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# 1. (20 points) Consider the following signaling game. The players are 1 and 2. Nature chooses player I's type. Then player 1 chooses Left or Right....

This question was created from PS135_Quiz6.pdf https://www.coursehero.com/file/28088137/PS135-Quiz6pdf/

3 is in 2 parts

1. (20 peinta) Ceneider the following aignaling game. The players are 1
and 2. Nature eheeeea player 1’: type. Then player 1 eheeaea Left er Right. Then player 2 ebeervea player l’a rueye (but net type} and
eheeaea Up er Dewn. [2, 2} (3, 4] [319) (1:1) I. P (111} (2:1) I'I'r-&quot;I'I' [1, 2) (2, 2] (a) What ia the type apaee and eet ef pure atrategim fer player 1?
(b) What ia the type apaee and eat at pure atrategiea fer player 2'? (e) What are the pemihle separating pure etrategiea for player 1'?
What are the peaaihle peeling pure atrategiea fer player 1'? [{1} la there a aeparatieg perfect Bayeacian equilibrium?
(e) la there a peeling perfeet Bayeaian equilibrium?

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