable position in the initial phase
of the national crisis mirrors that of former president Jimmy
Carter. In 1979, Carter enjoyed a wave of leader-focused
patriotism when U.S. embassy personnel were kidnapped
in Tehran; the wave crested and broke with Carter’s inabil-
ity to bring his people home. Eleven months into the unre-
solved hostage crisis, Carter was badly defeated by Ronald
Reagan in the presidential elections.
The New York mayor can look across the Atlantic for a
similar anecdote. In 1992, an El-Al Boeing 747 crashed into
the suburbs of Amsterdam. Mayor Van Thijn directed the
city’s popular “caring government” response—victims were
assured long-term support. The response came to haunt the
city administration years later when victims had lost this
promised government support. An ensuing parliamentary
investigation in 1999 tarnished the government’s reputation
and even threatened the survival of the national coalition.
Crisis and leadership are closely intertwined phenom-
ena. People experience crises as episodes of threat and
uncertainty, a grave predicament requiring urgent action
(Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). It is a natural incli-
nation in such distress to look to leaders to “do some-
thing.” When crisis leadership results in reduced stress
and a return to normality, people herald their “true lead-
ers.” Successful performance in times of collective stress
turns leaders into statesmen. But when the crisis fails to
dissipate and “normality” does not return, leaders are ob-
vious scapegoats.
Arjen Boin
is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administra-
tion at Leiden University. He publishes on crisis management, institutional
design, correctional management, and leadership. He is the coeditor of
Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities
(Charles C. Thomas,
2001) and author of
Crafting Public Institutions: Leadership in Two Prison
Systems
(Lynne Rienner, 2001).
Email: [email protected]
Paul ‘t Hart
is a professor of public administration at Utrecht University and
associate professor of public management at the Swedish Defence College
in Stockholm. Among his books are
Understanding Policy Fiascoes
(Transac-
tion, 1996),
Beyond Groupthink
(University of Michigan Press, 1997) and
Success and Failure in Public Governance
(Elgar, 2001).
Email: [email protected]
fsw.leidenuniv.nl.
Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?
545
The challenge to “bring things back to normal” is com-
pounded by the sense of opportunity that often accompanies
a crisis. It is a widely held notion that crisis generates a win-
dow of opportunity for reforming institutional structures and
long-standing policies (Kingdon 1984; Keeler 1993). This
“crisis-reform thesis” suggests that, in order to be effective
reformers, leaders should avoid being tainted by crises and
simultaneously exploit their dynamic potential.
1
We argue that the requirements of crisis management
are inherently incompatible with the requisites for effec-
tive reform.
2
Our argument unfolds in three stages. First,
we set out the changing nature of the crises that beset
today’s governments. Second, we show the difficulty of
managing these crises in the face of popular expectations.
Third, we assert that effective crisis management is at odds
with effective reform strategies.
The Transformation of Crises and Crisis
Consciousness: Leadership Challenges
Crisis management has never been easy. Organizational
chaos, media pressure, stress, and inaccurate information
are but a few factors that make it very hard for crisis lead-
ers to make sound decisions. Changes in the nature and
context of contemporary crises render these decisions
nearly elusive. Certainly, the classic contingencies—natu-
ral disasters, industrial accidents, violent political conflict,
and public disorder—continue to menace us. But when they
transpire on our modern world stage, their sociopolitical
impact affects more players than ever before.
The modern crisis is increasingly complex. It is not spa-
tially confined by common boundaries; it entangles quickly
with other deep problems, and its impact is prolonged
(Rosenthal 1998; ‘t Hart and Boin 2001). The modern cri-
sis is the product of several modernization processes—glo-
balization, deregulation, information and communication
technology, developments and technological advances, to
name but a few. These advances promote a close-knit world
that is nonetheless susceptible to infestation by a single
crisis. Comparatively slight mishaps within these massive
and intricate infrastructures can rapidly escalate in unfore-
seen ways (Perrow 1999).
A prime example can be found in the European food
and agriculture sector. One animal was diagnosed with foot-
and-mouth disease in a remote English farm and, within
days, the disease had affected all of Europe. Farmers,
slaughterhouses, distributors, butcheries, consumers, in-
spection agencies, policy makers, and politicians endured
enormous economic and social-psychological costs. A
week later, the world had installed precautionary measures
to resist the disease. Canada, Japan, Mexico, Australia—
all were on alert, and not without reason. Open interna-
tional borders permit both economic growth and epidemic
proliferation, and so, too, invite massive flows of illegal
migration. Epidemiologists warn of resistant killer viruses
whose destructive impact is magnified by the enhanced
global mobility of people, goods, and animals (Garret
1994). Modern crises are no longer confined to their site
of origin.
Equally important is the cognitive and sociocultural
context of contemporary crises. After decades of compla-
cence, there is a growing sense of vulnerability. Unease
prevails, even though memories of world war have faded,
communism has died, political terrorism has decreased,
and the modern state has proven a reliable and effective
custodian. Highly prosperous countries in Western Europe
have experienced more rather than fewer disasters and dis-
turbances in the last decade. As this is being written,
America and the West are still reeling from the September
11 attacks and the consuming war on terrorism they un-
leashed. Scientists issue warnings of many other global
threats—medical, ecological, technological, and biologi-
cal. The net result of these combined assaults on the public’s
peace of mind has been a renewed concern with risk and
vulnerability (Beck 1992).
Many citizens are wary of crises; at the same time, they
are naive about the intricacies of crises. Citizens expect to
be safeguarded by their state; the idea that wholesale crisis
cannot be prevented comes as a shock. That crises are not
exclusively the fault of exogenous forces does little to rec-
oncile public frustration. Postmortem investigations often
unveil erroneous policies or bureaucratic mismanagement.
This erosion of public trust in the capability of state insti-
tutions to perform their classic custodian functions is ac-
companied by increasingly assertive and tenacious media
coverage of risks, disasters, and other critical events. The
aftermath of today’s crises tends to be as intense and con-
tentious as the acute crisis periods are, with leaders put
under pressure by streams of informal investigations, pro-
active journalism, insurance claims, and juridical (includ-
ing criminal) proceedings against them. Leadership in the
face of this sort of adversity is, in short, precarious.
Leadership Issues
Given the nature of modern crises and their ensuing dis-
ruption, it is best to reassess our understanding of leader-
ship in modern crises. First and foremost, we should aban-
don the notion that crises are events that are neatly
delineated in time and space (Rosenthal 1998). Instead,
we need to treat crises as extended periods of high threat,
high uncertainty, and high politics that disrupt a wide range
of social, political, and organizational processes. Crises
are dynamic and chaotic processes, not discrete events se-
quenced neatly on a linear time scale. A crisis may smol-
der, flare up, wind down, flare up again, depending as much
on the pattern of physical events as on the framing and
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